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A b s t r a c t
In the offshore oil and gas industry in the UK, one of the most common forms of structure is the 
fixed steel jacket type of offshore platform. These are highly redundant structures subject to many 
random or uncertain factors. In particular, they are subject to uncertainties in the load distribution 
through the components, and to time-varying and cyclic loads leading to deterioration through 
fatigue. Operators are required to ensure the integrity of these structures by carrying out periodic 
inspections and repairing when necessary.
Decisions on inspection, repair and maintenance (IRM) actions on structures involves making use 
of various tools and can be a complex problem. Traditionally, engineering judgement is employed 
to schedule inspections and deterministic analyses are used to confirm decisions. The use of 
structural reliability methods may lead to more rational scheduling of IRM actions. Applying 
structural reliability analysis to the production of rational inspection strategies, however, requires 
understanding the inspection procedure and making use of the appropriate information on 
inspection techniques. There are difficulties in collecting input data and the interpreted results 
need to be combined to form a rational global solution for the structure which takes into account 
practical constraints.
The development of a knowledge base system (KBS) for reliability based inspection scheduling 
(RISC) provides a way of making use of complex quantitative objective analyses for scheduling. 
This thesis describes the development of a demonstrator RISC KBS. The general problems of 
knowledge representation and scheduling are discussed and schemes from Artificial Intelligence 
are proposed. Additionally, a system for automated inspection is described and its role in IRM of 
platforms is considered.
A RISC System integrating suitable databases with fatigue fracture mechanics based reliability 
analysis within a KBS framework will enable operators to develop rational IRM scheduling 
strategies.
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1 In t r o d u c t io n
This thesis presents a solution to the problem of rational inspection planning for steel jacket 
structures in the offshore oil and gas industry. The approach is based on structural reliability 
analysis which is now known as reliability-based inspection scheduling fo r  fixed  offshore platforms 
(RISC), and is encapsulated in computer software with a knowledge base system architecture.
1.1 Ba ckground
The application of reliability methods in the design and maintenance of offshore structures has 
been developed only relatively recently. For many reasons, such as the degradation of existing 
platforms and the requirement to be able to extend the life of some of these in order that satellites 
may be attached for the purposes of horizontal drilling, there is now a need to be able to analyse 
the reliability of such stmctures more rigorously.
One problem facing engineers is the maintenance of stmctures and in particular in carrying out 
inspections. Solving the decision-making problem of when, where and how to carry out inspection 
actions, involves using various tools. Traditionally, and in most industries, engineering judgement 
is employed to make decisions on maintenance strategies and inspection schedules for stmctures, 
and deterministic analyses are used to confirm these decisions.
In the offshore oil and gas industry in the UK, one of the most common forms of stmcture is the 
fixed steel jacket type of offshore platform. These are highly redundant and are subject to many 
random or uncertain factors, such as uncertainties in the load distribution through the components 
and in particular, to time-varying and cyclic loads and so to fatigue. Conventional reliability 
assessment of these stmctures is not always feasible, due to the complexity of the problem. 
Instead, use can be made of reliability analysis techniques recently developed specifically for 
complex stmctures, based on simplifications of the functions describing failure.
Another real problem lies in applying this analysis to the production of rational inspection 
strategies. Planning and scheduling requires understanding the inspection procedure and making 
use of the appropriate information on inspection techniques.
Finally, the difficulties in collecting input data for the analysis and of interpretation of the results 
remain. The interpreted results must then be combined to form a rational global solution for the 
stmcture which takes into account constraints which may not have been included, neither implicitly 
nor explicitly, into the analysis. Thus to provide rational IRM schedules, it is necessary to consider
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developing complete systems that will aid in carrying out analysis and interpreting the results in 
light of external information.
The problem of being able to process and use correctly all required data and information could be 
a major factor in limiting the use of what ought to be widely available information for improved 
scheduling of inspection for fixed offshore platforms. Some information is very recent and many 
models and analysis methods are relatively new. Therefore the analytical tools are not easy to use 
as there is little documentation and, more importantly, little expertise to exploit the information and 
the techniques within operator organisations. On the other hand, a platform may have been 
designed in an earlier time when more primitive information and methods were applied, and as a 
result not all required data on the structure may be available. Information overload is also a 
problem. Often there is too much data and information to be taken into account, and this alone can 
make it difficult for the operator to make full and rational use of it.
The development of a knowledge base system (KBS) for RISC provides a solution to the above 
issues. KBS technology was developed precisely in an attempt to provide a computer framework 
for the use of little documented and extensive information.
The work carried out for this thesis is the application of knowledge base systems to the problem 
of reliability-based inspection scheduling for fixed offshore structures. Such systems will enable 
operators to develop rational inspection, repair and maintenance (IRM) scheduling strategies.
1.2 H isto r y  of  O ffshore Structures
The birth of the oil industry was in 1859, when the first drilling structure was erected in Titusville, 
Pennsylvania, USA. In 1896, the first offshore drilling occurred in Summerland, California: piers 
extending from the coastline provided the base for drilling to take place. A wooden platform was 
used in Lake Ferry, Louisiana, in 1909. The two first steel structures were installed in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 1947, in 5.5m and 7m of water. These were constructed completely offshore: small 
pilings of varying sizes and depths were driven into the seabed and on a construction barge, 
horizontal braces were cut to fit. By 1948, prefabricated sections of substructures were employed. 
This development was followed in the 1950s by the advent of onshore préfabrication of complete 
substructures, that is, templates or jackets, which were placed upright on to the seabed and piles 
were then driven through the legs into the seabed.
Gas was discovered at Groningen in Holland in 1959 and this marked the start of the search for gas 
and oil in the North Sea. The first offshore structure was installed in 1966 for gas production in
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the Viking Field, which was only 17m  deep. This was followed by the discovery of oil in 1969. 
The industry has been marked by rapid technological development and hence in 1974, installation 
of a platform in the much deeper Forties field (130 m) was carried out and was followed in 1975 
by the start of large scale production of oil. By 1988, drilling started in the Troll Field in depths 
greater than 300 m. Over 100 steel structures were installed in the North Sea by 1989.
Fixed steel platforms are limited to a maximum water depth o f approximately 400 m. Because of 
this limitation, other form of stmctures such as tension leg platforms and guyed towers have largely 
superceded them in recent years. Nevertheless, jacket platforms still represent a major economic 
investment which requires protection. In addition, in many fields, platforms are coming to the end 
of their design life but some are still required in order to exploit small outlying fields, and these 
stmctures may, in some cases, require some top-side modifications.
1.3 M otivation
Jacket type steel offshore platforms can be very large and heavy stmctures. The jacket of a typical 
stmcture is the shell framework which supports the deck and topside modules for accommodation, 
drilling and production. A typical jacket stmcture is shown in Figure 1.1. The basic framework 
or jacket is fabricated from steel cylindrical members, where the horizontal members may be up 
to 1.5 m in diameter and the vertical members up to 3.5 m in diameter. The nodes (see Figure 1.2), 
or the intersections of the members, can be simple T configurations with one brace joined at right- 
angles to a main member or chord, or highly complex with many braces joined at the same point 
of a chord.
It has been found that the weakest part of these stmcmres is the node points, that is, the welded 
connections between two members. Defects in the weld introduced during constmction are 
difficult to identify and even when a weld can be said to be defect-free, it is in this area where 
cracks frequently appear. Hence it is at the welded connections at the nodes where much routine 
inspection for fatigue crack growth is aimed. The mechanism behind the growth of cracks and the 
problems in identifying defects are described in more detail in Chapter 2.
Underwater inspection is a dangerous and costly exercise. Resources, such as work force and time 
availability of equipment, are highly constrained. In particular, in areas such as the North Sea, 
weather conditions mean that diving can only take place during a short part of the summer. In 
addition, the planning of routine weld inspections is carried out against a background of guidelines 
and regulations dictating the proportion of the stmcture which must be inspected and the intervals
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between inspections and methods to be employed. Regulatory bodies, however, may allow 
offshore operators flexibility in their planning if a thorougn technical justification for their 
schedules is given. Such a justification requires detailed analysis of the structure.
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Figure 1.1 A typical jacket type platform (from Drawe and Reiffel, 1986)
A  jacket platform is typically a highly redundant structure. This redundancy occurs for two 
reasons. During the manufacturing process, the structure lies on its side and hence members are 
required for ‘horizontal’ loads as well as for the final vertical dead loads. Additionally, 
redundancy is also introduced in following a fail-safe design approach, that is, should one member 
fail, the load may be redistributed to other members, until repair can take place. Although 
redundancy adds to the overall reliability of the structure, it also makes the structure more difficult 
to analyse.
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Besides the sheer structural complexity, modelling realistically the loads applied to the structure 
is an added problem. Thus, the structural and stress analysis of nodes and joints can be complex. 
Detailed analyses based on the finite element method, for instance, are time-consuming and input 
models can be very difficult to define correctly. Analyses based on parametric equations, which 
encapsulate empirical knowledge of the behaviour of the node, are simpler to carry out, but the 
appropriate choice of equations must be made and the results carefully interpreted. Thus, the 
provision of a sufficient case for reduced or at least flexible schedules can introduce difficulties.
K-2 K*3
Figure 1.2 Typical node configurations fo r  jacket type platforms
Finally, legislation and guidelines are being directed towards improved safety (Lang, 1990). There 
were few fatalities in the oil and gas industry until 1988: from 1976 to 1987 the average number 
of fatal accidents was of the order of 10 per year. In 1988, however, three accidents overshadowed 
the safety record of the industry. The Piper Alpha platform was destroyed by fire in July and 167 
people were killed. The Ocean Odyssey rig was damaged also by fire in September, causing one 
death. A Shell oi 1-storage vessel broke free from its moorings in December. These accidents led 
to pressure on the government to apply higher safety requirements on operators.
The main motivating factor behind rational inspection and evaluation of structures is to confirm 
the continuing safety of the platform concerned, while not incurring excessive costs. A secondary 
factor, which is beginning to be ever more important, is the need to demonstrate the feasibility of 
life extension of jacket platforms.
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1.4 Glossary
The following table defines terms as used within this document. Italicised words refer to other 
terms in the table. Wherever a reference is made to a country, e.g. (UK), this is meant to show that 
the information is relevant to that country and may not be for other countries.
Action A general term for any action (inspection, repair, etc.) to be carried 
out on the structure. Expected required resources (time, techniques, 
labour, etc.) are associated with each action.
Analysis module Any external analysis software to be used by the RISC system. For 
example, COMREL (component reliability analysis), SYSREL 
(system reliability analysis), ULDAN (loading analysis software), 
FAFRAM and FACTS (two fatigue analysis crack growth 
programs), which were combined into one Component Fatigue 
Analysis (CFA) module, and the main program RISCREL, which is 
CFA, COMREL and SYSREL integrated into one reliability-based 
fatigue fracture mechanics analysis software for tubular joints. 
Analysis modules in the RISC system are regarded as knowledge 
sources and the creation of input files, running of the software and 
interpretation of output files are controlled by the RISC System.
As-installed data The design data updated with the results from the first post­
installation inspections.
B race A tubular member welded to another. It is cut to fit the geometry of 
the uncut member and other braces at the same intersection or node.
C hord A tubular member on to which other tubular members, the braces, 
are welded. It is the uncut member at the intersection point or node.
Concept An item of knowledge relating to a class of objects, an object itself, 
or an abstract notion, stored in a knowledge base. Knowledge 
sources act on the data in a concept to provide more data for the 
same or other concept or to create new concepts.
Cost evaluation Analysis carried out by the analysis module RISCREL taking as 
input a maintenance plan for a joint and costs associated with 
failure of the joint, inspection and repair to output expected costs.
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C ritical com ponent A non-redundant component (note that this term is sometimes used 
synonymously with primary q.v.).
H euristic Knowledge abstracted from experience rather than from formal 
analysis. Often also called a ‘rule of thumb’.
H ot spot stress The product of the nominal stress and stress concentration factor.
Inspection A discrete monitoring action on a component at a point in time.
Inspection period A period of time in a year during which inspection is carried out. 
Usually the same as the weather window, but in cases where some of 
the weather window period has been taken up by other activities, so 
restricting inspection, the inspection period may be continued 
beyond the weather window.
In te rp re ta tion The interpretation of the results from any analysis module is carried 
out after they have been read into the system. A rule set type of 
knowledge source is employed for this process. The separation of 
the interpretation task from the reading-in of analysis results is 
essential to allow future changes made to the system due to new 
operator preferences or regulations.
Jo in t The welded connection between any two members.
Knowledge base 
(KB)
A KB is a computer module containing stored knowledge in the 
form of production rules, knowledge sources or concepts.
Knowledge source 
(KS)
A KS is an independent and self-contained program which is 
controlled by a KBS control subsystem, or system controller, to 
carry out an identified task. A single production rule, a set of such 
rules or a complex software package can all be regarded as KSs. In 
the context of the RISC System, a KS represents either an analysis 
module, or a set of rules and procedures.
Knowledge base 
system (KBS)
A KBS is a software system that uses captured heuristics or other 
forms of knowledge in a knowledge base to perform or support tasks 
normally done by an expert or consultant. The RISC System is a 
KBS which provides intelligent support to the problem of inspection 
scheduling for fixed offshore structures.
Chapter 1 23
M aintenance plan A proposed action for a joint where the inspection technique, 
possible repair action and inspection time(s) are given.
Node A set of welded connections between one chord and one or more 
braces.
Optim al scheduling Optimal scheduling involves the combination of classical decision 
theory and modem reliability analysis methods only to find the least- 
cost schedule of IRM actions for a structure. It is usually only 
possible for a small number of actions.
P F I Probability of false indications or the false call rate, that is, the 
probability of a nonexisting crack being detected by a given 
inspection technique.
POD The probability of crack detection for an inspection technique, 
which is a measure of the technique’s sensitivity.
POS Reliability of sizing or probability of sizing for an inspection 
technique, which is a measure of the technique’s accuracy.
P rim ary
component
A component which has been pre-defined/agreed as being important 
for structural integrity.
Production rule A knowledge structure with an ‘IF-THEN’ form. Heuristics, 




Rational scheduling works on a large number of joints (c.f. optimal 
scheduling) using heuristic knowledge abstracted from operators' 
experience, management procedures etc. as the major problem 
solving strategies.
Resource deficit A measure for an inspection period or schedule indicating the 
difference between the required resources and the available 
resources.
Rule set A grouped set of production rules intended for a particular task.
Schedule A list of actions to be carried out at each inspection period of the 
scheduling period. The list, also known as the Scope of Work, does 
not give the order of actions within inspection periods.





The scheduling IRM model describes the processes and activities 
necessary to produce a valid schedule which satisfies time, resource 
and cost constraints. The model defines the tasks to be performed 
by a computer system supporting the scheduling procedure.
Scheduling period The period of consideration for scheduling purposes: usually 5 years 
for the UK or 4 years for Norway.
Software system 
architecture
A software system architecture identifies the necessary components 
of the system to perform identified tasks. In the RISC System, this 
architecture refers to the core of the KBS which controls the 
inferences of knowledge sources, manages the interactions between 
system and users, and maintains the knowledge bases and databases.
Survey A series of inspections and/or general review of the state of an area 
of the structure carried out over a single period of time.
Through-thickness
crack
A crack that has grown through the wall of the member.
W eather window Period of time in a year when it is considered safest for divers to 
carry out subsea activities.
1.5 N om en c la tu r e
The following table contains a list of mathematical symbols related to fatigue fracture mechanics 
and reliability analysis as used in this thesis.
a The sensitivity vector, and OP =pa where P is the design point, i.e. the 
point on the failure surface of shortest distance to the origin.
a,p,Y, and x Non-dimensional geometric parameters, used in the evaluation of the 
geometric SCF
P Reliability index
P c’P H L Reliability indices as defined by Cornell and by Hasofer and Lind
AK The local stress range
Px and Ox The mean and standard deviation values of the random variable X
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PxY A correlation coefficient between the random variables X and Y
^HS The stress at the hot spot, that is, the maximum stress value for a welded 
connection
On The nominal stress
c|)(.) and 0 (.) The standard normal density function and standard normal cumulative 
function
a The crack size, which can be either be half of the length or the total depth 
according to the context
U q or a, The crack size at the start of the life of the component, that is, the initial 
crack size
« c r The critical crack size
a(t) The instantaneous crack size due to fatigue at time t
a - p Final or failure crack size
^ N D I The detectable crack size for a non-destructive inspection technique
B Magnetic field as a 3-dimensional matrix
B . Component of magnetic field in x-axis stored as a matrix
B , Component of magnetic field in y-axis stored as a matrix
B . Component of magnetic field in z-axis stored as a matrix
c/a The aspect ratio, that is, the ratio ^zlengthidepth, of a crack
c„ Cf, Cj, or c. Cost of an IRM action, failure, inspection or repair for a joint
C g r in d  and
c^
w e l d
Cost of grinding and welding repairs
c(.) Cost function
C and m Material properties for use with Paris’ crack growth Law
Cov[X,Y] The covariance between the random variables X and Y
ckz/dN The instantaneous crack growth rate (m/s)
D Total damage due to varying stress levels
AD Damage due to one level of stress
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E[X] The expectation of random variable X or expected value of X, where 
E[X]=px for the population of X; if considering a sample of X, E[X] is only 
an estimate of px
fx(.) and Fx(.) The probability density function (pdf) and corresponding cumulative 




The joint pdf and CDF for random variables X and Y
fyixCyl^ ) ’ 
Fvixtylx)
Conditional pdf and CDF for the random variable Y given variable X takes 
on value x
g(-) Failure function or failure surface function or limit state function or state 
function, defined such that when g(.)<0 => failure, g(.) > 0 => safety, and 
g(.) = 0 is the failure surface
h(.) The tangent surface to the failure surface in the normalised basic variable 
space
K Stress intensity factor
L Geometric (lengths) basic variables
M The safety margin, define^ suqh that M<0 implies failure, and M =0 is the 
limit state
n Number of stress cycles
«i Number of stress cycles at the stress level Sj
N Number of stress cycles to failure
Ni Number of stress cycles to failure for the stress level Sj
Nt The number of stress cycles to the end of the design life
P The design point, which is a point on the failure surface closest to the 
origin.
P(-) Membership function for a fuzzy set
P(A) The probability of an event A occurring
POD and 
POD(a)
Probability of Detection for an inspection technique, which depends on the 
crack size a
Chapter 1 27
PCF The Probability of Failure = P(M<0)
PCS and 
POS(a)
Probability of Sizing for an inspection technique, which may depend on 
crack size a
R and R(r) Reliability at time t
R Resistance basic variables
S Stress level
S and R Single load and strength parameters
s Loading (stresses) basic variables
SCFg The geometric SCF
The stress concentration factor at the hot spot
SCFn The SCF at the crack tip or notch, which is a function of 1/r, where r is the 
radius of curvature of the crack at the notch tip
Si A particular stress level
T Member wall thickness
T(.) A transform operator
hnsp Discrete points in time corresponding to inspection periods
h n sp * Point in time corresponding to the current inspection period
Tl Expected lifetime of a structure
u The normalised basic variables
m(.) Utility function
X A vector representing the basic variables
Z Standardised basic variables
1.6 O rga n isa tio n  of  th e  Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to present the problem to be solved, followed by a description of the 
analytical tools and approaches which can be applied to solve the specified problem and finally a 
proposed system for IRM scheduling.
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In Chapter 2, the current procedures for IRM in the offshore industry are reviewed. In addition, 
as crack growth due to fatigue is one of the main causes of degradation of steel jacket platforms, 
an explanation of the basic principles of fatigue fracture mechanics analysis is given in the second 
half of the chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to assemble the current state of IRM scheduling 
and the basic analysis tool, that is, fatigue fracture mechanics, for estimating the life of a structure. 
The information gathered for this chapter formed the basis for the requirements specification for 
the RISC System and provided the information required to formulate the scheduling model for 
RISC.
The fundamental concepts of structural reliability analysis are explained in Chapter 3. The 
required decision theory, the modelling of uncertainties for offshore structures and the analysis 
software RISCREL and ULDAN are also described. This c h u te r  is a review of the current state- 
of-the-art in structural reliability and explains the Level II reliability analysis techniques First and 
Second Order Reliability Methods (FORM and SORM). Some early assumptions made for this 
work and necessary to be able to apply structural reliability analysis to IRM scheduling were based 
on the requirements specifications produced by the author. The specifications were also used to 
define the interfaces to the reliability software package RISCREL, for the FORM and SORM 
analysis and cost evaluation of IRM actions and which was implemented by other colleagues during 
the RISC project.
A review of applied artificial intelligence and knowledge base systems is given in Chapter 4. The 
formalisms and applications described provide a basis for defining the architecture for a 
knowledge-based IRM scheduling system and the algorithms employed. The discussion of the 
implementation issues provides an understanding of the choices made in the implementation and 
management of the IRM scheduling KBS. Constraints-based scheduling based on basic searching 
techniques and concepts from constraints satisfaction is explained in some detail here.
After a thorough study of the IRM problem and reviews of the tools that would provide a solution 
to the IRM problem, work was carried out on a computer-aided RISC System. The design and 
implementation of this IRM scheduling KBS is described in Chapter 5. Details are given of the 
Scheduling Model, that is of the procedures employed to carry out rational inspection planning 
based on the analysis results. Details of the design are described. A software review was carried 
out of the possible development tools and a condensed version is given here. The implemented 
RISC Demonstrator provides the basis for the final RISC System.
A case study is presented in Chapter 6 to illustrate the methods and the use of the complete RISC 
System. The data for the study was gathered from a variety of sources, including example 
structures provided by several sponsors of the RISC project. The complete procedure is
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demonstrated, including the generation of possible maintenance plans and the input to the 
RISCREL software, the interpretation of the results from RISCREL and the algorithms for 
constraints-based searching for the scheduling of the inspection actions.
One issue, which arose early in during work for this thesis, is the problem of interpreting inspection 
results. In Chapter 7, work carried out as part of the AIRES project to develop a prototype 
automated inspection system that provides intelligent interpretation of electromagnetic sensor data 
is presented. In this chapter, some implementation problems, particularly regarding knowledge 
representation and data fusion, are discussed.
Chapter 8 describes the future work which may be carried out to provide a scheme for full systems 
reliability-based design and IRM scheduling for structures. This includes a description of how 
automated inspection interpretation systems such as AIRES may be integrated into RISC. Also 
considered are extensions to the RISC methodology to consider, for instance, systems reliability 
and case-based reasoning. Finally, the extent to which RISC may be applied to other structures and 
in other industries is discussed.
1.7 Sum m ary  o f  W ork
The work carried out for this thesis was carried out as part of two projects:
■ Reliability-based Inspection Scheduling for fîxed offshore platforms (RISC)
The RISC project was approved by the Commission of European Communities for partial funding 
under the THERMIE programme. The leading partner in this project was Technical Software 
Consultants Ltd (UK); other partners were University College London (UK), Registro Navale 
Italiano (I), University of Pisa (I) and TNO-IBBC (NL). The total budget was set at £1,222,000 
of which £455,164 was funded by the EC and £221,000 was non-UK funding. Some of the 
reliability analysis software modules developed within another EEC-funded project (BRTTE P2124) 
were included and further extended with collaboration with RCP ApS (Denmark) and RCP GMBh 
(Germany). The RISC project ran from the 1st May 1991 to April 1994. The deliverable from this 
work was the RISC System demonstrator: a knowledge base system with analysis modules and 
sample databases integrated to provide inspection schedules.
The author’s work in this project was primarily on the development of the knowledge base system. 
This included involvement in the early definition of the problem; responsibility for the 
requirements specification; and a major role in the definition of the scheduling model. A functional
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specification for the complete system was provided by the author. The programming of the 
demonstrator system was carried out under the author’s supervision from design documents 
produced by the author.
■ Automated Image Reconstruction using Expert Systems (AIRES)
The aim  of the Automated Image Recognition using Expert Systems project was to provide the 
technology for automated total surface inspection. The inspection of components or materials was 
to be carried out during both production and service. Interpretation of the data from the sensors 
was to be carried out within an expert system framework for image reconstruction from multiple 
sensors. For this, an integrated software and multi-sensor system was developed, based on a CCD 
camera providing vision data and on an electromagnetic sensor employing the alternating current 
field measurement (ACFM) system. The total budget for the 2-year project was £1,814,000 partly 
funded by the CEC under the BRITE/EURAM programme. The partners were Technical Software 
Consultants Ltd (UK), University College London (UK), Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (F), 
University of Hanover (D), Peugeot SA (F) and Deutsche Aerospace SA (D).
The author was responsible for the work carried out for the electromagnetic sensor KBS. This 
involved understanding the use of the ACFM inspection technique, and also of the KBS 
development tool developed by LETI; overseeing the methods undertaken for knowledge 
acquisition from the ACFM experts; and specifying the data structures required for the 
interpretation of the ACFM data.
1.8 Sum m ary
The widespread use of reliability-based inspection scheduling systems in a knowledge-based 
framework will help to improve the fundamental understanding of the problem. In addition, the 
use of such systems may lead to improved overall reliability of offshore structures without 
incurring economic penalties.
The basic approach described in this thesis could be applied to other forms of large structures in 
other industries, where inspections of a similar nature have to be carried out in situ on similar 
components. Examples of these include pipelines, steel bridges, production plants and aircraft.
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2 In s p e c t io n , R e p a ir  a n d  M a in t e n a n c e  o f  O f f s h o r e  S t r u c t u r e s
Inspection and other monitoring actions are carried out on structures to find out if any damage or 
deterioration has occurred. Any damage found requires evaluation to decide upon future 
maintenance actions. The initial problem is to decide on a plan for inspection.
For offshore structures, fatigue crack growth is one of the main deterioration processes, particularly 
in deep waters. Other causes of deterioration are corrosion leading to loss of section, marine 
growth leading to increased loading and impact damage due to dropped objects or ships colliding. 
Nevertheless, the fatigue life of welded connections in offshore structures is a governing factor for 
the planning of inspection and maintenance actions, especially in areas such as the North Sea, 
where weather conditions are unfavourable. The occurrence of frequent storms leads to a large 
number of loading cycles. Also, deeper waters imply taller structures. These are prone to a greater 
dynamic response because ensuring that the structure’s natural frequency is very different to the 
loading frequency becomes more difficult for taller structures, which means greater fatigue 
problems. High stress concentrations at welded intersections lead to fatigue cracks growing from 
weld defects acting as crack initiators.
Since many uncertainties are inherent in the analysis of the deterioration process of offshore 
structures, the use of reliability techniques, which will consider uncertainties, combined with 
fatigue fracture mechanics analysis is being considered. Further, operators are moving towards 
adopting a reliability-based approach to deciding where and when to inspect offshore structures and 
in particular the tubular welded-connections of steel jacket platforms. This approach is endorsed 
by certification authorities, as these methods provide a more rational basis for decision-making 
(Birkinshaw et al, 1993; RBI, 1989; DnV, 1982).
To provide the requirements for a computer-aided system to aid inspection, repair and maintenance 
(IRM), a review of existing practice for IRM of offshore platforms in the North Sea was carried 
out. A Working Group of representatives from the offshore industry was consulted and provided 
further insight into existing practices in maintenance and inspection scheduling. Interviewing the 
experts and operators followed the recommendations in the Research Task Force on Risk-based 
Inspection Guidelines report (RBI Research Task Force, 1989). Additionally, literature reviews 
were carried out and in particular, a report from The Marine Technology Directorate on 
Underwater Inspection of Steel Offshore Structures provided much background information (MTD, 
1989).
The Reliability based Inspection Scheduling (RISC) methodology is based on fatigue fracture 
mechanics as a model of the failure mechanism, combined with reliability analysis to take into
Chapter 2 3 2
account uncertainties. Reliability-based fatigue fracture mechanics analysis is then integrated into 
a rational scheduling system that incorporates current practice and guidelines. The main aim of 
the RISC methodology is to enable useful IRM planning, based on objective, quantitative analyses 
which estimate the expected costs of IRM actions, but allowing operators’ preferences and 
requirements to take precedence if necessary.
This chapter describes the inspection, repair and maintenance (IRM) activities carried out on fixed 
offshore platforms and provides the background for the requirements for a computer system, the 
RISC System, to aid IRM planning based on the RISC methodology. The final section of this 
chapter briefly reviews current approaches for maintenance planning, including consideration of 
uncertain or random factors for offshore structures.
2.1 A n O v e r v ie w  o f  C u r r e n t  P r o c e d u r e s
This section describes the current procedures carried out by operators for in-service inspection, 
repair and maintenance of an offshore fixed platform. Only the problems relating to the scheduling 
of inspection and repair of the substructure are discussed. Inspection of components in the 
superstructure or deck is not considered and the actual techniques employed are only outlined.
2.1.1 Guidelines and Legislation
An IRM system needs to take into account current and possible future legislation and guidelines 
for the production of usable schedules. Current statutory requirements in the UK are that the 
certifying authorities issue a Certificate of Fitness for each platform. This certificate is valid for 
five years, or four years only for Norwegian waters based on the requirements laid down in The 
Offshore Installations (Constmction and Survey) Regulations (1974) (MTD, 1989). Furthermore, 
the installation owner or operator has to demonstrate the integrity of the structure to receive the 
certificate.
The starting point of the procedure to demonstrate integrity of a structure involves the operator and 
certifying authorities or agencies agreeing on a set of primary nodes or components, based on 
criteria that are discussed later. The operator is required to inspect these primary components over 
a period of four to five years usually. Regulations state that these inspections must be carried out 
at the end of one certified period to obtain the next certificate. A programme of inspections carried 
out over the life of the certificate is usually allowed, however, if the schedule is approved by the 
certifying authorities. Approval is dependent on the operator ensuring that all primary joints are
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included.
Figure 2.1 represents the current procedure as laid down by the Department of Energy (DEn, 1984) 
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Figure 2.1 Current IRM procedure described by the Department o f  Energy
In certain countries, no definitive regulations exist. Instead, certification authorities require 
justification from the operators that the analysis carried out to produce a plan of inspections is 
sufficient. As an example, in Norway, operators are largely self-certifying, although Det norske 
Veritas guidelines include the need to inspect all primary nodes at least once every five years 
(DnV, 1982).
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To summarise, current representative regulations/guidelines include:
• a five-year period, in the UK, or four years in Norwegian waters, in which to inspect all 
primary nodes
• 2nd annual inspection, in the UK, of all damaged joints
• incident inspections to ensure integrity of structure
• annual surveys may be implemented instead of one major survey covering all the structure
Current practices incorporate guidelines relating to the definition of primary nodes, the extent and 
methods of analysis, and the interpretation of the analysis results.
2.1.2 Participants
Several organisations are involved in the production of an inspection schedule and so information 
from each participants is required for an IRM computer-aided system. During each phase of the 
inspection scheduling process, each participant carries out a different role:
1. The operator, or a consultancy to the operator, produces a schedule.
2. The operator proposes a schedule to the certification agency.
3. The certification agency agrees to the schedule or requires some modifications or
justification for the schedule.
4. A subcontracted inspection company carries out inspection tasks according to the schedule.
5. Repair specialists may carry out any major repair required.
The designers may not be involved with the operation of the stmcture and therefore do not 
necessarily design with maintenance in mind. In Norway, the operator’s maintenance department 
will provide a list of tasks and of joints to be inspected to its sub sea operations department, which 
in turn will attempt to produce a schedule for the list. The time from producing a schedule to 
carrying out the inspection may be up to 6-9 months. This lag may be significant as the schedule 
may be produced with out-of-date information on the structure. After inspection, re-analysis of the 
structure may take place to decide the repair actions or if re-inspection needs to take place.
2.1.3 Selection Criteria
As inspecting all parts of the structure frequently is impossible, design and analysis data is taken 
into account to identify important or primary nodes. A node or any component is defined to be 
primary if it is agreed by the certification authority and the operator to be important in some way
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for structural integrity. This may be because the node is a non-redundant component, it has been 
assessed to have a low fatigue life, it is damaged and requires frequent monitoring to ensure safety 
or a combination of these factors. Inspection effort is then concentrated on these primary nodes 
with parts of the platform known to be at risk of damage, for instance due to collisions.
For a jacket structure, such as can be found on shallow waters in the Gulf of Mexico, the number 
of nodes may be as little as 300. In the North Sea, for a typical structure the total number of nodes 
is approximately 1500-2000. The maximum number expected for any structure is up to 3000 
nodes. The number of agreed and predefined primary nodes can be approximately 200 to 300.
Every year inspection is usually carried out on:
• a percentage of the primary joints
• nodes with known weld-toe cracks or defects, found in past inspections
• members and nodes that are possibly damaged due to known incidents
• past repairs (including grinding carried out at inspection)
• areas of severe marine growth which will require cleaning
In the UK, the data on damaged nodes and members are stored in the damage register of the 
structure, and all components included in the register are inspected regularly.
In order to rank the joints, current guidelines suggest associating a weighting to each joint j  given 
by the following:
W eightings {Yj x Xj )+ Wj (2.1)
where Yj is a weighting representing the consequence of failure, X j represents the likelihood of 
failure and W j is a factor that is dependent on the number of years since the last inspection. The 
consequence of failure is based on a set of ten factors including redundancy and risk to life; the 
likelihood of failure is the sum of weighting for each type of failure mode; both include a factor 
representing confidence in the assessment. The details and recommended values for the weighting 
that may be assigned to each type of member can be found in the Marine Technology Directorate 
report for Underwater Inspection of Steel Offshore Structures (MTD, 1989). The higher the total 
weighting, the more likely it is that the node.requires inspection.
Values of the Y j  and X j factors range from 10 to 450 and 15 to 250 respectively. W j values step 
in value, nonlinearly, from 0 for inspection in the previous year, up to a maximum 6400 for 
inspection more than 5 years before. As an example, consider an ‘average’ node inspected three 
years before. The medium ratings of both X and Y are 80 and the W factor is 2560. So the total
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weighting for this joint is 80 x 80 +2560 = 8960. For a very safe node, with a minimum likelihood 
of failure and a minimum consequence of failure, inspected more than 5 years ago, the total 
weighting is 15 x 10 + 6400 = 6550. In contrast, for a highly critical with a very high likelihood 
of failure and inspected last year, the total weighting becomes 450 x 250 + 0 =  112500, Normally 
it is not expected that any one node would achieve such high X and Y factor values.
Figure 2.2 shows the DEn procedure that makes use of weighting factors in an attempt to 
incorporate reliability into IRM planning.
FOR EACH COMPONENT IMR PHILOSOPHY
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Figure 2.2 DEn IRM procedure making use o f weighting factors
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For certain components, inspection may be carried out once only and post-installation to ensure the 
integrity of the structure, and to confirm that no damage has occurred during installation. An 
example is the possibility of damage to the principal legs during post-installation removal of the 
wooden runways, as found in some Mexican structures (IMP, 1992b). Once confirmed that no such 
damage has occurred it may be safely assumed that the principal legs in place are as designed. 
Usually, post-installation inspection can be integrated as part of the first inspection schedule, but 
is used as part of the as-installed data.
2.1.4 Analysis Methods
Detailed analysis of a platform is carried out at the design stage, and when
• damage is detected, such as dents from impact, or extensive cracks
• changes are made to the structure, such as extensive repair or when new loads are added 
on to the deck, or changes are made to the layout of the deck, etc.
• codes or guidelines change, to ensure that the structure complies with new regulations
In the UK until the mid-1990s, the analysis of an offshore oil platform was essentially 
deterministic, that is, the assumptions were that the structural properties are time invarian t, the 
frequency of inspections fixed, and the results of inspections are accurate. In contrast, probabilistic 
and reliability analysis has been allowed by the certification authorities in Norway for some time 
now as justification for a proposed schedule.
From the information provided by the Working Group, current analysis procedures together with 
the role they each play in inspection scheduling were identified:
► Static strength analysis involves little analysis, and is employed to identify components 
that are likely to fail.
► Redundancy analysis which simulates the failure of members or nodes, is carried out in the 
UK and requires the use of data-files held by the designer organisation. In Norway, the 
SRS model, or Structural Re-analysis System, is used. Both techniques identify critical 
components.
Collapse analysis is carried out in the UK, and Push-over analysis in Norway. These 
analyses are carried out in the nonlinear range, implementing codes such as USFOS, to 
predict the consequence of failure of a component.
Appropriate S/N curves can be used to calculate the expected life of a component. 
Designers use conservative stress concentration factor parametric equations and thus the
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►
results show shorter fatigue lives than may be the actual case (Nicholson, 1986). 
Components may be ranked according to their fatigue life based on an S/N curve.
► Fracture mechanics or crack growth analysis predicts the remaining life of a joint for a 
given initial crack size.
2.1.5 Scheduling Constraints
The main scheduling constraint is that whenever possible inspection is carried out within a weather 
window, in Norway for instance, this window lasts for 50-60 days in the summer. Production 
operations on the structure, such as drilling, regardless usually take priority. This often affects the 
inspection procedure in the UK, in that inspection may be kept outside the weather window because 
of other operations taking precedence.
As the RISC methodology includes allowing the expected costs as an objective decision-making 
parameter, the costs of carrying out actions, and of the failure of the structure are also considered 
to be scheduling constraints.
The actual operation of inspections is constrained by many economic considerations:
• each inspection technique has associated with it an approximate cost per node, which may 
restrict the choice of inspection technique
• the costs of employing more than one vessel from which the inspection operations are 
carried out are prohibitive: approximately £50,000, per day in 1992 in Norway
• the total cost of moving the inspection vessel around the stmcture is typically of the order 
of £50,000, according to UK prices in 1992
The last two considerations introduce other constraints that affect the way in which diving 
operations are carried out:
• the position of the diving vessel leads to geographical constraints: the part of the platform 
that may be inspected is the area closest to the diving vessel
• there is a restriction on the total number of divers available, since only a few divers, 
usually two, can operate from the same vessel (UK, Norway)
Other economic concerns must also be taken into account. There is a trade-off between the 
employment of high-performance and efficient inspection teams and vessels, and the use of less 
expensive crews of divers. The former is associated with a short season for inspections and the 
increased sensitivity to bad weather spells and breakdowns, and therefore the required higher 
complement of offshore management to tackle any problems; the reduced cost of the latter allows
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these divers to be employed over a longer period and means that the schedules are not so 
susceptible to disruptions (Christer et al, 1989; Rivers, 1986). For an inspection scheduling 
decision support system such as the RISC System, it would be assumed that such economic 
considerations are made outside the system. The duration of the weather window and certain 
inspection procedural details, such as length of diving shifts, would be predefined.
Other constraints that may be included are on the use of remotely-operated-vehicles (ROVs) and 
those taking human safety into account:
• ROV inspection is carried out only for nodes that are deeper than 10m from the sea surface
• diver inspection from air-tanks takes place between the water level and 25m below the
surface
• saturated diving takes place below 25m from the sea surface
It should be noted here that accurate cost information could be important for the application of 
RISC. Nonetheless, actual costs need not be provided since information on the relative costs will 
be sufficient, as the main purpose of identifying the costs is to provide a measure of 
‘undesirability’.
The size of the diving operation is considerable. In a survey carried out in 1985 it was reported that 
on one day in July, the peak period for the North Sea, 306 diving supervisors, 718 air divers, 680 
mixed gas and bell divers and 167 life-support divers were active: a total 1871 diving personnel. 
It is estimated that approximately twice this number were working in one day in 1985 (Christer et 
al, 1989). In addition, to support one diver requires the backup of 50 surface personnel, at a weekly 
cost of £250,000 (1989 figures). To inspect a large structure in its entirety requires approximately 
four calender years.
Finally, a cost is associated with the fatality rates of divers. This cost cannot be taken into account 
directly here, but it does allow the consideration that if the numbers of inspections are reduced then 
the num ber of diving accidents may be reduced. The probability of fewer accidents due to fewer 
inspection tasks may be traded off against the higher probability of failure for components and 
ultimately of the structure.
2.2 In spe c t io n  of T ubular  Joints
The main purpose of inspection is to assess the current state of the structure and in particular of the 
component (Bray & Stanley, 1996). The presence of surface-breaking cracks indicates that fatigue
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damage is occurring in the node. The depth of the crack shows the severity of the damage, while 
the rate of crack growth provides a predictor of the remaining life of the joint. It is generally 
assumed that if a crack has grown through the thickness of a joint, then the joint has failed and 
immediate repair is required. Thus, one requirement of inspection on tubular joints is to identify 
fatigue cracks and to measure, in one way or another, the size of the crack.
Inspection techniques used for non-destructive evaluation(NDE) are either active, in that some 
probe or other element is applied to the component and an immediate response is measured, or 
passive, where monitoring is carried out over some reference period to check for some secondary 
reaction indicating a problem(Bray & Stanley, 1996).
This section describes the inspection procedures carried out to detect surface-breaking cracks on 
tubular joints in particular, which for steel jacket platforms active techniques are more often 
employed.
2.2.1 Inspection Techniques
Various inspection techniques for crack detection and sizing are currently in use in the detailed 
inspection of the sub-deck tubular joints. A summary follows of the main techniques reported in 
detail in the MTD report (1989) and in use as of 1992.
2.2.1.1 Visual Inspection
Close visual inspection (CV) is the most common technique. The diver cleans the weld and 
inspects it visually, or takes photographs or a video for later interpretation. The effectiveness of 
close visual inspection is significantly affected by the underwater environment. Thus, although it 
can be very rapid and cheap to implement, if the conditions are bad or the marine growth is heavy 
requiring much cleaning, it is often inefficient compared with other techniques. The method is 
used for detection of defects only; if a defect is seen, then another method is often used to size it.
2.2.1.2 Magnetic Particle Inspection
MPI is the next most common technique, employed by more than 80% of North Sea operators. It 
is most often used for detection, but it is sometimes used for sizing, although it only gives length 
measurements. The accuracy of the length measurements is undoubtedly not high, but it does at 
least detect reasonably well.
After detection with MPI, confirmation of the defect is usually carried out by either using another 
method for sizing, such as ACPD, discussed below, or carrying out proo f grinding. In proof 
grinding, the diver removes by grinding a thin layer of the surface and reapplies MPI. If no crack
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is then detected, it is considered to have been removed and the smoothing of the weld surface 
implies an improved fatigue strength of the joint. If a crack is still there after grinding to a usual 
maximum of 2 mm, then further investigation of the crack and the joint is required.
2.2.1.3 Eddv Current
Many commercial systems are based on eddy current methods which give length, though not depth, 
measurement. It is a well-established technique for land structures, but it is still considered 
expensive and difficult to use on offshore structures. The diver needs only to move a hand unit 
over the weld of the joint, but the surface operator is required to be highly trained to interpret the 
sensor data.
2.2.1.4 Ultrasonic Characterisation
Techniques based on ultrasonics are contacting methods giving depth measurements. Ultrasonics 
characterisation is highly sensitive to operator performance and the equipment characteristics, and 
the defect’s position and shape. In addition, the surface of the joint requires careful cleaning to 
remove all roughness. The difficulties in sizing cracks within an acceptable accuracy underwater 
means that ultrasonics is used less than other techniques in the offshore industry, although some 
work is being carried out in solving these problems with the time-of-flight diffraction (TOFD) 
technique based on ultrasonics.
2.2.1.5 Alternating Current Potential Drop and AC Field Measurement
These are relatively new methods developed at UCL, which will give depth measurements and 
therefore are ideal techniques for sizing of defects (Collins, 1995). ACPD is a contacting technique 
that measures the potential drop across a metallic surface due to the presence of a crack. The newer 
ACFM method is non-contacting and measures the changes in the electromagnetic field above the 
surface again due to the presence of a crack or pit.
ACPD or ACFM can be used with MPI, where the latter technique is best employed to detect 
cracks and the former is used to size cracks.
2.2.1.6 Flooded Member Detection
Other methods of detecting fatigue cracks include flooded member detection (FMD), which can 
be carried out by use of various techniques. FMD is a passive technique in that the check carried 
out is for the presence of a leak which in turn indicates a through-crack. FMD must be treated 
carefully: if failure is defined as occurring when a crack has penetrated the wall of the member, 
then a positive indication of FMD represents failure of the component.
Chapter 2 4 2
FM D will certainly allow an operator to detect failed joints, but does not allow the progressive 
measurement of cracks as they grow or develop. As it is necessary to be able to detect cracks 
before failure to avoid failure of the joint, FMD can only be used as a backup method, and not for 
planning purposes.
2.2.2 Inspection Data
Much inspection data is currently collected and there are clearly no standard forms, or even types 
of data, which are common across operator organisations. In the case of data on cracks found at 
the weld toe of welded joints, information currently recorded on a crack will include
• indication length and, if possible, depth
• clock position given relative to some predefined point on the joint
• grinding length, width and depth
Other features of a weld for which information is recorded are
• corrosion and pitting in a qualitative form
• undercut in quantitative measures
• grinding marks as descriptive, qualitative information
All the inspection information is stored in various formats and in different locations:
• diver or inspection job-sheets
• engineering assessment reports
• platform damage status register
Most data is held as text and in tabular form. In addition, information on cracks and other defects 
found both at component level and at structure level (for example, from swim-round surveys) may 
be kept in a pictorial form. Such pictures may be drawings held as hand-drawn diagrams, computer 
graphics files, e.g. AUTOCAD in the UK, and photographic evidence, as both stills and in video 
format.
From the information provided by the Working Group and the above, the types of inspection data 
collected every year can be listed and are described in Table 2.1 overleaf.
Some data is already kept in computer databases and operators are making use of database 
technology, wherever possible, for storage of inspection results. For example, the Institute 
Mexicano del Petroleo store data in a specialised inspection database (IMP, 1996). Operators in
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the Norwegian North Sea make use of DnV’s PIA (Probabilistic Inspection Analysis) system that 
includes a central database of past inspections (Vardel & Moan, 1997). More advanced examples 
of computers to store data include the possible use of expert systems that provide lists of joints to 
be inspected and of tasks for each year to aid scheduling in Norway and in the UK (Khong & 
Lucia, 1991; Ahmad et al, 1993).
Table 2.1 Inspection data recorded for a fixed platform
Inspection Data Type Coverage
swim-round survey for general damage and marine growth inventory 100%
flooded member detection providing information on the 
existence of through-thickness cracks
yes/no 100%
seabed debris survey to check that no items or objects have 
dropped onto the seabed, either from the structure itself due 
to unnoticed impacts or from the top-deck, and may have 
caused damage on falling down
inventory at four 
locations
scour survey to check integrity of foundations quantitative
cathodic protection measurements numeric one leg
anode condition given as subjective information either as a 





marine growth information on depth of growth for cleaning numeric
bolted connections’ information on the condition of the 
connection, such as cleaning and re-tightening required, 
visually inspected every year
qualitative 100%
welded joints data on cracks and other defects and immediate 
repair information in formats highly dependent on the type of 
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2.2.3 Inspection Procedures
Every year, monitoring tasks involving inspections of individual components and surveys of 
complete sections of the platform are carried out. Inspections are made of some primary nodes, 
all known/expected defects, previous repairs and areas with severe marine growth. General 
surveying is carried out to obtain information on marine growth and possible or known incidents. 
The thickness of marine growth is measured because marine growth increases the effective size of 
the tubular members considerably, which in turn affects the loading on the structure. After 
incidents, the structure will be surveyed to ascertain if any major impact damage has occurred.
The main current areas of concern are that of the individual inspection actions. The decision­
making process for scheduling of inspections does not need to consider surveys, as these require 
the use of a nearly constant level of resources. For RISC, the assumption has been made that only 
discrete monitoring activities listed above as inspection tasks are an issue and need to be considered 
in detail for rational planning and scheduling.
2.2.4 Other Tasks
The main aim  of inspection and surveying is to check for damage or potential damage to the 
structure. At the time of inspection, several other tasks may also be carried out simultaneously on 
the component, such as immediate cleaning or minor repair. The act of inspection itself may 
require cleaning, but the main reason for specifying cleaning is to remove marine growth. Marine 
growth thickness measurements can be included in some way in the loading analysis and when 
marine growth is considered to have increased the loading appreciably, it is removed. The task of 
cleaning members is scheduled in to the overall maintenance plan.
In the UK, inspectors are permitted to carry out confirmatory or proof grinding, usually up to 2mm 
depth. Proof grinding carries out the double role of confirming the existence of a crack and then, 
in the case of a shallow crack, removing it. Further grinding repairs are also often carried out up 
to a permitted maximum percentage of chord wall, after which the weld is re-inspected to confirm 
removal o f defects. For instance, 6-8mm deep and 200 mm long cracks have been removed by 
immediate grinding.
In Norway, any anomaly or detected defect is reported by the inspecting diver and the topside 
engineer to the maintenance department. As 24-hour reporting exists, a report will be followed 
by immediate analysis by the maintenance department to confirm the existence of a crack or defect 
and to classify it. Analysis is also used to decide whether immediate repair is required or if 
postponing the repair until the following weather window is safe, although the usual practice is to
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carry out immediate repairs.
Minor repair, in the form of grinding, may be carried out by the inspecting diver. More extensive 
repair actions are passed over to specialists to carry out. If a repair is to be carried out by 
participants other than the inspection organisation, then the schedule of future inspections will be 
unaffected. Major repairs may be carried out by welding or even clamping. Both affect the 
behaviour of the node. Welding changes the material properties and the initial crack distribution 
in the joint, while clamping requires extensive re-modelling and re-analysis of the joint.
2.2.5 Summary
The sequence of events in the inspection of a welded joint may be summarised as follows:
1 an inspection is performed
2 the inspection results are interpreted to give inspection data
3 on discovery of an anomaly, confirmation is carried out, possibly by use of proof grinding
4 if the defect or crack is confirmed, then it is reported and analysed
5 if appropriate, immediate minor repair, in the form of further grinding, is carried out by the
inspecting diver and is reported
A computer system for IRM planning would be required to store and handle information related 
to interpreted inspection data, any confirmed cracks or defects and the repairs carried out. The way 
inspection information is stored should reflect the way it is recorded, that is, the database stmctures 
or file formats should allow the input and storage of data in the same form as when first recorded 
on paper. Such a computer storage system would allow large amounts of data to be analysed as 
part of trend monitoring, during audits and to enable historical records to be built.
2.2.6 Operators’ Future Requirements
One way in which the RISC methodology and other work in this area may affect future 
requirements is that regulations and guidelines will be modified. For instance, the UK guidelines 
for defining primary joints may change, affecting the number o f joints to be inspected once every 
five years. Furthermore, it is the current accepted practice that repairs always take place when a 
crack or defect is found (Topp, 1985). This policy may be found to be not required. Further, it 
may compromise the integrity of the stmcture which would be contrary to recent recommendations 
from the Health and Safety Executive on using the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
principle (HSE, 1992; Sharp et al, 1993).
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A particular change may be in the level of inspection effort required, as it may be found that 
carrying out inspections every year may no longer be necessary. This would then affect the 
assumptions made in producing a schedule and in fact true optimisation of the schedule may be 
carried out.
As reliability analysis techniques become more accepted, more data may be required on the amount 
and form of the reliability analysis method carried out. More up-to-date loading and other 
environmental information may be recorded. The incorporation of human factors, either explicitly 
or at least in the modelling of random variables, will be required. Further analysis may be carried 
out on the collected data to update uncertainties and parameters, for instance measure variances 
in inspection performances, of both the equipment and the human inspectors (Rivers, 1986),
Inspection equipment and how it is used will also change with time. Very recent work at 
University College London for the ICON project involves producing databases of NDI techniques 
and procedures that will lead to the standardisation of inspection procedures (Dover & Rudlin, 
1996; Rudlin & Dover, 1996). It is also foreseen that data-entry forms for inspection data in 
particular will become standardised. This will ease many problems in setting up inspection 
planning systems for practical use.
A usable IRM scheduling system would have to allow for these future requirements.
2.3 Fatigue F ra ctur e  M ec h a n ic s  of Fixed O ffshore  Structures
The main mode of failure for fixed offshore structures in areas such as the North Sea is that of 
fatigue, that is, accumulative damage due to dynamic and cyclic loading. Fatigue damage manifests 
itself in the development of cracks or in the growth of existing small cracks in the structure. The 
main areas where cracks occur are at the welded tubular connections. Thus much of the inspection 
carried out is to detect and size cracks in the tubular joints of the structure. Similarly, much of the 
analysis carried out in evaluating the long term effects on a jacket structure of any damage is based 
on fatigue fracture mechanics.
This section outlines the analysis quantifying the damage caused by fatigue in structures. Much 
work on modelling the fatigue process in tubular joints has taken place in the NDE Centre, 
University College London, as part of large managed projects (Dover et al, 1986 and 1988) and as 
has been reported by Dharmavasan and Dover (1988).
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2.3.1 The Process of Fatigue
The process of fatigue damage and its effect on ship and railway structures has been recognised 
since the mid-19“’ century. Since the 1940s, much work has been carried out to understand, model 
and quantify fatigue in general structures (Fuchs & Stephens, 1980; Pook, 1983).
Typical curves describing the progressive growth of a fatigue crack for different applied stress 
ranges are shown below, where S, is the highest stress range and S3 is the lowest.
I
u
A p p lied  cycles. N
Figure 2.3 Typical fa tigue crack growth (Fuchs  < &  Stephens, 1980)
Broadly speaking, the life of a component being degraded due to fatigue can be divided 
approximately into three phases:
1. the crack initiation period, during which microstructural changes occur in the material 
leading to the microscopic cracks being formed, cmd that occupies most of the fatigue life 
of the component
2 . the crack propagation phase, when macroscopic cracks grow at a stable and increasing but 
linear rate
3. very rapid or explosive crack growth leading to complete fracture of the component and 
which usually occupies a small percentage of the total fatigue life
Not all cracks grow to failure. A phenomenon known as crack growth threshold  exists where, 
given certain conditions, cracks may reach a maximum size and grow no longer. It is not usually 
possible, under realistic conditions, to predict when crack growth threshold will occur. Usually 
then, it is assumed that fatigue cracks will grow to failure at some point in time.
The division between the phases listed above is somewhat arbitrary and, in fact, the idea of dividing 
the crack growth process into distinct phases only came about in the 1950s. It is useful in the
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the crack growth process into distinct phases only came about in the 1950s. It is useful in the 
analysis of the crack growth as it allows simplified models to be employed, particularly for the 2"^  
phase, to predict crack growth with some certainty. In the case of welded structures, the existence 
of microscopic cracks is assumed and crack growth predictions are based on the 2'^ phase only.
Fatigue assessment is carried out at various stages of the life of a structure: at design, in the 
interpretation of inspection results and in the process of justifying life extension. There are several 
approaches to fatigue assessment, that is, mathematical analysis, standardised or codified 
procedures, and service-load testing. In this section, it is the first approach that is considered in 
detail. It is important to realise that fatigue is a random process in that the exact size and shape of 
fatigue cracks cannot be predicted with accuracy. This is due to reasons such as material 
inhomogeneity, the uncertainties in the exact geometry of the component, varying loads and load 
paths and the model uncertainties inherent in the fatigue assessment.
2.3.1.1 Loading Modes
The way in which the crack will grow is dependent on several aspects. For instance, cracks will 
usually initiate at the points of highest stress, which implies that any discontinuities in the surface 
and any areas of corrosion are likely to contain the first signs of fatigue cracks. Small and 
neighbouring initial cracks will coalesce and will usually propagate in the plane of maximum 
tensile stress.
There are three modes of crack extension or, equivalently, of loading. Mode I is the opening mode 
where the load is tensile. In mode II, the load applied is a shear load in the direction of the crack 
depth extension, and in mode III, the load is a shear load in the direction of the crack length 
extension. Naturally, load combinations can and do occur.
Mode I Mode II Mode III
Figure 2.4 Mode direction and notation
The direction and plane of growth, although it is largely dictated by the initial crack and the mode 
of loading, cannot always be predicted exactly due to combinations of modes of loading.
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2.3.2 Modelling Fatigue
Several established models are employed for evaluating the fatigue life and predicting future crack 
growth used in mathematical analysis of fatigue.
2.3.2.1 Miner’s Rule
Early work in fatigue testing was carried out under constant amplitude loading. The problem of 
how to employ the results to predict the fatigue life of a component under variable amplitude 
service loading then arose. It was suggested by Palmgren in 1924 and Miner in 1945 (see Pook, 
1983) that damage accumulates linearly with each cycle and at each stress level. This can be 
formulated by considering the damage due to one cycle at stress range S say, for which N is the 
number of cycles to failure, as
(2.2)
N
The total accumulated fatigue damage for a component, then, is given by:
D =T  (2.3)
where n^  represents the number of cycles in the stress range S, say, and where Nj is the number of 
cycles to failure for the same stress range Sj. This is the Miner-Palmgren model, also known as 
M iner’s Sum or Miner’s Rule. In design, this model of damage accumulation is the most common 
deterministic method used to predict the fatigue life of a component. The assumption made is that 
fatigue damage occurs with every stress cycle and that the accumulated damage is independent of 
the sequence in which the stress cycles occur. Using this approach, fatigue failure occurs when:
T f i = l  (2.4)
In practice, a safety factor is applied so that the required sum value giving the maximum allowed 
accumulated damage in an evaluation, and thus the end of life, is less than unity. So as an example, 
if a safety factor of 2 is applied, then fatigue failure would be assumed to occur when the sum value 
equalled 1/2. Miner’s rule may be used for simple loading cases to estimate the elapsed fatigue life 
of a component in situations when its past in-service load history is known. With a prediction of 
the future service load, it can also be used to estimate the remaining fatigue life.
2.3.2.2 Stress-Life Curves
A graph of the stress, usually the alternating stress S, as log(S), versus the life of a component, 
usually as log(N) where N is the number of cycles to failure, is commonly known as an S-N curve.
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This curve indicates the life of component for a given load. Figure 2.5 shows a typical S-N curve 




Figure 2.5 Typical S-N curve (from Pook, 1983)
The test results would show some scatter; typically the curve would be drawn through the median 
points to provide the smooth curve shown. A smooth S-N cur\ e is typical of nearly all materials. 
One exception is that of low strength steels, particularly in corrosive environments, where 
discontinuities in the curve would be evident.
The S-N curve does not distinguish among the three phases o f  crack initiation, propagation and 
fracture, yet it does provide the total life to fracture at different levels of stress. This concept of 
an effective S-N curve, where the S-N curve from constant amplitude loading is normalised such 
that the M iner’s sum gives 1, was introduced in the 1950s.
2.3.2.3 Loads and Stress Intensitv Factors
For more advanced methods of predicting crack growth, it is necessary to be able to model the 
stress applied through the component and in particular near the crack tip, the point at which the 
crack is growing.
The stress intensity factor (SIF) is a convenient measure used :o describe the stress field near the 
crack-tip. The exact form of the expression used to evaluate the SIF, or K, varies according to the 
geometry of the component and crack and the loading mode. For a 2-dimensional crack of size a 
(which may be either depth or Vz the length along the surface ) in an infinite lamina subjected to a 
tensile stress S, K is given by:
(2 .6)
For the more general case, a calibration factor Y may be employed in which case the SIF is written
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as (Kirkemo, 1988; Dharmavasan & Dover, 1988):
K=YS^ |^ â^
where S  is the applied or nominal stress, and here, a is the crack depth at its deepest point, Y is a 
dimensionless factor and is dependent on the local geometry of the crack (such as the curvature of 
the notch tip) and on the loading mode.
Usually three different SIFs, K„ Kg, Kgj, for each of one the loading modes described earlier, may 
be calculated. In the general case, Y can be obtained by analytical methods for simple notches, but 
for semi-elliptical cracks, the evaluation of Y requires applying weight function techniques (some 
of these require the aspect ratio), finite element analysis or experiments or tests.
Once the SIF is found, the actual stress at any point close to the crack tip is now easily calculated. 
The stress is only dependent on the SIF, the distance r to the crack tip and the angle 0 that the line 
from the crack tip to the point in question makes with the crack growth direction, as shown in the 
figure below.
Figure 2.6 Use o f SIF to calculate the actual stress at a point P
Several parametric solutions for the SIF for cracks in flat plates exist. Examples include the 
Newman-Raju model, which is based on finite element analysis results and assumes a semi­
elliptical crack (Newman & Raju, 1981), and the Holdbrook-Dover solution for realistically 
cracked plates (Holdbrook & Dover, 1979).
The complex geometry of tubular joints does not allow analytical solutions for SIFs to be found 
and the flat-plate solutions give over-conservative results when applied to tubular joins due to the 
effects o f  load shedding. Thus two important practical SIF models for tubular joints are the AVS, 
or AVerage Stress (Dover & Dharmavasan, 1982; Dharmavasan, 1983), and the TPM, or Two 
Phase Method, (Kam, 1990) methods. Both are based on actual experimental results from cracked 
tubular joints.
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2.3.2A The Erdogan-Paris Relation
This relation, also known as Paris’ Law, describes crack growth rate for steels in terms of AK, the 




where a represents crack measurement, length or depth, and A' is number of stress cycles and so 
represents time, AK  is the stress range and C and m are constants.
This law is derived from typical log-log plots of da/dN  against the local stress range such as is 
shown in Figure 2,7. It is a typical sigmoidal curve that can be divided into three regions 
corresponding to the phases of fatigue crack growth described earlier. The mid region showing a 
linear relationship between \og(da/dN ) and log (AK) gives Paris’ Law.
Region II 
Paris-Erdcgan




Figure 2.7 Typical fatigue crack growth versus local stress range (Dharmavasan et al, 1994)
The parameters C and m are dependent on the material. For steals used in fixed jacket platforms, 
m has a value of approximately 3 and C around 5 x 10 '^ . The units of C depend on the actual value 
of m and given that the stress range AK  has units MPa m*^ and da/dN  is in m/cyc. The local stress 
range is calculated as follows:
AK = - Kmin (2.10)
As K is undefined in compression, K i^  ^ is taken as zero in :he Mode I loading case. In other 
loading modes, this may not be the case. Fatigue crack growth is dominated by Mode I loads and 
hence other cases are not often considered.
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2.3.3 Fatigue Life of Offshore Structures
Currently two main methods of predicting fatigue life of tubular joints in offshore structures are 
employed (Dover et al, 1991):
1. Use of stress-life curves with a damage assessment procedure
2. Fracture mechanics analysis
The first approach assumes that most of the life of the component is crack initiation. In contrast, 
fracture mechanics theory describes crack growth once a crack is present, that is, it does not predict 
when a crack will grow from a perfect specimen. The period of crack initiation cannot be taken 
into account using standard fracture mechanics theory. Ignoring crack initiation has the effect of 
making the procedure more conservative and, as such, may not be too undesirable. Even so, 
standard fracture mechanics theory can be used to predict the future degradation of a tubular joint, 
given an inspected crack size. Finally, fatigue fracture mechanics does not model the final fracture 
phase.
2.3.3.1 Hot-Spot Stress and Stress Concentration Factors
As fatigue cracks grow in areas of maximum stress, these areas are of particular interest. In 
tubular joints, the point on the intersection with maximum stress is termed the hot-spot. The stress 
at this point, the hot spot stress, is, in effect, the amplification of the nominal stress due to the 
geometry of component; it is a fictitious measure in that it cannot be physically measured. Thus 
to obtain the hot-spot stress, a stress concentration factor (SCF) is used. This is a factor by which 
nominal stress is multiplied to give the hot-spot stress value or actual stress:
^ H S  “  ( 2  1 1 )
Actual stress = Ohs SCF^ (2.12)
where SCF^ = f(a ,p ,y ,t) is the geometric SCF, SCF^ = f(l/r )  is the notch SCF. The parameters 
are r, the radius of curvature of the crack at the notch tip, and a=2L/D, P=J/D, y=D/2T, t= //T  are 
non-dimensional, each representing a different aspect of the geometry of the component, since 
L=chord length, D=chord diameter, d=brace diameter, T=chord thickness and f=brace thickness. 
The M TD report on underwater inspection gives methods o f interpolating for SCF values from 
experimental and tabulated values (MTD, 1989).
Use of Paris’ Law for estimating the life of a tubular joint requires hot-spot stress values. To 
obtain these, first it is necessary to find an accurate SCF value. There are at least seven SCF 
parametric equations that are applicable to welded joints (Dover et al, 1991). The choice of which
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equation to use is not always obvious and the wrong choice can make a substantial difference to 
the estimate of remaining life, for example, up to +/-200%. To choose the most appropriate 
method, it is necessary to compare SCF values given by the equations with experimental values. 
Once the best fitting equation has been chosen, interpolation can then be carried out for unknown 
values.
A review of the SCF equations was carried out in the RISC project (Suganan, 1994). The Gibstein 
(GIB), Kuang et al (KUA), Wordsworth and Smedley (WS), modified Wordsworth and Smedley 
or UEG UR 33 (UEG), Efthymiou and Durkin (ED) and the Hellier, Connolly and Dover (HCD) 
SCF equations were considered. A statistical analysis was performed of the SCF predictions from 
the use of these equations and the results were compared to recorded experimental data on T and 
Y joints for
• both the chord and brace SCF irrespective of the validity range of the equation
• only the chord SCF with the validity range
• only the brace SCF also within the validity range
As can be seen in the Table 2.2, the results showed a wide variation for the first case which
considered the full database of recorded SCFs for 173 joints. The variable being considered is the 
so-called bias factor that is the ratio of the recorded experimental SCF to the predicted SCF. Thus 
a bias factor of 1 is ideal, a value less than one implies over prediction and greater than 1 is under 
prediction. It would be expected that the results would be better for the cases within the validity 
ranges, but this was not always so. For example the Hellier, Connolly and Dover equation showed 
a mean value for the bias factor of 0.67, although with a low standard deviation of 0.11 for brace 
SCFs within the validity range, as compared to the mean value of 0.81 for all welded joints. This 
result may be due to the low number of recorded SCFs in the validity range, which for this example 
was only 9. Only a few atypical SCF values would have an undue influence the analysis results.
Table 2.2 Exam ple SCF predictions for all welded m em bers
KUA ED(F) ED(P) WS UEG HCD
M ean 0.95 1.13 1.01 0.86 0.83 0.81
S.D. 0.35 0.63 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.32
2.3.3.2 The Effect of Corrosion
Extensive experimental work at University College London, NDE Centre, has shown that for 
realistic modelling of the fatigue crack growth in a corrosive environment, a multi-segment crack
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growth rate versus stress range curve is required (Kam, 1990). Figure 2.8 shows a typical multi­
segment curve.
Each straight segment of the curve represents a different set of material C and m values for the 
application of Paris’ Law. Thus, estimating fatigue crack growth in a tubular joint in real 
environments requires these different sets of values together the values on ÂK  axis or da/dN axis 











Figure 2.8 Multi-segment da/dN versus stress range AK (from MTD, 1989)
Work was carried out as part the RISC project to gather data on fatigue crack growth and then this 
was statistically analysed to find best fitting multi-segment curves (Bertini, 1994). A high-level 
materials database was created to contain the C and m sets for some materials in corrosive 
environments to be used by the RISC System.
2.3.4 Summary
To predict the fatigue crack growth in an offshore structure requires the use of a fatigue fracture 
mechanics crack growth model such as Paris’ Law. Such models require data on the applied loads 
and the material properties. For realistic results, the implementation of the model must allow the 
effects of corrosion and the variation of the loading data to be taken into account. In addition, 
careful consideration should be taken of the model uncertainties inherent in the Paris’ Law which 
ignores the early and late crack growth phases.
Chapter 2 56
2.4 Cur rent  IRM  S cheduling  and Planning  M et h o d o lo g ies
The scheduling of IRM actions is in essence a decision problem. It is necessary to carry out some 
form of quantitative analysis that will identify solutions to this decision problem, that is, to 
generate schedules, and give a measure of the effectiveness of each solution. In addition, the 
fatigue life of a welded connection, such as a tubular joint, is influenced by many uncertainties 
such as the wave loading, stress concentration factors, material properties and size and number of 
initial defects. The inspection and repair actions on the tubular joints are subjected to significant 
uncertainty due to the extremely difficult conditions under which they must be performed. It is 
important to incorporate or account for all these uncertainties into the inspection and maintenance 
plans for the stmctures.
IRM planning approaches in the offshore industry, such as the use of the Worst Case Growth 
Curve, attempt to take into account uncertain information and the difficulties of maintenance 
procedures. One method of incorporating uncertainties about the structure and the inspection 
process is to use reliability concepts as a decision tool for inspection planning. Some example IRM 
planning approaches from various industries are reviewed in this section.
2.4.1 Failure Mechanisms
The main potential modes of failure for tubular joints are yielding, buckling, punching, fracture, 
and fatigue damage. Each of these modes must be considered at each potential failure point on the 
structure. The combination of a failure point and an associated failure mode is termed a failure 
element, for example, one possible failure point is the hot spot of the weld of a tubular joint at 
which a fatigue crack may grow.
From a computational point of view, not all failure elements can be considered when estimating 
the reliability of an offshore stmcture. Those elements with the greatest probability are considered. 
Of all the failure modes, fatigue is considered one of the most important maintenance problems in 
the North Sea. Work on the reliability of offshore structures has been concentrated on the 
modelling of fatigue crack growth (Madsen et al, 1987a; Wirsching, 1984; Kirkemo, 1988).
2.4.2 Inspection Reliability
One major uncertainty is due to the inspection itself. Early work carried out within the aerospace 
industry led to the concept of a detectable crack size (aNoi) for a non-destructive inspection (NDI) 
technique to be used with fracture mechanics and crack growth analyses (Rummel et al, 1988). The 
detectable crack size is defined as the minimum defect size that the NDI technique can detect with
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a high probability of success or detection. The concept corresponds to the basic requirement for 
an inspection technique, namely that cracks larger than a given critical size be detected virtually 
every time (Moyzis & Forney, 1982).
M ore generally, the reliability of an NDI technique has been traditionally quantified as the 
probability of crack detection (POD) which is dependent on the crack size (Berens & Hovey, 1982). 
This definition of reliability allows the more usual case that there is no clear detectable crack size 
to be modelled. The POD of an inspection technique is affected by crack qualities other than 
length or depth, for example position, or by human factors, and the required confidence level.
Another general way of describing the ability of a technique to detect is to consider randomness 
of the detectable crack size. Thus the reliability of detection may be modelled as a distribution of 
detectable crack size. Confusingly, the same term, POD, is sometimes employed by reliability 
experts for this description. Regardless, in the experimental work carried out on the reliability of 
NDI techniques and in manufacturers’ specifications, POD refers to a probability and not the 
distribution of detectable crack sizes.
Usually after detection, further work, such as re-inspection and sizing, may be carried out to 
confirm and provide information for crack assessment. Reliability of sizing or probability of sizing 
(POS) will be needed for a complete assessment, and the POS cannot be derived from the POD data 
alone (Kam & Dover, 1987).
The false call rate, that is, the probability of a nonexisting crack being detected, sometimes termed 
the probability of false indications (PFl), should also be taken into account. The accept/reject 
decision level affects the detection capability of the technique; if all indications are accepted then 
the POD and PFl values for the technique will be high. Conversely, if few indications are accepted, 
so eliminating all spurious indications, the PFl and the POD will be low. A high PFl value is, of 
course, undesirable since unnecessary repairs would be carried out, while a high POD value is very 
desirable. Therefore a careful balance has to be made in choosing the acceptance decision level 
for reasonable values of both the PFl and POD (Wall & Wedgewood, 1994).
In the ideal situation, the three factors, represented by POD, POS and PFl values, need to be 
considered to make a thorough assessment of inspection techniques.
2.4.3 Load and Stress Histories
The loads experienced by offshore stmctures are inherently random, since they are due to winds 
and waves and thus require modelling as such. Since the loads applied are random, the responses 
produced in the stmcture are also random. Many models exist that describe random load histories.
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These range from intricate techniques modelling exactly the loads over a period, to methods 
attempting to condense the loads and responses to one load which produce damage equivalent to 
that caused by the actual loads. This topic is a complex one and is outside the scope of this thesis. 
It suffices here to explain very briefly the two basic approaches to the modelling of wave forces 
(McClelland & Reiffel, 1986) and describe how they are used in the modelling of the responses.
In the deterministic approach, the wave forces are calculated through the detailed consideration of 
a sequence of maximum wave heights representing the variability of the sea. The sequence itself 
can be treated statistically. A detailed analysis of loads due the wave height still requires many 
simplifying assumptions. The alternative approach involves the representation of the sea as power 
spectra, incorporating the variability of the sea directly into the calculations. It involves making 
the assumption of linear superposition, which does not hold true in all situations.
With power spectra, it is possible to model sea-states that are periods during which there is a 
constant characteristic wave. By this it is meant that the distribution representing the loads due to 
waves is invariant with respect to time, that is, a sea-state can be described as a stationary 
stochastic process. A sea-state is defined by the significant wave height that is a characteristic 
value for the wave height, and the wave dominant period, that is a characteristic value for the 
period of the wave. In addition, the power spectra may take into account the directional nature of 
the waves. To complete the model of a changing sea, a scatter diagram is used to represent the 
jo in t occurrence of the significant wave height and dominant time period. Power spectra 
representing different states of load history can be obtained from dynamic stress analyses and can 
be used directly in fatigue analysis. These calculations can be time-consuming, since they involve 
generating the stress history by simulating the waves and hence the stresses experienced by the 
structure, then counting the resulting stress cycles and assessing the fatigue damage.
More rapid methods of carrying out fatigue assessments under random stress histories exist (Kam 
& Dover, 1988). These involve calculating an equivalent stress range that is, an imaginary 
constant amplitude stress range causing the same total fatigue damage over the same number of 
cycles as the random stress history. The equivalent stress range method requires some modification 
if it is to be used for prediction. The random nature of sea-states requires the equivalent stress 
range to be described statistically by use of the stress range probability density function (SRPD).
2.4.4 O th er Factors
2.4.4.1 Repair Actions
The effects of repairs carried out in situ may not be as expected. For instance, since underwater 
welding is very difficult, it is possible that the crack being repaired is replaced by worse defects
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in the new weld. It is also possible, although not likely, that grinding carried out to remove a
detected crack may, by reducing the thickness of the member, reduce the strength of the node.
Certainly, the reduced thickness does lead to a shorter period before new cracks grow to through­
thickness.
For these reasons, the choice of when and how to repair, requires careful consideration. The 
changes to the node caused by a repair require modelling in some form.
2.4.4.2 Costs and Measures of Utility
In the problem of rational IRM planning, the cost, or other utility measure, for each action and the 
consequence of failure are required. Unfortunately, predicting these exactly is not always possible. 
There is no systematic method of considering how to incorporate uncertainties in costs into the 
required analyses, save perhaps by the use of fuzzy logic, which is described in Chapter 4. Ad hoc 
methods may be employed, such as not attaching great incçortance to the exact values and 
considering a range of costs to be approximately equivalent. For instance, a simplistic example 
is that of comparing two plans with associated values of £150000 and £150500. A difference of 
£500 could be considered negligible and thus the two plans would have equal worth. This 
simplistic approach does require deciding on the allowable ranges, that is, the granularity has to 
be defined. Fuzzy logic may overcome some of these problems, but as explained in Chapter 4 it 
introduces other difficulties.
2.4.4.5 Gross Errors and Human Factors
Although reliability methods provide a more rational basis for inspection planning, accounting for 
gross errors within the analysis is difficult. For most work in this area, it is considered that these 
errors are accounted for within the procedure to carry out the inspection and to report the results. 
The procedures are set up to attempt to minimise the effects of any mistakes by divers and top-side 
operators of inspection equipment.
2.4.5 Current Work in Inspection Planning
Several different approaches have been investigated which seek to account for the uncertainties 
described above. The approaches vary from deterministic analyses, such as the W orst Case Crack 
Growth which uses upper or lower bounds for the variables of interest, to pure stochastic methods 
which make full use of distributions of random variables and time variance of loads. In addition, 
they differ in terms of the variables taken into account. For instance, the Receiver Operating Curve 
procedure, also known as the Relative Operating Curve, considers in detail the effect of the false 
call rate and the POD for an NDI technique, but does not use other factors explicitly. On the other
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hand, general structural reliability analysis methods attempt to consider all uncertainties. Other 
procedures emphasise a few of the factors, while trying to include other possibly less important 
factors. Some possible approaches to aid inspection planning are described here.
2.4.5.1 W orst Case Crack Growth
One methodology, which is essentially deterministic, uses a worst case crack growth curve and the 
idea of a detectable crack size (andi) for an NDI technique. A worst case crack development curve 
is found by carrying out analyses using subjective choices bounding values for the input 
parameters, that is, for the stresses, and the material properties.
By not allowing cracks to grow beyond the critical size, within one inspection interval, a 
maximum allowable starting size or a maximum interval between inspections can be determined. 
The starting value determines the minimum allowable ûndi and hence the NDI techniques which 
may be used for a particular inspection interval. An example curve is shown in Figure 2.9.
Crack A  
Size
Intpcction Inlaival Time
Figure 2.9 Crack growth and the concept
This approach has been extended to provide flexible definitions of ûndi to allow variable 
inspection intervals (see Figure 2.10), but it is restricted to considering only a few of the total 
uncertainties (Kam, 1988).
A  disadvantage of this type of semi-deterministic approach is that the predicted crack growth could 
be made excessively conservative since only bounding values are used. The lack of a common 
measure o f fitness makes it difficult to compare the reliability o f different components. Another 
point to note is that these approaches are detection-based strategies. Fracture mechanics is only 
used for determining a^Di not for in-service assessment o f  defects. In-service crack growth 
assessment is required in the offshore industry, since repair is not always an efficient solution in 
the short term, since the size of the offshore components and the environment mean that repairs 
may be o f low quality.
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Figure 2.10 Inspection planning using the approach 
The Relative Operating Characteristic (ROC) Method
This decision tool takes into account variation due to human operator skill and makes an economic 
argument based on the capabilities o f inspection techniques only (Spanner, 1988; Kam, 1989a). 
In medicine, a similar technique is known as Receiver Operating Curve (Wall & Wedgwood, 1994).
As the criteria for a successful detection varies from exacting to less demanding, the POD for an 
inspection technique increases. The false call rate or PFl, however, will also increase, although 
usually at a slower rate. A Relative Operating Characteristic (ROC) graph can be obtained by 
plotting the POD versus the PFl for an NDI technique as shown in Figure 2.11. A measure of merit 
for the technique is given by twice the area between the curve and the diagonal, that is, the integral 
of the POD with respect to the PFL For the perfect technique, that is, one which will detect all 
cracks, POD = 1 irrespective of the detection criteria, and so the area is 0.5. For a useless 
technique, the PFl is the same as giving correct information, that is, PFl =POD and the area is 0.
O 1
Figure 2.11 A typical Receiver Operating Curve with Value Line
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The economic decision required is to ensure that employing the technique adds value to the system. 
The value of the inspection can be calculated by considering the number of spurious indications 
and of both the missed and detected defects, obtained from the original population of defects, with 
associated costs. A straight Value Line, representing no-added-value, can be plotted on the ROC 
graph. Thus the points on the ROC which lie above the Value Line give positive added value, and 
the point furthest from the line, point P in the diagram above, represents the maximum added value.
Indirectly, the ROC method may take fatigue, or other failure modes, into account by using fatigue 
fracture mechanics, or other failure models, to decide what is a potentially damaging defect and 
to evaluate the consequences of missing a defect. Furthermore, crack growth predictions may be 
used to plot several Value Lines on the ROC graphs, where each line represents a new point in time 
and therefore a different assumed population of cracks. The point with the best overall added value 
can be identified from the family of curves. This point lies on the Value Line corresponding to the 
optimum inspection time and would indicate the optimum accept/reject criteria to be adopted.
2.4.5.3 Fatigue Reliabilitv
Another method, proposed by Connolly (1994), uses fatigue fracture mechanics and its starting 
point is the distribution of initial crack or defect sizes present in the structure after fabrication. The 
aim of this method is to use POD values directly as defined by the NDE specialists, as opposed to 
the distribution of the detectable crack size. The method is applied to one component at a time and 
takes no account of future inspection or repair actions.
Other very recent work considering fatigue is reported by Zimmerman and Banon from Exxon 
(1994). The method applies simple system reliability concepts, as will be described in Section 
3.2.4, to the structure and probability of fatigue failure is computed using the Monte Carlo 
technique.
2.4.5.4 The MSG -3 Method
This is an example taken from another industry. MSG is an analytical methodology developed by 
the Air Transport Association o f America for the implementation o f a reliability centred 
maintenance strategy (Brascamp, 1991). The third version, MSG-3, was introduced in 1980.
MSG-3 is employed to define, at the design stage, an initial maintenance strategy for a structure. 
If a satisfactory maintenance strategy cannot be defined, then redesign of the structure is required. 
During the life of the structure, the data and information arising from maintenance tasks are fed 
back into the maintenance strategy.
The approach is structured and systematic: the first step is to identify maintenance elements: 
Chapter 2 63
components or subsystems of the structure that can be treated as an individual item on which some 
maintenance task will be required. The next step is to divide the strategy into two areas o f concern.
One area considers the failure effects or consequences for each maintenance element. The 
procedure at this stage is similar to the failure mode effects analysis (FMEA) approach o f classical 
reliability theory. Failure modes are classified according to whether or not they can be easily 
detected within the normal operation of the stmcture and according to the type of consequence, of 
which there are two in MSG-3; safety failures leading to a hazardous situation and operational 
failures leading to an economic problem.
The second area of concern is that of identifying maintenance tasks and their order o f preference. 
For instance, carrying out routine maintenance before repair is preferable. In certain situations and 
for certain components, some tasks may not be feasible. For example, inspection may be the only 
routine task that may be carried out on certain irreparable components, and at som e point 
replacement may be the only suitable option.
M SG-3 determines practicable maintenance strategies for a stmcture and produces valuable 
maintenance plans at the design stage. Such a pragmatic philosophy allows what is a 
fundamentally difficult problem to be tackled and at least partly solved.
2.4.5.5 Risk and the ALARP Principle
The Health and Safety Executive in the UK has applied a systems approach to general safety
management in many industries (Birkinshaw et al, 1993). This approach considers the organisation
required o f the corporate body to achieve the safety objectives set; the identification and 
assessment o f the hazards and risks; the application o f safety plans; the monitoring and control 
activities; and, finally, the audits and reviews of the safety procedures and the strategies employed. 
Notwithstanding this, setting appropriate safety targets requires an understanding of levels o f risk.
The accepted definition of risk is given as
Risk = POF X  Consequence (2.13)
where POF is the probability o f a failure event and the Consequence is usually expressed 
quantitatively as the total costs associated with the failure and provides the context. The failure 
costs can include the cost related to closing down the stmcture after the event, the often very much 
lower repair cost, and, at the other extreme the cost associated with injuries and fatalities. 
Although the last are hard to quantify, figures have been published by HSE and others that have 
been used in cost-benefit analyses of public projects and these vary according to the type o f project.
For any decision problem involving a choice between courses of actions, there is clearly some point 
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at which the risks are perceived to be unacceptably high and the action is rejected; conversely, for 
very low risks, the decision is to carry out the action. In the mid-region, the decision becomes 
complicated. The HSE uses the term As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) to indicate this 
mid-region where reducing risks to a minimum practicable level is desirable. Setting of the upper 
and lower bounds for the ALARP region is dictated by regulatory and social considerations.
The ALARP principle makes explicit the idea that there is a grey area where risk may be tolerated, 
if it has been considered and reduced wherever possible. Reduction of the levels of risk is carried 
out by balancing the costs of carrying out a safety action against the marginal reduction in the costs 
associated with the risk.
U nacceptable
Region






Figure 2.12 The ALARP principle
2.4.5.Ô Structural Reliabilitv Methods
In the last decade, modern reliability methods have become accepted tools in several industries 
such as offshore, nuclear and aerospace. The potential of modem reliability methods as decision 
support tools in engineering applications lies'in the consistent modelling of uncertainties. These 
methods provide the means to compare the consequences of different actions and designs, as in the 
fatigue design of offshore structures (Dalane et al, 1990).
In more recent years, the application of modern reliability methods within the framework of 
classical decision theory to inspection and maintenance planning of engineering systems subject 
to uncertain deterioration processes has been investigated (see Thoft-Christensen & Baker, 1982; 
Faber et al, 1992). The work has led to a consistent framework for evaluation of the consequences, 
as expected costs, of carrying out different inspection and repair actions. The evaluation of 
expected costs allows optimisation of the overall inspection and maintenance plan for a given
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structure within its anticipated lifetime.
Other examples of the full use of structural reliability is in the work by Det norske Veritas 
(Lotsberg & Marley, 1992) and by WS Atkins (Gierlinski et al, 1993). DnV has now introduced 
inspection planning based on target reliability measures. These are based on annual probability of 
failures and crack growth as the only measure of fatigue damage. Inspection can result in no 
detection or detection followed by measurement of a crack. Updating can be carried out with direct 
measurements of stress and gross errors are not accounted for directly. WS Atkins carry out full 
reliability assessments of fixed jacket platforms using the software RASOS.
The reliability of the stmcture could be maintained in several ways, such as by carrying out repair 
operations at various scales or more frequent inspections. The costs and benefits of these options 
could be assessed in part by making use of reliability-based fracture mechanics analysis.
2.5 D isc u ssio n  and  Conclusions
In this chapter, current inspection procedures have been reviewed. The information from the 
Working Group and the survey of the available documentation o f inspection procedures provided 
the basis for the requirements specification of a decision support system to scheduling of IRM 
actions. The acquisition of information and knowledge took place over many meetings and it was 
clear early on that the information gathering process would be iterative. The results confirmed the 
problem described by Christer et al (1989) that it was difficult to identify the exact decision-making 
procedure in IRM of platforms. Several versions of a report describing the inspection procedure, 
in here Sections 2.1 and 2.2, were circulated among the members of the Working Group until it was 
agreed that the information it contained was representative of what actually happens in the operator 
organisations.
The background to fatigue fracture mechanics has also been described in this chapter. Fatigue 
fracture mechanics theory provides the fundamental concepts required to understand the 
mechanism behind the degradation of a jacket-type platform due to dynamic wind and wave loads, 
and then to predict the crack growth in the tubular welded connections of a platform. This becomes 
the main mechanism for predicting the state of the stmcture for the purpose of planning future IRM 
actions.
A short review of current approaches to maintenance planning has also been given. Included in this 
was a very brief outline to the concept of reliability-based planning and some factors to be taken 
into account. Stmctural reliability analysis is considered to be a promising method of providing
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decision-makers with objective measures by which to base their IRM planning policies.
The three elements considered in this chapter were combined to provide the base assumptions for 
a Reliability based Inspection Scheduling (RISC) methodology. The procedure was restricted to 
consider only the sub-deck and the planning of inspections o f the tubular welded connections of 
steel jacket-type platforms. Only fatigue crack growth is considered as the damage mechanism, 
since fatigue of tubular joints is considered the main area of concern to both the operators and the 
certification authorities.
To implement the RISC methodology, a computer-based knowledge base system, the RISC System, 
was proposed which not only carries out numerical analysis but will aid planning of IRM actions 
taking into account the constraints on operators.
This chapter has provided the background to the problem of IRM planning. A quantitative 
framework is required to make rational and objective decisions based on the assumptions here 
given. In the final section, it was hinted that stmctural reliability analysis is a suitable framework 
for IRM planning, hence a detailed description of stmctural reliability and decision theory as 
applied to scheduling of IRM actions, follows in Chapter 3.
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3 Re l ia b il it y  A n a l y sis  o f  O ffsh o r e  S t r u c t u r e s
Solving the decision-making problem of when, where and how to carry out inspection actions has 
traditionally involved using engineering judgement. A more objective and rational way of 
evaluating structures is to use structural reliability analysis that takes into account the uncertainties 
inherent in the structures and the environment. There is a need to incorporate reliability into a 
system view of offshore structures for the evaluation of inspection, repair and maintenance 
strategies. A system approach requires the use of several techniques and, to enable their 
application, an automated system that can integrate all the various forms of information, the 
methods to be used, the structural model and data, and on appropriate IRM strategies. Such a 
system could present candidate IRM plans to the operators of the structure.
This chapter reviews methods for evaluating the reliability of structures. The fundamental case is 
described and the techniques used to evaluate the reliability of more complex cases are explained. 
The use o f stmctural reliability analysis in the offshore industry and the influence by reliability 
concepts to guidelines and codes are discussed.
The background to decision theory is outlined. The application of decision theory to the problem 
of IRM planning for fixed offshore platforms incorporating fatigue fracture mechanics for tubular 
joints is described. Decision theory provided a framework for an IRM analysis procedure that 
integrated reliability analysis with fatigue fracture mechanics analysis. The procedure was 
implemented as a set of software programs. The work on the analytical procedures was carried out 
in parallel to the design work for the RISC System described in Chapter 5.
3.1 W h y  Reliability  for  O ffshore  Structures?
Although stmctural analyses, and so stmctural codes, have traditionally been based on 
deterministic analyses, there are now concerted moves towards reliability-based analysis that can 
take into account the inherent uncertainties in
• environmental conditions leading to loading variation, both from wave and wind action and 
from unknown conditions
• material properties, since steels cannot be wholly homogeneous
• stmctural geometry, as there are slight variations in diameters of joints etc.
• inspection results, since inspection techniques will not detect all defects and will not be 
completely accurate in sizing
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• analysis models, which are approximations of the real world
Engineering makes use of quantitative models to analyse and evaluate structures. Some methods 
and techniques have become complex and highly elaborate, requiring input data of greater detail 
than may be available to be able to test the predictions made.
In an effort to account for lack of information or doubtful data, deterministic analyses in structural 
engineering usually en^ loy  safety factors, sometimes known as factors of ignorance (Gordon, 
1978). An immediate consequence is that the structures so evaluated are by definition over 
designed. A more serious consequence is that the results gained from such an analysis do not 
provide any long term knowledge about the structure. In the past, failures in structures analysed 
in this way and known to have been constructed as-designed have been attributed to poor materials. 
Such reasoning does not hold for steel structures. Material properties of metals vary by no more 
than a few percent of the characteristic or mean values. Yet the safety factors employed in the 
design of steel structures are usually greater than 2 and hence are more than sufficient to counteract 
any variations in the material properties.
Historically, it was believed that single safety factors were sufficient. It was believed that practical 
absolute limits of load and strength existed and so it was only necessary to use a safety factor to 
account for uncertainties in construction, materials, etc. All that was needed to be able to use a 
safety factor only slightly larger than 1 was more knowledge on the behaviour o f the structure, 
better models and more data.
Currently, it is now understood that for large complex structures in difficult environments, even 
complete knowledge can never lead to complete certainty (see Blockley, 1992). Probabilistic 
analysis is now part of an engineer’s basic set of modelling tools and many textbooks exist on the 
subject, such as that by Ang and Tang (1975) and Jardine (1973). It is also generally accepted to 
be the best type of analysis (Brebbia & Walker, 1979; Madsen et al, 1987b). This is because it will 
give
• a measure of the uncertainty in the outcome of the evaluation of the structure
• indications of any major inadequacies in the modelling of the structure or of the data 
entered
The uncertainty measure is not important in itself, although it can be used to compare different 
designs or actions and to weigh the costs of adopting a course of action as part of risk analysis. 
More important in the long term is the second set of measures which allow targeting of problems 
to be tackled in the future. As data and models are updated, re-analysis adds to knowledge of the 
expected behaviour of the structure.
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3.1.1 Types of Uncertainties
In dealing with uncertainties, Thoft-Christensen and Baker (1982) differentiate between four 
classes:
► Physical uncertainties, that is to say uncertainties in environmental conditions, 
hydrodynamic loading, material properties cannot be ignored nor easily reduced. For 
instance, in fatigue crack growth studies, it is now known the scatter o f data is due to the 
inhomogeneity o f materials (Kirkemo, 1988).
► Statistical uncertainties are possibly due to human errors, though mainly due to 
inaccuracies in measurement, or inadequate sampling (Spanner, 1986).
► Model uncertainties arise from attempting to quantify a problem. Modelling a system  
without making any simplifying assumptions is rarely possible. A  model is an idealized 
representation of the system and thus making highly accurate predictions, no matter how 
accurate the input values are, is not usually possible. Also, unknown effects or unknown 
boundary conditions play their part.
► Gross errors can occur in design, construction, planning, analysis, etc., or arise from 
malfunctioning measurement equipment. Gross errors are usually the result of one-off 
events and hence are not easily modelled.
The first two of these types o f uncertainties can be incorporated into probabilistic reliability 
analyses relatively easily and how this may be done is discussed below. Model uncertainties can 
also be considered if any approximations made can be identified. Gross errors, in contrast, are dealt 
with by considering procedures that will highlight possible problematic situations and so will not 
be covered in detail here (see Anderson & Kragh, 1991; Lotsberg & Marley 1992; Spanner, 1986).
3.2 G eneral  Ba c k g r o u n d  to  R eliability  Analysis
Reliability is the science of evaluating an item's fitness-for-purpose within its required life-span. 
A  useful definition for reliability is given by British Standard BS4778 as
"The ability (probability) of an item to perform a required function under stated 
conditions for a stated period o f time".
There is also a generally accepted mathematical definition for reliability, although even this 
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definition may appear in various forms,
R( )=i-P( ) (3.1)
where R(.) is a measure of reliability as a probability and thus has a value in the interval [0,1], x  
is the vector containing all the relevant controlling parameters, usually including time, a is a set 
of limiting values to distinguish the states of the system, g(.) is the state function of the generalised 
system under investigation defined such that if g (.)< 0  then the system is said to be in a state of 
failure, and P(.) is the probability of the event occurring, hence P(g(^ a ) <0 ) is the probability of 
system failure, sometimes denoted as POF.
The main purpose behind the study of reliability analysis is to attempt to identify common elements 
in the methods of dealing with uncertainties. Yet the definitions given above are too general and 
too abstract for practical use. There are practical difficulties in finding a quantifiable measure of 
reliability, which is appropriate for an application, and of deciding upon, and collecting the data 
for, the relevant parameters. Because of these difficulties, various interpretations of reliability have 
evolved in different industries, each developed according to the particular requirements for the 
relevant application.
The following sections explain the particular methods developed for structural reliability analysis 
with reference to offshore structures. Inspection and maintenance uncertainties are important to 
structural reliability when considering the lifetime of the structure. Fatigue fracture mechanics 
theory, which is specially relevant to fixed steel jacket-type platforms in the North Sea, can be 
incorporated into reliability analysis by defining failure in terms of the size of fatigue cracks in 
welded tubular joints.
It has long been recognised that the reliability of a structure is best judged from a systems 
perspective taking into account the interactions between the components making up the structure. 
Ideally, aspects such as the economics of construction, maintenance and long term management 
should also be included in the equation as made clear in very early commentary by Forsell from 
1924 (Lind, 1970) and an early paper by Gordon (1957). These considerations can alter the way 
in which the methods are implemented and applied.
3.2.1 Uncertainties in Structures
Consider the strength (plastic moment, buckling strength, fracture toughness, etc.) and loading 
(maximum bending moment, buckling load, stress intensity factor, etc.) values in any structure or 
component (Figure 3.1). Both strength R and the loading S could be, and in the real world usually 
are, random variables. The failure of the component does not depend on the absolute values of the
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two variables, but on the difference between the two. That is, failure occurs when the loading is 
greater than the strength, whatever the values of strength and loads.
Com ponent A 
frequency
C om ponent B 
frequency
S* R.SR.S
Figure 3.1 Loading and strength variations fo r  two components
A simple assessment based on comparing some form of characterisation values, such as for instance 
the mean values, in Figure 3.1 represented by S* and R*, is not a complete assessment of the 
reliability of these components. For example, the difference between R* and S* for both the 
components is the same, but it is obvious that component A is more reliable than component B. 
The area of overlap suggests where the structure is unsafe. To quantify the reliability of a 
component, a more advanced approach for reliability assessment than just comparing the means 
is required.
3.2.2 The Limit State Function
The lim it state function oi failure function is introduced to formulate a universal approach for 
reliability analysis. The failure function g(.) is defined to describe the failure of a structural 
component such that whenever g(.) falls below zero, the component or system is then said to be in 
a state of failure, similarly whenever g(.) is above zero then the system is said to be safe or 
functioning. For example, in a simple strength against loading situation, a safety margin M may 
be taken to be
M = R - S (3.2a)
The corresponding limit state function is then
g{r, s) = r - s  (3.2b)
where r and s are realisations of R, the resistance or strength of the component, and S, the stresses
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or loads applied to the component.
The boundary g{r, 5) = 0 is called Ü\q failure surface or the lim it state. The probability of failure 
(POF) is given by
0
POF = P( g < 0 ) = jf^ (x)dx  = F g (0 ) (3.3)
where fg(x) is the probability density function of g(.) and Fg(%) is the cumulative distribution 
function of g(.).
More generally, the safety margin may be defined in terms of many basic variables X, say, which 
in general are random, with a corresponding failure function g (^ , which divides the space of the 
basic variables into two regions: the failure space, given by g(x)<0, and the region of safety or 
where the component can be said to be functioning, given by g(x)>0. If the joint probability density 
function /xCï) is known, then the POF can be calculated by noting that the POF is exactly the 
probability that the joint random variables are in the failure space:
POF = /  f ^ d ^
g ( i ) < 0
3.2.2.1 The Fundamental Case
Consider in more detail the case above when g has only two independent variables, R and S, but 
where it is known that each variable is normally distributed as shown in Figure 3.2. Given the 
well-known properties of linear functions of normally distributed variables, the resulting value of 
the failure function g = r-s is also normally distributed.
pdf
f (g)
Figure 3.2 Normally distributed strength and loading random variables R and S 
The mean and standard deviation of g are easily calculated by
P g  — P r  ■ P s (3.5a)
(3.5b)
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Since failure occurs when g <0, then the area under the graph of f^ig) for g <0 in Figure 3.2 
represents the probability of failure. From equation 3.4, and by standardising the normally 
distributed random variable g, the POF is given by:
=1 (3.6)
^ g  g
where 0 ( )  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, which is tabulated.
If R and S are not normally distributed, then there are other combinations of distributions, such as 
lognormal and normal, lognormal and exponential, etc., where the exact POF can be calculated by 
using equation 3.3 in a similar manner. Furthermore, equation 3.4 may be used easily in cases 
where the joint distribution function is a product of the individual distribution functions, that is 
where the random variables are independent, and where the failure space can be clearly defined in 
terms of the limits of the multi-variable integral.
For the general case involving many non-normally distributed random and possibly correlated 
variables, the evaluation of equations 3.3 or 3.4 is usually very complex as it involves multi­
dimensional volume integrals. Such integrals are often very difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate 
analytically. Because of this, alternative methods are required to estimate the probability of failure 
of a component.
3.2.2.2 A Definition of the Reliabilitv Index
In order to overcome the problem explained above, the results of the Central Limit Theorem may 
be called into play. This theorem states that for non-normally distributed random variables X,, Xj, 
... Xn, the random variable Y, a linear combination of X,, X ,, ... X^, (that is, Y= X, ), will 
become normally distributed as N tends to infinity. The mean and standard deviation of Y can then 
be approximated by the values obtained from the corresponding expressions assuming normal 
distributions for X,, Xj, ... X^. The theorem in effect allows the approximation of the POF by 
calculating the ratio of the sample mean of g to the sample standard deviation of g, and then 
exploiting the relationship:
(3.7)
It has been found that this expression does provide a good estimate for POF in many practical 
situations where the failure function can be given as a linear combination of several basic variables. 
It also has the advantage of requiring the use of only the first two moments of the basic variables. 
M ost of the available data or information on realistic structural performance is sufficient to 
evaluate only the first and the second moments for the population from the sample, that is, the
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sample mean values and variance of the respective random variables including the covariances of 
pairs of variables. Practical measures of safety or reliability, therefore, are necessarily limited to 
evaluations based on these first two moments.
As the ratio of the mean of g to the standard deviation of g is often easy to calculate given the 
limitations, and as the POP is easily estimated from this ratio, Cornell defined it as the reliability 
index (Pc) (see Thoft-Christensen & Baker, 1982):
Pc“ Pg/^g (3 8)
Another point to note here is that the assumption still being made is that the failure function is a 
linear one. In the case when the failure function is not linear, then the definition above has to be 
extended, but the idea behind Cornell's reliability index is the basis of what is known as a Level 
n  technique. The various levels of structural reliability analysis techniques are next explained, 
before considering the general non-linear failure function.
3.2.3 Levels of Structural Reliability Analysis
Most structural reliability analysis is complex and many methods exist for idealising and 
simplifying stmctures for different types of problems. It is convenient to classify analysis methods 
into levels of approximation (Thoft-Christensen & Baker, 1982):
■ Level I
These methods, which take only a characteristic value for each parameter, are termed Level I 
methods. They usually only provide a pass or fail result. Although not complete methods of 
reliability assessment. Level I methods can be used for very rapid assessment. Design codes that 
include a checking procedure are in effect Level I methods.
■ Level II
Methods that employ only two values of each uncertain parameter, usually the mean and variance 
with some measure of correlation such as the covariance, are termed Level II methods. These 
methods employ approximations and iterative procedures to calculate an approximation to the 
probability of failure.
■ Level III
Techniques used to carry out full reliability analysis, without any idealisations taking place as to 
the random variables involved, in particular in terms of joint distributions and the failure region, 
are classified as Level HI methods. The resulting POP values are accurate, given model
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uncertainties and errors in data collection. As indicated in the above simple example, full Level 
m  analysis is usually very difficult unless the state function is composed of normally distributed 
random parameters. Therefore, in practice and in general. Level I or II methods are used. Level 
in  methods may be employed for the purposes of the calibration of values used in the approximate 
methods.
■ Level IV
For completeness only, it is fit to mention this classification which is sometimes mentioned in 
literature (Gnedenko & Ushakov, 1995). Level IV methods are in essence Level HI methods 
incorporating economic models. The application of such methods is also known as risk analysis.
3.2.3.1 Overview of Level II Analvsis
In Level II methods, the exact POP is not evaluated directly. Instead the method seeks to find a 
measure of reliability that can give an estimate for the POP in some way. In Section 3.2.2.2, the 
use of Cornell’s reliability index was explained for estimating the POP for a system with a linear 
failure function. In this section, the case of nonlinear failure functions is now considered. To 
understand the idea, the simplest and fundamental case o f S and R, two normally distributed 
variables, and the failure function g = r-s is again considered:
A set of transformed variables is calculated:
The state function is then transformed into
(3.10)
For the limit state (g = 0), equation 3.10 describes straight lines both in the space of the basic 
variables R and S and in the transformed space of Z, and Z? (see Figure 3.3).
Prom analytical geometry, the shortest distance of this line from the origin is
(3.11)
/ôpôs
This is exactly the reliability index as defined by Cornell for this case of a linear failure function 
and normally distributed random variables. When the failure function is not linear then Cornell’s 
reliability index, although useful and practical, has no physical basis.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.3 Linear failure surfaces (a) in the R, S space and (b) in the Z,, Z2 space
The development given above does lead to a more stringent definition by Hasofer and Lind of the 
reliability index ((3) or the safety index as the shortest distance from the failure function to the 
origin in the space of standardised normal random variables. This is given by
P -  min
i e « ( i ) = 0 \
(3 .12)
where the Zj represent the standard normal basic random variables on the failure surface, that is, 
on the line g(z) = 0. The point P on the failure surface which is closest to the origin is termed the 
design point. The distance from the design point to the origin is a more convenient parameter to 
describe the reliability of the strength versus load system and other more complex systems, as it 
remains invariant for the same failure space.
To explain the relevance of invariance of the reliability measure, consider the same fundamental 
problem as before: two normally distributed random variables R, representing strength, and S, 
representing loads applied. The safety margin M= R -S  has already been discussed. The form of 
the safety margin is clearly a choice: another reasonable choice for the safety margin, with its 
corresponding failure function, is




This safety margin is as appropriate as M=R-S, since its corresponding failure function g(r,s) 
would satisfy the conditions that g(.)<0 for failure and g(.) > 0 for safety.
The Cornell reliability index for this failure function can be calculated to be:
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and this is clearly different from the expression for Cornell’s reliability index obtained for the 
safety margin M = R - S.
If the space of the basic variables R and S is considered, the limit state or failure surface for the 
case M=R-S will be the same for both safety margins since the same set of points will form the 
failure region, as shown in Figure 3.3(a). The reliability index as defined by Hasofer and Lind will 
give then the same result for different but equivalent failure functions. The property of invariance 
of the equivalent failure functions is very desirable and so this definition is more often preferred.
The reliability index approach is the basis of the advanced Level U formulation that uses only the 
first and second moments of the random variables to estimate the probability of failure for a 
structure (Thoft-Christensen & Baker, 1982; Thoft-Christensen & Murotsu, 1984).
The exact relation of the reliability index to the probability of failure, for the case of normally 
distributed basic random variables and a linear failure function, is exploited to estimate the POP 
for all other cases:
POP -  1 - 0(P) = 0  (-P ) (3.15)
where 0 ( .)  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
In general then, if the state function consists of linear, uncorrelated and normally distributed basic 
variables. Level II and Level IQ analyses would give the same result.
3.2.3.2 The General Level Q Method
The approach discussed above has been extended to study the interference of multiple (more than 
two), correlated, mixed normal and non-normal random variables and non-linear state functions. 
As the argument is a geometric one, the technique is based on finding this minimum distance in the 
failure space of the standardised, normalised random variables, which will require approximating 
the failure surface by a tangent surface at each point. Thus, Level Q analysis is iterative.
The steps taken for Level Q analysis are:
1. Transform the given system of basic variables into a set of normalised and standardised 
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random variables
X : - > Z  <=> Z = T{X) (3.16)
2. Approximate the failure surface given by g(Z) = 0 by a tangent surface h^(Z) that is more
easily analysed, such that at a point Pp which has coordinates ^  close to the design point
P ,h /Z ,)  = g(Z,)
3. The surface h^(Z) is then used to find a new point ?r+, closer to P, which in turn is used to
define a new hr+i(Z)-
4. The process repeats from step 2.
3.2.3.3 First and Second Order Reliabilitv Method
If the tangent surface h(Z) = 0 is a hyper plane, that is, if the failure surface is linearised, the 
method is called First Order Reliability Method (FORM) (see Figure 3.4). If h(Z^ = 0 describes 
a hyper parabolic surface then this is Second Order Reliability Method (SORM).
SORM generally leads to quicker convergence to the design point. It has the disadvantage of being 






Figure 3.4 Tangent surfaces to the failure surface at point P,.
The approximation to the failure surface is easily achieved by considering a Taylor’s series 
expansion of the failure surface and taking the constant and terms in z, in the case of FORM, or 
terms up to and including z /  for SORM.
The definition of the reliability index by Cornell is often in practice a good approximation to the 
more formal Hasofer and Lind definition. Hence, calculating the ratio of the mean to the standard
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deviation of the limit state function is often carried out for a first estimate o f the reliability of a 
component. O f course, if the state function is normally distributed, then Cornell’s reliability index 
provides an exact measure of reliability.
3.2.4 Extending Structural Reliability Analysis
The SORM and FORM techniques employed for evaluating the reliability index for a structure are 
approximations. In spite of this, the basic procedure can be computationally intensive if employed 
on complex cases. Because of this, avoiding full Level H analysis is desirable whenever possible.
Two basic ways of extending the reliability analysis techniques discussed can be considered:
• complex failure modes for components
• systems o f components
The following explains methods that help to reduce the computational effort,
3,2.4.1 Updating the Reliabilitv Index
One method o f reducing the need to carry out component level analysis, is to take advantage of 
Bayesian updating of the reliability index. Updating can be employed when an evaluation o f the 
reliability index has already been carried out, but new information on the structure requires a re- 
evaluation of this index. One example is that of using a recent inspection result for a tubular joint 
to update the reliability index for after the inspection.
The basic idea behind Bayesian updating is the application of Bayes’ Theorem, which is given by;
P{A\A)P{A)
where A is a subset of the world o f possible exclusive events {A J. The event A could represent 
the result of an inspection of a component and the {Ai} could be the state o f the component, where 
for instance. A, = failure and Aj = safety. Here the state events are exclusive, since the component 
cannot fail and be safe simultaneously. An inspection result is a subset o f (failure, safety}, since 
failure or safety and inspection results are not mutually exclusive and, o f course, (failure, safety} 
covers all possibilities.
For Bayesian updating o f the probabilities to be applicable, the following conditions must hold 
(Turkstra, 1969):
1 All possible future events can be listed.
2 There exist well-defined relative probabilities for all events.
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3 There exist measures of the undesirability of all events.
In other words, for every action Aj, all possible outcomes or events Ey with their probabilities p(Ejj) 
and costs Uy, can be given. The total cost for Aj is given by
Ti = Z p ( E y ) U y  (3.18)
From this, the total cost, Tj, is an expected value.
In the situation where the absolute probabilities of failure or safety, P (A J and PCAj), are known 
and the probability of any inspection result, given the failure or safety of the component is known, 
P(AIAi) and PCAIAj), then obtaining the probability of failure given an inspection result P(A,IA) 
is simple. Thus, the updating procedure allows the consideration of conditional probabilities, that 
is, given new information, the reliability index can be updated without having to carry out the 
lengthy methods described earlier.
3.2.4.2 Svstems Reliabilitv
The above discussion has concentrated on component level reliability analysis. For structures, 
taking a systems point of view, that requires being able to evaluate the reliability of the system as 
a whole is important. Systems reliability evaluation requires a consideration of the effect of failure 
of each component and of every combination of components on the reliability of the structure.
Systems modelling can be carried out in various ways. One of the most commonly used approaches 
to evaluating the reliability of structural systems is to consider block diagrams (Bentley, 1996). 
There are two fundamental ways of combining components according to reliability considerations:
• Series structure, where all components in the system are required to carry out the task, that 
is, failure of any one component leads to system failure.
• Parallel structure, where components share the task and hence all components have to fail 
for system failure to occur.
Block diagrams are drawn to represent the combinations as shown in Figure 3.5.
These diagrams do not necessarily represent how the components are physically joined. For 
example, a parallel connection of capacitors would represent a series system in a reliability sense, 
as each capacitor needs to function for the system to function. Another example is that of the legs 
of an offshore structure. Physically, these are approximately in parallel, but if failure is defined 
as an event requiring cessation of production to allow major repairs to take place then the loss of 
any one leg would constitute failure. Thus, the main legs o f a jacket platform represent a series 
system.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.5 Components combined (a) in series and (b) in parallel
At this point it is important to note that, as before for reliability analysis at component level, the 
definition of failure needs to be stated clearly. Returning to the example of the legs of a platform, 
if failure were redefined as the formation of a mechanical hinge in the frame, i.e. total collapse of 
the structure and as failure of one leg would not cause a hinge mechanism to form, then the legs 
of a six-legged platform would form a parallel system.
Parallel systems are often employed to provide redundancy. A fixed offshore platform is a 
redundant system since groups of components share the task o f supporting a load. The effect of 
redundancy is to increase overall reliability. Fail-safe design is based on these considerations, 
since failure of a component will not lead to the immediate failure of the whole system. Series 
systems, on the other hand, are the most common in practical engineering terms, in that it is usually 
required that all components of a system function. Failure of one joint in a platform may not lead 
to collapse of the structure, but in terms of evaluating maintenance, the need for repair may be 
considered to be failure and if repair must always be carried out, the platform is in effect a series 
system.
The reliability of a simple parallel system can be calculated relatively easily given the reliability 
or POF of each component and that the failure of each component has no effect on the failure of 
the other components. The probability of failure POF for a parallel system is represented by P( F, 
and Fj and .... F J  where Fj is the event that the component fails. If events are independent then,
n
POF=P(F| and Fj and ... F„)=P(F,)x ...P (FJ=  H  P(F|) (3.19)
i=l
The reliability of a simple parallel system is then given by
R=i- n  p(Ff) (3.20)
1 =  1
The probability of failure for a series system is represented by P(F, or Fj or ... F„) where F; is the 
event that the i^ component fails. The assumption of exclusivity is not a sensible one as failure of 
any one component does not preclude failure of any other. Therefore, this probability of failure 
is not easily derived directly. Instead it is easier to consider the reliability of the system R =
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P(system functions or is safe). Since a series system functions if all its components function or are 
safe, R is given by P(S, and Sj and ... S J  where Sj is the event that the component is safe. So 
for a simple series system.
R=P(S,)X ...P(S„)= r i  P(Si)= i t (3,21)
i = l
Pure series or parallel systems rarely occur in practice. In fact, for parallel systems, often more 
than one component needs to function for the system to function. These are termed k-out-of-n 
structures: where k components must function for the system with a total of n components to 
function. A simple example of this that of a system of 3 pipelines carrying a fluid, each capable 
of carrying 100 gallons per second. Thus, if all are functioning, a total of 300 gallons per second 
can be carried. If it is expected that a minimum of 150 gallons per second must be carried, then 
at least 2 pipelines must be functioning. This is then a 2-out-3 structure. The evaluation of such 
a structure is more complex, but usually not impossible.
To model complex systems, the two simple series and parallel models are combined. It is relatively 
easy to calculate the reliability of a pure series-parallel systems, that is, a series system of parallel 
subsystems, or a parallel-series systems, a parallel system o f series subsystems.
(a) b)
Figure 3.6 (a) Series - parallel and (b) parallel - series systems
An example of a combined system is that of two computers monitoring a process. The computers 
form a parallel system since if one fails the other one can still carry out the task. Each computer 
could be considered a series system of components, since if any one of a computer’s components 
fails then the whole computer fails. For jacket platforms, which are redundant frame structures, 
it is usual to model these as a series system of highly critical substructures. The substructures are 
systems of components carrying out a load-sharing task.
In the idealised situation, where all failures are independent and where the parallel systems are 
purely parallel, that is, only one component needs to function for the parallel system to function, 
then the calculation of the reliability for a given series-parallel model of a structure is
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straightforward. In the real world and non-ideal situation, three issues arise:
► Failures of components, such as joints, are rarely independent, since failure of one joint 
usually indicates that the environmental conditions differ from those assumed during 
design and this would have a bearing on the rest of the structure.
► There a very few pure parallel systems; out of a group of components sharing a load, it is 
usually the case that more than one component is required to carry the total load.
► Defining a suitable model of the stmcture is not an easy task, as it requires identifying all 
the sets of components which share loads, that is all possible combinations o f failure 
leading to failure of the structure.
To add to the above complications, a block representing the failure of one component may appear 
in two or more parallel subsystems, in which case, the assumption of independence is no longer 
reasonable.
Given a model, it is possible to calculate upper and lower bounds for the POF by making use of 
assumptions of independence and pure parallel systems. These methods are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but may be found in any textbook considering systems reliability (for example, Ang & 
Tang, 1984) and also in the literature considering structural reliability (Thoft-Christensen & 
Murotsu, 1984).
Additionally, an approximation to the model is often acceptable. Instead of attempting to identify 
all parallel subsystems, only the most important are identified and sometimes a maximum number 
of components per subsystem are considered. The simplification reduces the computation involved 
in calculating the total POF for the structure. Unfortunately, the problem remains of identifying 
the components and parallel subsystems making up the approximate model for structure. 
Considered components and subsystems are those whose failure has a substantial impact of the 
POF of the structure and have high POFs, and thus they are critical to the system. Any method that 
identifies the important components will also carry out some evaluation of the POF for the structure 
and require some information on the POF of the component.
Methods of estimating the POF for a structural system and identifying the series-parallel model 
include two techniques that are specific to structural reliability analysis:
■ P-Unzipping
In this method developed at the University of Aalborg, each component’s reliability index is 
calculated using the FORM and SORM techniques (Thoft-Christensen & Baker, 1982; Thoft- 
Christensen & Murotsu, 1984).
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The technique exploits the concept of approximating the systems model as a series-parallel system 
with a maximum number of components per parallel system. If the maximum number is 1 then this 
results in a pure series system; if 2, then the model is a series system of parallel systems with only 
two components; and so on. This is termed systems modelling at level N, where N is the maximum 
number of components allowed. Thoft-Christensen and Baker (1982) use level 2 modelling for 
fixed platforms, since the POF of a 2-element parallel system can be calculated easily even when 
allowing for dependencies.
Figure 3.7 Level 2 modelling o f  a structure
The method constructs a systems model at level N as an approximation to the actual structure and 
at the same time calculates the reliability of the model. The model is created by identifying the 
components which have the greatest impact on the reliability of the structure. The procedure first 
considers the reliability index values for all the components. Certainly the components with lowest 
P values are to be considered for inclusion. A maximum P value is required to limit the number 
of components considered. This value is set in an ad hoc fashion by considering the total number 
of components and using experience to decide on a reasonable proportion to be included for a 
particular structure. For each of these components, its failure is simulated and the new reliability 
of all remaining components is calculated. The P values for each combination of two failures can 
now be calculated and any with a P value higher than the maximum is discarded. If the process 
stops at the point of identifying only important pairs of components, the result is a level 2 systems 
model. Assuming exact POFs for each component, the exact POF for this model can be calculated. 
This is not the exact for the real structure, but assuming good approximations for the POF of each 
component, the level 2 model POF often gives a reasonable approximation to the POF for the actual 
system. Continuing the process allows the structure to be modelled to any required level N.
The P-Unzipping method can be extended by considering ways in which a sensible choice of the 
definition of the range of the reliability index values can be made. One interesting example of 
extending this approach is given by Chen et al (1996).
■ Branch-and-Bound
This technique is taken from operational research and has been applied to the same problem at the 
University of Osaka Prefecture (Thoft-Christensen & Murotsu, 1984). It is a more rigorous 
approach and more complex to carry out. The idea behind this technique is to find the most likely
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failure paths, that is, the sequence of components which fail such that eventually the structure fails. 
A failure path is modelled as a parallel system of elements, representing components with 
associated damage mechanisms, which are linked to form a series-parallel model for the structure. 
Failure paths which are likely to have negligibly low POFs are discarded before attempting to 
calculate their POF.
If a failure path has more than 2 elements, then an upper bound is calculated for the POF of the 
failure path. This process of considering combinations, involves calculation of the upper POF for 
each combination, selection of the most likely, and branching again from this combination. Once 
a most likely complete failure path has been identified, using the upper value for the POF as an 
estimate, the lower bound for the POF of the complete parallel system is calculated and is used as 
a bounding value. Since the POF for a parallel system is always lower than the component POFs, 
it is not necessary to be concerned about subsystems guaranteed to have a very low POF, Thus the 
components or combinations of components with an upper bound for the POF that is lower than 
the bounding value can be discarded and need not be considered any further. By considering each 
incomplete failure path from the set already identified while finding the first failure path, the 
process is repeated until the next complete failure path is found. A lower POF is calculated for this 
and if this is larger than the current bounding value, it is taken to be the next bounding value and 
used to discard failure paths with very low POFs. By this process, the most likely failure paths, 
that is, the parallel subsystems with highest POFs, can be identified with an upper and lower value 
for their POFs. From this, it is simple matter to calculate a lower and upper value for the POF of 
the series system made up of the failure paths and so of the structure.
Several variations on branch-and-bound exist, such as the Selective Enumeration Method that 
orders components according to their importance to the structure, before considering each in turn 
for inclusion into the failure path (Shetty, 1994). These variations try to avoid carrying out 
labourious calculations required in enumerating the possible failure paths, which are later 
discarded, by reducing the number of possible branches in the first place.
■ A Pragmatic Approach
As even these techniques are computationally intensive, it is more usual to take a pragmatic 
approach that takes into account the consequence of failure. For instance, the failure of a highly 
critical node, such as a connection at a leg of an offshore structure, will be of greater concern than 
the failure of a small X-joint at the centre of the structure. Hence a lower reliability for the smaller 
node will be more acceptable than for the node at the leg.
Some formal techniques that systematically identify the consequences of failure exist, such as 
failure trees and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Bentley, 1996). For jacket platforms.
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this type of analysis is already carried out by certification authorities for defining the criticality of 
individual tubular nodes (MTD, 1989). Consideration of the consequence of the failure dictates 
that different minimum threshold values of the reliability index be set for different types of nodes. 
For critical nodes, higher levels of reliability are required than for non-critical nodes. The scheme 
takes into account the redundancy of the stmcture and therefore in some form the system reliability.
3.2.5 Applications of Reliability Analysis in the Offshore Industry
Reliability analysis has been applied to many industries to provide a rational assessment of the 
stmctures based on uncertainties introduced by manufacturing processes, testing procedures, 
material properties, the design models employed and also the in-service conditions. Some 
examples of the application of reliability concepts can be fotmd in
• manufacturing and production industries, in which reliability analysis is employed to 
decide planned maintenance strategies and customer service provisions (Bentley, 1996)
• the aerospace industry, where probabilistic analysis is carried out during design (see an 
example of a reliability stmctural optimisation package in Rajagoplan & Grandhi, 1996) 
and reliability centred maintenance is now routine for army aircraft in the US (Anderson 
& Neri, 1990)
• constmction, where optimal design considers reliability of the completed stmcture (Rojiani 
& Bailey, 1984)
• marine industries, where reliability centred maintenance is also now routinely applied and 
interest has been shown in design evaluation based on reliability (Faulkner & Sadden, 
1978; Baker & Vrouwenvelder, 1992)
The various forms of probabilistic analyses are carried out in many different industries for 
applications in three areas, namely, evaluation at the design stage, planning of maintenance, and 
réévaluation after an incident.
Marine stmctures suffer the added problem of dynamic loading. The huge uncertainties inherent 
in the environment, in addition to the uncertainties common to any other stmcture, need to be 
considered in analysis. Hence, the application of reliability analysis has great interest to the 
offshore industry. Currently, detailed reliability analysis at component level is carried out for re- 
evaluation of stmctures after incidents. Reliability analysis considering the ultimate load-carrying 
capacity of a stmcture is used in the re-assessment of stmctures for life extension or increased top­
side loading (Stewart et al, 1988). Systems reliability is also considered in the design and operation 
of offshore stmctures (Baker & Vrouwenvelder, 1992).
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3.2.5.1 Design Codes
Classification authorities have been incorporating structural reliability methods into their codes of 
practice and guidelines since the late 80s. The Load and Resistance Factor Design (RP 2A-LRFD) 
code produced by the American Petroleum Institute makes use of structural reliability methods to 
calibrate the factors used (API, 1993). LRFD is in effect a Level I method (Winkworth et al, 1993).
The classification authority Det norske Veritas Classification takes a different approach (DnV, 
1982). It allows and recommends the direct use of Level II methods, although it recommends the 
use of Level II methods, in particular the Monte Carlo technique, to calibrate the results of the 
Level II method applied. Since different classification authorities have taken such different 
approaches, some recent moves have been made towards producing an international standard for 
the application of structural reliability which attempts to incorporate all these approaches 
(Wirsching, 1985; Snell, 1993).
3.2.5.2 Evaluation of Designs
Structural reliability analysis is being applied as part of detailed re-evaluations of tubular joints and 
other components after incidents and as part of detailed design. Much work has been carried out 
in applying probabilistic concepts to fatigue design of tubular joints (Wirsching, 1984; Wolfram, 
1986).
One interesting example of probabilistic assessment of oil platforms, which extends quality control 
concepts, is given by Saldanha Peres and Rogerson (1984). This work made use of a distribution 
of fatigue crack sizes and numbers of cracks in a platform to derive a probability of failure for a 
population of similar platforms. This is rather different to most other applications of reliability 
concepts for platforms, where assumptions of similarity are not exploited and indeed avoided. 
Such examples can be found including reliability analysis for re-qualification and design of jacket 
platforms (Diamantidis, 1986; Diamantidis et al, 1991; Dalane et al, 1990; Frieze, 1989) and of 
tension leg platforms, considering fatigue and including inspection updating (Ximenes & Mansour, 
1991).
3.2.5.3 Probabilistic Analvsis For Planning
Interest in the application of reliability and risk analysis to the maintenance problem has increased 
over the past ten years. The reasons for this include the realisation that many structures in areas 
such as the North Sea have been over-designed. For instance, recent fatigue research in tubular 
structures has shown that large fatigue cracks can be tolerated sometimes in joints within the design 
life (Dover et al, 1986 and 1988). In addition, underwater operations for large scale maintenance, 
such as detailed inspections or repairs in the form of re-welding, replacement or grouting, are very
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costly. Thus, maintenance schedules produced with the aid of deterministic analyses may lead to 
unnecessary and expensive repairs. Recent research results have provided the type of data required 
to be able to apply reliability analysis to offshore structures.
In Norway, maintenance planning for offshore structures by DnV is carried out based on target 
reliability measures for the year (Lotsberg & Marley, 1992). It is considered that crack growth is 
the only measure of fatigue damage. Updating, however, can be carried out with direct 
measurements of stress and inspection is assumed to result in either no detection or detection 
followed by measurement of a crack. Although reliability methods provide a more rational basis 
for inspection planning, gross errors are not accounted for within the analysis and thus need to be 
accounted for in the planning procedure.
One approach uses the idea offitness-for-purpose: if the components in question can be shown to 
be fit for their intended purpose, then no maintenance action is required. Use of reliability analysis 
to establish a relative level of fitness (such as described in Kam, 1988, and Kirkemo, 1988) allows 
targeting of the more critical joints to be considered for repair. Further, rational planning of future 
remedial actions can also be carried out based on measures o f expected level of fitness. If repair 
is preferred for all joints in which a defect has been found, the analysis should also show whether 
the operations could be delayed until a time of better weather. A possible added benefit of 
working under less hostile weather conditions is that of higher quality inspections and repairs. 
Another possibility is to reschedule the inspection programme to maintain the required level of 
reliability and thus eliminate the necessity for repair, at least in the short term.
The option to delay could give industry more flexibility in rationalising and targeting expensive 
maintenance operations. The next sections discuss this application in more detail and consider the 
use of reliability analysis in RISC.
3.3 Str u c tu r al  Reliability  Analysis for  IRM Pla n n in g
From the review of stmctural reliability in Section 3.1, it follows that if IRM planning is to be 
based on considerations of reliability, advanced Level II reliability techniques may be employed. 
In addition, models of fatigue crack growth should be included in the analysis, as was discussed 
in Chapter 2. This section discusses the integration of fatigue fracture mechanics with stmctural 
reliability, explains the decision problem behind inspection and maintenance planning, and 
describes the stmctural reliability analysis programs implemented for RISC.
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3.3.1 A Limit State Function for IRM Planning
For offshore structures with tubular members, it is common practice to define accumulated damage 
failure as the occurrence of a through-thickness crack, that is, a crack that has grown through the 
thickness of the tubular member. An appropriate safety margin is of the form:
M = Member Thickness - Crack depth (3.22)
It is convenient to generalise (3.22) to consider a critical crack size, instead of member thickness, 
and a general crack size at a time t. The limit state function for this case becomes simply
g(- )^ = «CRIT - a(f,.%) (3.23)
where is the critical crack size and a{t,x) is the actual crack size at time t. This limit state 
function is often reformulated as
g{x) =N(acRrr^) - N (3.24)
where N is the number of elapsed stress cycles and N(ûcrit»^ ) represents the number of cycles to 
failure.
To calculate the crack size at any point in time requires fatigue fracture mechanics and in particular 
Paris’ Law as explained in Chapter 2. Analytical integration of the crack growth relation from an 
initial defect to the final size Ocrjt gives the lifetime in terms of the number of cycles to failure 
for the joint. In theory, a similar integration of the crack growth relation over a number of stress 
cycles, or equivalently (assuming an average number of cycles per unit time) over a period, will 
give the crack size. In practice, the integration is not possible, since the SIF, AK, in general is 
related to the crack size. Hence, a numerical integration procedure is required. The numerical 
integration procedure can be applied to any crack growth curve and so to a multi-segment curve, 
which allows incorporation of corrosion information.
Fatigue crack growth models for welded structures, based on linear elastic fracture mechanics, have 
been described recently by several authors (Dijkstra & Straalen, 1991; Dharmavasan et al, 1991; 
Thorpe, 1986). The IRM planning of offshore fixed platforms requires detailed consideration of 
tubular structures and therefore the general fatigue fracture mechanics model is modified for steel 
welded joints.
The real geometry of the tubular joint is translated to a simplified model as given in Figure 3.8. 
Fatigue cracks in tubular joints generally start at the weld toe and grow both in depth and width 







Figure 3.8 Fracture mechanics model fo r  tubular joints
Figure 3.9 Semi-elliptical surface crack shape
A model that describes the 2-dimensional shape of the crack is required, since such a model can 
be used with inspection results given as crack lengths only. Some have been proposed, such as that 
suggested by Ma and Kam (1991). In the RISC project, two methods that carry out a 
transformation of length to the depth based on crack extension rules for both directions were 
considered:
1. Using crack growth models for both crack depth and width. Paris’ Law can be used for 
crack growth in both directions, independently, with the appropriate SIF range for each 
direction.
2. Applying a forcing function for crack width direction. Paris’ Law is used only in the depth 
direction and the crack width is given as a function o f the crack depth.
The first approach is more accurate from a theoretical point of \iew . In practice it is more difficult 
to implement as there is no obvious way of incorporating the effects of multi-initiation and crack 
coalescence, since in practice several short cracks will join to form one long crack (Dover et al, 
1994).
The forcing function for the second approach relates the depth to the length. The available forcing 
functions were derived from experimental observations, but it is not yet certain that they are 
applicable to situations different from the experiments on which they were based (Dijkstra et al, 
1994). In the short term, the use of crack length as an indicator is not viable and it is best to 
consider, when possible, only crack depth.
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3.3.2 Optimal Maintenance Planning
The goal of the rational IRM planning methodology is to provide a tool for the identification of an 
inspection and maintenance plan which can fulfil the practical requirements. An optimal inspection 
and maintenance plan is one that yields the minimum expected total costs for maintaining the 
structure throughout its anticipated lifetime. As the number of practical constraints imposed on 
the inspection and maintenance scheduling is very large, carrying out automatic identification of 
the optimum plan is not always possible. This is because the total number of numerical operations 
necessary to estimate the expected costs for all inspection and maintenance plans can be extremely 
large and time consuming.
One method of overcoming these problems is to employ an adaptive scheme for inspection and 
maintenance planning (Fujita et al, 1989). In this scheme only the next inspection time is 
planned based on a selected inspection method and repair strategy. When the inspection has been 
performed, the next inspection is planned taking the most recent observations into account.
3.3.2.1 Overview of the Use of Decision Theory
IRM planning of offshore structures can be formulated as a decision theory problem. In practical 
decision problems, such as inspection and maintenance planning for offshore structures, the number 
of alternative actions can be extremely large and a systematic analysis of the corresponding 
consequences is necessary. The following is based on the theory in Sorensen et al (1991).
The decision problem can be stated as: which experiment e should be chosen from the space of 
possible experiments E? and, given the result from experiment e, what action a should be 
performed out of the possible available actions A? It is known is that experiment e yields a random 
result r  of possible experiment results R, and action a will in turn have a consequent effect on the 
state of the universe, resulting in random state s, one of a possible set of states S. Decision 
problems are conveniently represented by decision trees as illustrated in Figure 3.10, where each 
node represents a decision or action taken out of a space of possible decisions or actions.
Figure 3.10 Decision tree
The formulation of a decision problem in this way allows the use of a Bayesian approach to 
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evaluating probabilities. This approach uses subjective information and has been applied to IRM 
planning as outlined below. Fuller explanations of the basis for Bayesian decision analysis can be 
found in Raiffa and Schlaifer (1960), Benjamin and Cornell (1970) and Ang and Tang (1984).
In inspection scheduling, the experiments E correspond to possible inspection techniques and 
inspection times; the results R to inspection results, that is, no cracks found or the sizes of detected 
cracks; the actions A correspond to setting a repair criterion for carrying out welding or grinding; 
and the state S to the reliability of the tubular joint. The performed experiment and the chosen 
action, with the result of the experiment and resulting reliability of the component, determine the 
utility value. The measure of utility could, in IRM planning, correspond to overall costs.
To perform decision analysis, it is necessary to have information on the experiments E and actions 
A, i.e. the possible inspection techniques combined with inspection times, and the repair actions, 
with the utility function u{e,r,a,s), or alternatively, some form of cost function c{e,r,a,s). The only 
difference between u{.) and c(.) is that whereas a high utility value is desirable, a low value for c(.) 
is preferred.
In addition, information on the probabilities of various combinations of possibilities is required. 
The joint probability r\e) that the universe is in state s and the result of the experiment is r, 
given that experiment e was carried out, is required. In other words, some understanding of how 
the failure of the joint is related to an inspection result is necessary. Ps,R(‘y, r\e) will also give four 
important probabilities. One is Pg(j), representing the cracks which may possibly exist irrespective 
of previous inspections or repairs. Ps(^) is a prior probability since a value is assigned to this prior 
to knowing the results r of the experiment. Another is the conditional probability PR(rls,e) for a 
particular result obtained from an experiment, that is, the probability of an inspection result, given 
the existing state of the tubular joint and the experiments carried out. PR(rls,e) is a measure of the 
reliability of the inspection technique. Also required is the conditional probability PR(rk) for a 
result r given experiment g; or given an inspection, the probability of an inspection result being r  
irrespective of the state of the tubular joint.
Since the above information is what is required to apply Bayes' rule (see Equation 3.17), the 
probability of the state of the universe or of the failure of the tubular joint, given inspection results 
and repair actions, can be obtained by
s
In summary, the decision problem is to choose the experiment e, given E, R, A, S and Pg r( s, r\e), 
such that the cost function u(.) is minimised (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1960). For IRM planning then.
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this choice of an experiment corresponds to a choice of an inspection technique and time, such that 
the expected costs are minimised.
One way of carrying out the analysis which will result in a minimum cost value is to employ 
normal form analysis. In this, a decision rule d  is specified which prescribes the action which must 
be taken for all possible outcomes of the experiment e. For each experiment e an optimal decision 
rule can be found. Thus, by considering all possible experiments e, the overall optimal experiment 
can be selected. The decision rule for a specific experiment e is a mapping d(.) from R into A, that 
is, the rule assigns a specific combination of repair and inspection action d(r) that must be carried 
out given a specific inspection result r for a specific technique.
For an experiment e, the expected cost is given by
c{e,d)=E^j^^[c{e,r,d{r),s)] (3.26)
And the optimal experiment e and the optimal decision rule can now be identified by solving
C=min[min[c(^,J)]] (3.27)
e d
3.3.2.2 Identification of Optimal IRM Plans
The optimal inspection and maintenance plan is the plan minimising the total cost c(.) associated 
with the inspection and maintenance of the stmcture throughout its anticipated lifetime. In general, 
the total cost c(.) must include the costs associated with the inspection, with repairs, and with the 
event of failure which in turn may include costs associated with loss of production. The expected 
total cost, associated with a particular inspection and maintenance plan carried out at a point in 
time t, is given by
E[c(f)]=E[cJ+E[cJ+E[cJ (3.28)
where is the cost of the state of the universe or for this case, c, = cost of failure Cy, is the
cost of the repair action and = c, is the cost of inspection.
In the analysis carried out for RISC, minimisation is not performed. Instead, the total expected cost 
Es jng[c(e,r,d(r),s)] corresponding to a specific inspection e and maintenance d(e) plan is estimated.
3.3.3 Modelling of Inspection and Repair
To obtain the total expected costs for a plan of action on a joint, requires the definition of the 
events and the associated costs. The relevant events are the past inspection and one future 
inspection combined with repair.
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3.3.3.1 Inspection Events
For the two inspection events, the different possible situations that arise need to be identified. 
When considering previous inspections, the possible results or events are
1. No crack is detected.
2. A crack is observed with a depth equal to A^ bs-
3. A crack is observed with a depth smaller than A^y,.
4. A crack is observed with a depth larger than A^y,.
For practical purposes, only events 1 and 2 are considered, since it is assumed that as much 
information as possible will be derived from the inspection.
Slightly different outcomes are possible with the future planned inspection. Ignoring the events 
that are equivalent to events 3 and 4 above and adding new events related to the possibility of 
failure before the next inspection, they are,
1. No crack is detected.
2. A crack is observed of depth equal to A^y,.
3. The crack depth at planned inspection is smaller than the critical crack depth.
4. The crack depth at planned inspection is larger than the critical crack depth, which implies
failure before the next inspection could take place.
The probability for each of these events can be evaluated by defining state functions in a similar 
way to the failure state function. The exact probability is given by the integral of the joint 
probability density functions over the space of the basic variables, where the state function takes 
on the appropriate value. Structural reliability analysis techniques can be applied to find a measure 
equivalent to the reliability index, which is then used to obtain an approximation to the actual Joint 
probability.
The quality of inspection, its sensitivity and accuracy, is modelled by a distribution fAd(a) for the 
detectable crack depth A^, corresponding in some form to the probability of detection (POD), and 
by a second distribution fg(e) for measurement uncertainty ej„sp, corresponding to probability of 
sizing (PCS). When cracks are not detected, then the POD measure is used to update the 
information on the crack depth. For observed cracks, the POS measure is used instead. The 
distribution form and the parameters for the POD and POS measures differ from inspection method 
to inspection method.
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3.3.3.2 Modelling of Repairs
Having identified and measured a crack at the time of inspection, a decision must be taken with 
respect to possible repair actions. The decision is usually well defined, in that some size is given 
so that if a crack smaller than the prescribed size is found, then no major repair takes place, 
otherwise, a repair will be carried out.
Preliminary grinding of the crack is very often performed before actual sizing of a defect. This is 
to avoid the situation that a surface crack with a very small depth is measured using an expensive 
sizing technique. If the crack is still present after the preliminary grinding, rigorous sizing is 
performed and after this, a decision is made on the actual repair action. Thus, in effect small cracks 
are removed by grinding. So, two types of repair actions are considered: grinding for small cracks 
and welding for larger cracks. In addition, it is possible that failure occurs after repair. The 
corresponding events are
1. If the crack depth is smaller than the crack is ground away.
2. Otherwise, if the crack depth is greater than then weld repair takes place.
3. The crack depth at the end of the service life is smaller than the critical crack depth, after
repair.
4. The crack depth is greater than the critical crack depth, after repair and before the end of
the service life, which implies failure after repair.
The first two possibilities correspond to the events,
1. A crack is observed with depth greater than A^g,j.
2. A crack is observed with depth smaller than A^ eid-
As before, the probabilities of these events can be relatively easily evaluated by using POS 
information. The value for A^g,j is set for each Joint individually, based on its past in-service 
history. A^g,j has a lower value for a joint that has been ground in the past, as compared to a joint 
that has not been ground at all.
Material properties after grind repair will be the same as before grind repair. The initial crack 
depth and length after grind repair can, in general, be assumed to be smaller than those assumed 
at the start of the lifetime of the joint. A change in the initial crack is taken into account by 
considering random variables representing initial crack depth and crack length after grind repair, 
which are independent of those used to model the initial crack depth and length at the start of the 
lifetime of the joint. Similarly, as the tubular wall thickness is changed during grind repair, the
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random variable modelling tubular wall thickness after grind repair is also assumed to be 
independent of the tubular wall thickness random variable at the start of the lifetime of the joint.
After weld repair, it is usual to use the same model as at the start of the lifetime, both with respect 
to initial crack geometry and with respect to tubular wall thickness. Since crack growth behaviour 
after repair is independent of that before repair and to allow possible new models, perhaps to reflect 
the fact that underwater welding is not as precise as welding at manufacture, new random variables 
are introduced for the crack depth and wall thickness after weld repairs. Similarly, new random 
variables representing the Paris Law parameter C after welding are introduced, as material 
properties are expected to change after welding.
3.3.3.3 Calculation of Costs and Sensitivities
As explained in the previous sections, the optimal inspection and maintenance strategy can be 
identified by estimating and comparing the expected total costs corresponding to the possible 
options of inspection types, inspection times and repair actions. According to (3.28), this requires 
calculation of the expected failure costs, the expected repair costs and the inspection costs. The 
total expected cost of failure has to account for failure before inspection has taken place and after 
inspection, that is, between the time of inspection and the lifetime of the structure:
(3.29)
where Q  is the cost of failure, Pj(t) is the probability of failure occurring in the interval of time t 
assuming no failure before the start of the interval, 7^ is the lifetime of the structure and is the 
time to the next inspection. To calculate the probability of failure occurring between the previous 
inspection and the next inspection point, that is P/ti„sp), requires considering only the possibility 
that the crack be larger than the critical crack size before the end of the service life, given the 
previous inspection results. To calculate the probability of failure occurring after the next 
inspection, requires considering the all possible combinations of the crack growing to
the critical crack size and the inspection outcomes, given the previous inspection results.
Similarly, the expected cost of repair E[cJ is calculated as
E[cJ grind^ i^ns^^giind^^welJ< i^ns^^weld (3.30)
where Pg^ ndCO and P^ eidCO is the probability of grind or weld repairs, respectively, being required 
immediately after inspection at the inspection point t, and where Cg^ nd and are the costs of 
grinding and welding.
The cost of inspection Q  is a constant in that the inspection will take place, even if failure has 
occurred. The total expected costs are given by
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E[c^=E[c^]*E[cyC, (3.31)
Typical results for expected costs calculated for over the interval [r,„sp*, T J ,  where is the 
last inspection point, are shown in Figure 3.11. Ti is the optim al inspection time which leads to 
minimal expected costs.
8
I — Tolal Costs—  ' — Failure Costs  Repair Costs
—  — Inspection Costs
Ti
Time to Next Inspection 
Figure 3.11 Expected costs
Inspection and maintenance actions are, in effect, long term investments, so the real rate of interest 
should be taken into account. The calculations for this are standard and were included in the RISC 
project, but are not discussed here.
33.4 Evaluation of Updated Reliability
To be assured that the reliability of the considered welded connection is acceptable, it is necessary 
to provide estimates of the reliability index p as function o f the current age or lifetime t of the 
structure, in addition to the expected costs.
If necessary and in addition, the POF associated with an inspection and maintenance plan can be 
estimated easily, by making use of the P fT^  - al ready calculated:
/ / =  P l h n s p )  + P f P h  -  hnsp) (3.32)
This total POF can also be used for deciding which inspection plan to carry out, by selecting the 
plan with the smallest POF.
If the considered joint is inspected at time the observations from this inspection can used to 
obtain P(r), the reliability index, at points in time t in the interval The updated values
at each point are calculated using of the relationship between p and the POF. A graph of typical 
results of updating P by inspections at time T\, Ti and Ts is shown in Figure 3.12.









Figure 3.12 Typical updated reliability index values
3.3.4.1 Use of Inspection Results
Once an inspection on a component has been carried out, the results have to be used in some way 
to update our information on the state of the component. Values for the reliability of the 
component can be recalculated by carrying out the analysis as if from the initial state, or, as 
discussed above by making use of the more rapid Bayesian updating method. The latter method 
is employed in the RISC methodology.
The uncertainties in the inspection need to be incorporated in to the analysis. Indeed either method 
requires data on the reliability of the technique, in the form of PO D as a distribution of detectable 
crack sizes and as a POS. Two scenarios may be considered: either no crack is detected or a crack 
has been detected and sized. The case that a crack is detected but not sized need not be considered, 
since this would not arise in practice: any defect found is normally reinspected to confirm its 
existence and sizing would then be carried out.
3.3.5 Structural Analysis in RISC
The reliability analysis carried out for the RISC procedure is based on the description given on 
fatigue crack growth modelling, load modelling and optimal scheduling. The complete procedure 
requires several stages and was implemented as a small set of linked software modules. These are 
shown diagrammatically in Figure 3,13. The stages are
1. Loading analysis carried out by the program ULDAN to provide stress history data.
2. Component level reliability analysis carried out by the package RISCREL based on Level 
n  structural reliability methods FORM and SORM.
3. Within the RISCREL package lies a limit state module based on fatigue fracture mechanics 
and employing fast assessment techniques.
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Figure 3.13 Structural analysis in RISC  
3.3.5.1 Loading Analysis with ULDAN
As the fatigue loading experienced by the offshore platform is an important input for the crack 
growth calculations, it is important to analyse loading reasonably accurately. There are several 
considerations dictating the ways in which loading analysis can be carried out.
The first issue is the method of load analysis. A fundamental method is to model the structure as 
a frame, that is, a system of connected beams, and carry out finite element analysis with the wave 
data as input to find the load on each connection. To do this within the reliability analysis is of 
course too time-consuming. To do this outside the reliability analysis does not provide results 
better than other more analytical approaches, such as spectral analysis. In addition, for some older 
stmctures only deterministic data as exceedance curves has been stored as information on the loads 
and thus sophisticated analysis is not possible. In the RISC project, it was decided that the entry 
point for the reliability analysis was predefined loads for each joint. The preferred method is to 
produce a stress range probability distribution (SRPD) from  sea states information and stress 
distributions for each point on the joint. An exceedance curve, modelled as a 2-parameter Weibull 
distribution, can be used to describe the SRPD. The ULDAN module carries out the SRPD 
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Figure 3.14 The loading analysis procedure
Another issue is where in the analysis procedure should the loading analysis be carried out. 
Loading analysis could be carried out within the reliability analysis algorithm, that is, it could be 
included in some way in the failure function. Limit state parameters corresponding to the dynamic 
environmental loading on the structure would then be input to the reliability analysis. These 
parameters would then have to be related to the loading at the joint in question at each iteration. 
This approach would increase the computational effort to a level beyond that which is feasible. 
At the component level, however, it would not provide much better results. The more pragmatic 
approach is to provide the limit state with parameters or random variables corresponding to the 
loading at the connection.
3.3.5.2 Fatigue Fracture Mechanics M odule (CFA)
The overall fatigue crack growth analysis is shown in Figure 3.15. The fracture mechanics 
modelling as described in previous sections has been implemented as a computer module known 
as Component Fatigue Analysis (CFA). The CFA module is a combination of the FACTS program 
developed at UCL (Dharmavasan, 1991; TSC, 1990) and the modified FAFRAM program, TNO- 
CFA, of TNG (Dijkstra & Straalen, 1991). This module calculates a predicted crack size at a point 
in time by integration of Paris’ crack growth model, given loading data in the form of the SCF and 
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Figure 3.15 The overall crack growth analysis procedure
The CFA has a number of crack growth relations available and the most appropriate method used 
for the reliability analysis can be chosen as required. A more detailed description can be found in 
a paper on the CPA (Dijkstra et al, 1994).
3.3.S.3 RISCREL
The reliability analysis using the fatigue failure criterion described was implemented by 
programmers as a set of FORTRAN modules. The overall output and input for RISCREL is shown 
in Figure 3.16.
The RISCREL program also carries out Bayesian updating based on a past inspection result and 
cost evaluation of a maintenance plan for a joint. RISCREL takes as input probabilistic models for 
the initial crack geometry, the joint geometry, material characteristics, in addition to the long term 
statistics o f the stress processes which are specific to the hot-spot. The statistical data on the 
stresses and the SCF are stored in a joint file and the material properties are held in a database. The 
costs required are on failure of the component, of the inspection and of repair. Other data required
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includes the analysis options, such as stress intensity factor solution, and inspection reliability for 





















Figure 3.16 The reliability analysis module, RISCREL
To allow the analysis module to be embedded within any system, the communication, both input 
and output, by text files. The output consists of updated reliability indices or expected cost 
estimates. More detailed results such as partial derivatives, information on algorithm monitoring, 
etc. are also possible.
3.4 Su m m ar y
Jacket type stmctures are highly redundant stmctures subject to many uncertainties and in 
particular, to time-varying, cyclic loads and so to fatigue. Conventional reliability assessment of 
these stmctures is not always feasible. Instead, this chapter described the use of reliability analysis 
techniques recently developed specifically for stmctures, based on simplifications of the functions 
describing failure.
The application of reliability methods in the design and maintenance of offshore stmctures has only 
been developed recently. For many reasons, such as the degradation of existing stmctures and the 
requirement to be able to extend the life of some stmctures, there is a need to be able to analyse 
the reliability of these stmctures in a more rigorous manner.
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The approach adopted was to provide a tool that would estimate the expected total costs associated 
with a particular inspection and maintenance plan. In that way, different inspection and 
maintenance plans can be compared, constraints enforced and from this an appropriate rational plan 
chosen.
The analytical tools described in this chapter formed the basis for the RISC methodology. The 
assumptions employed in their design were based on the survey of current procedures provided by 
the author and described in Chapter 2. They were implemented as the software modules ULDAN 
and RISCREL, incorporating the CFA module, which lie at the heart of the RISC System.
The real problem lies in applying the reliability-based analysis to the production of rational 
inspection strategies. To use reliability analysis requires understanding the inspection procedure 
and making use of the appropriate information on inspection techniques. The problems of 
generating input data for the analysis and of interpretation o f the results remain. The interpreted 
results must then be combined to form a rational global solution for the structure that takes into 
account constraints which may not have been included, implicitly or explicitly, into the analysis. 
It is necessary to consider developing complete systems which will aid in carrying out the analysis 
and interpreting the results.
The complete RISC System integrates the analysis modules within a framework that controls 
execution of the analysis modules. A clear understanding of the theory and the assumptions made 
in formulating the analysis methodology was required by the author in order to design and 
implement the system described in Chapter 5. The RISC Demonstrator includes a module that 
generates suitable schedules from the results, based on the information given in Chapter 2 and in 
this chapter. The following chapter reviews techniques from the artificial intelligence field which 
were considered for use for the complete RISC System.
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4 K n o w l e d g e  B a s e  S y s t e m s  f o r  IRM P l a n n i n g
A computer system for improved IRM scheduling for fixed offshore platforms is required that uses 
various forms of information to generate suitable schedules. Such a system will need to be able 
to process and utilise correctly all the required data and information for structural reliability 
analysis and the fatigue fracture mechanics analysis. As these techniques are relatively new and 
there is often little documentation on them. Additionally, these techniques require many different 
forms of data from many different sources.
It was proposed that a knowledge base system (KBS) for RISC would be able to tackle the 
requirements of
• flexibility of the representation scheme for the different types of information
• effective handling of incomplete information on the structure
• selective utilisation of knowledge for efficiency
• the capability for operators to control the problem solving sequence
• ease of maintenance and extension as new information is gathered and as inspection 
procedures change
This chapter reviews the background to artificial intelligence (AI), describes the basics of 
knowledge base systems and their workings and defines some of the most common terms. In 
addition, general planning and scheduling issues and algorithms are reviewed and described.
4.1 R ev iew  of  A rtificial  In tellig en c e  Concepts
Artificial intelligence is the study of human reasoning (Winston, 1977; Chamiak & McDermott, 
1985). There are two aims in AI;
• to understand the human mind through simulations making use of computers
• to make computers more intelligent and hence more usable
These two goals also represent the dichotomy which exists in AI. On the one hand, the researchers 
whose main interests lie in psychology investigate theoretical models of the human reasoning 
process and the systems produced may be very narrow in application. On the other, applied 
computer scientists and engineers apply AI concepts in the most pragmatic way to provide practical 
systems which help in decision making. The applications that are considered in AI include memory 
organisation, natural language processing, understanding and reasoning, which are areas of 
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particular interest to the psychologists; and vision, machine learning or cybernetics, control or 
robotics, and, of course, planning and scheduling.
Artificial intelligence was given its name by John McCarthy in 1956 in the proposal to run a 
workshop meeting at Dartmouth College, US, to review what appeared to be a new and promising 
field of research (Chamiak & McDermott, 1985). AI has its roots in the thought experiments 
carried out by Turing on the intelligence of computers, the chess-playing computer by Shannon and 
in the theory of logic invented in the previous century by Boole. It was McCarthy, Minsky, Newell 
and Herbert who first started working directly in this field.
Very early work in AI was based on the idea that humans reason at a high level with abstractions 
and carry out symbolic manipulation. By this it is meant that if someone was asked why they 
choose to do something a certain way, they would be able to provide a description of their 
reasoning process, as described in work on a first AI system. General Problem Solver (GPS) 
(Newell & Simon, 1963). This work led to the development of rule-based systems, which were 
generalised over time to encompass what are now known as expert or knowledge base systems. 
The representation of knowledge for these systems was soon to be recognised as a major issue, as 
the first formal discussion by McCarthy (1968) indicates.
By the 1970s, it was realised that most human reasoning is at a much lower level. For instance, 
humans cannot always explain how they have recognised that the shape of plotted sensor data 
indicates a crack, or why they have chosen to carry out a repair immediately. The use of logic with 
its requirement for consistency in inference, independent knowledge modules (propositions and 
facts) and the separation of knowledge from the inferencing procedures, may be inadequate to 
explain all human reasoning (Minsky, 1972; Dreyfuss, 1981). This realisation led to work in 
alternative forms of knowledge representation such as frames, but also in areas such as neural nets 
for pattern recognition that attempt to model the physical processes occurring within the brain.
Other related areas of computer science include genetic programming or the use of genetic 
algorithms. In a genetic algorithm, a population of individuals, corresponding to a subset of 
possible solutions to a problem, combines to form new populations or new solutions. The new 
solutions are evaluated and the ‘fittest’ are allowed to combine to create another generation of 
solutions and so on, until a very good solution is found (Davis, 1987; Bole & Cytowski, 1992). 
Thus to be applied to scheduling, a genetic algorithm requires an initial population of possible 
schedules. For RISC part of the problem is to find an initial schedule. Thus genetic algorithms 
were not considered in detail for this work and so are not explained further.
The basis for neural nets and pattern recognition is described briefly below. As KBS are of much 
more interest to the work in RISC, these are discussed in more detail.
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4.1.1 Pattern Recognition Techniques
The term pattern recognition is almost self-explanatory. Pattern recognition involves the extraction 
of features from a large set of data and is applied traditionally to problems of vision and, to a lesser 
extent, hearing (Elliman & Banks, 1989).
In early AI work most human reasoning problems, other than the very specific vision problem, were 
considered to be solvable by the application of high level reasoning and logic. It is now understood 
that in many situations humans develop an intuition about how to solve a problem: something about 
the problem stated makes them think that perhaps such a solution would be appropriate. The 
“something” is undefinable and the “perhaps” only emphasises that there are uncertainties in the 
reasoning. Forcing explicit representation of the reasoning process, however, would lead to 
fundamental difficulties later on as inconsistencies become evident, in that solutions for new 
situations are not agreed upon by the explicit reasoning process and the human. For this reason, 
this type of problem is now treated by methods which are to a certain extent black box  techniques, 
that is, the inner workings are unknown by the user, only the input and output are o f interest.
4.1.1.1 Issues of Pattern Recognition
Pattern recognition involves selecting case data which is relevant to the problem, identifying or 
extracting features with which to allow different results to be represented and then formulating an 
analytical method that gives values for the features when presented with a new case (Elliman & 
Banks, 1989). As an example, in the inspection data interpretation problem for a sensor employing 
the ACFM technique (explained later in Chapter 7), the data may be the magnetic field data from 
the sensor, the features may be the characteristic peaks and troughs which may be used to identify 
different types of defects, and the method is required to identify the peaks and troughs from the 
mass of magnetic field data in some way. As will be described in Chapter 7, the method for this 
pattern recognition process was a simple local minima and maxima searching procedure, which did 
not work well in practice.
There are many techniques which carry out pattern matching. Some are very specific to the 
application, for instance signal processing work is reliant on mathematical transforms of wave data. 
General techniques include classical statistical model fitting, clustering techniques, neural 
networks and to a certain extent fuzzy systems. The best-understood of these are the classical 
statistical methods, but these require a model to be stated and the data is fitted to this model. 
Clustering techniques or discriminant analysis can also be problematic in that the data has to form 
distinct clusters in an n-dimensional space of the variables (Elliman & Banks, 1989).
There is much argument over whether or not neural networks really do provide a new technique. 
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as is believed by the AI school of thought, or if they are just another clustering technique, as the 
statisticians believe (Kosko, 1992). The AI school believe that in fact neural nets and fuzzy 
systems are equivalent. Fuzzy systems are explained in Section 4.2.3.2, after neural nets are 
described.
4.1.1.2 Neural Networks
Based on the first aim of AI, much work is now being carried out on simulating the human learning 
process at neuron level, that is trying to model what is thought to occur within the brain of a human 
(Strange, 1989). This work led to the concept of neural networks, also known as artificial neural 
networks (ANNs), which are adaptive systems responding to stimuli (Kirk & Lewcock, 1995; 
Kosko, 1992). Neural networks have the very useful property of being able to recognize patterns 
that are difficult or even impossible to define, that is, no model is required before presenting data 
to a neural network, unlike classical statistical techniques. It is outside the scope of this thesis to 
discuss neural networks in detail, although the basic concepts are outlined.
A neural network can be visualised as a directed graph, that is, as a set of linked nodes, where the 
order of the nodes matters. The nodes are in the input, output or hidden or intermediate layers. 
Signals or data are received by the input nodes; this affects the nodes in the hidden layers, and 
hidden nodes in turn activate the output nodes which send out the data from the network. The links 
are weighted and the hidden nodes take on a state which is dependent on the state of other nodes, 
usually only the nodes in one layer closer to the input layer, and the weights of the links. An 
example of a forward feed neural net is shown in Figure 4.1 with three hidden layers of three nodes 
each. This is a typical network in that the number of hidden layers is usually greater than 1, and 
the number of input nodes is usually greater than the number of output nodes.
OutputInput
Figure 4.1 A simple neural network
As an example of a possible neural network, in the ACFM signal recognition problem mentioned 
earlier, a neural net was proposed by DASA in Munich to help with the characterisation of defects 
from ACFM sensor data (Ellingworth et al, 1992). In one proposal, the neural network had many
Chapter 4 108
input nodes, one for each point on a matrix of 2-D coordinates on a surface and the data at each 
input node was the average of nine magnetic field values around the point. The output nodes were 
only a few, one for each defect type.
The simplest form of the relationship between the nodes is a weighted sum of the states of the 
nodes in the layer before it. So for the i^ * node in the layer, its state a^ j is given by
M
r = l
where a-^Q is the given input layer, 0 < j < N, j=N represents the output layer; Wj^  is the weight of 
the link between the r^ node in the layer, that is the node with state a^q.,),and the i* node in 
the j*** layer; and M is the maximum number of nodes in any one layer. The simplest neural net is 
one in which the nodes can only take a value from the possible values {0,1}, where 0 represents 
an inactive node and 1 is activation. Alternatively another set of possible values could be (-1,0,1}, 
where -1 represents inhibition, 0 non-activation and 1 activation. The sum above would then be 
modified by including a threshold rule, such that if the sum is greater than 0.5 say, then state a^=l, 
and 0 otherwise. The weights w^  ^can be inhibitory, that is be negative in value; have no effect, that 
is zero; or stimulative, that is, have a positive value.
The strength of neural network theory is that it includes a learning algorithm. The weights between 
each node need not be defined. By presenting suitable training sets of data, that is to say, sample 
input and with the required output, iterative methods exist to determine the weights such that the 
required output is given from the input. What has to be predefined is the architecture for the 
network, that is, the form of the input data, the number of hidden nodes and layers, the output data 
format and the form relationship between the nodes.
The strength of this technique is also its weakness. The iterative search for a set of weights can be 
non-convergent, that is, may never come to a solution. It has been found that this process is highly 
sensitive to the network architecture chosen. For instance, changing the number of hidden layers 
by one, or varying the input layer, or selecting slightly different output features, may impact greatly 
on the convergence of the training process. A neural network which could be successfully trained, 
may, with slight variations, become a non-successful neural network, or vice versa. Training is also 
affected, but not as severely, by the choice of training set. Enough sets of input and output data 
must be chosen to ensure that the network will recognise new sets. On the other hand, too many 
training sets can make the resulting neural net over-sensitive and unable to recognise new sets. 
Unfortunately, there is no way at the moment of predicting when training will succeed. 
Fortunately, when it does succeed, the resulting neural network becomes a very powerful tool for 
rapid pattern recognition.
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4.1.2 Expert Systems and Knowledge Base Systems
There are various definitions, which do not all coincide, of what is meant by an expert system. One 
view is that it is a program which demonstrates expertise, that is carries out a task in the same way, 
seemingly, that a human expert would (Johnson & Kpravnou, 1985). Another view is that it is a 
program in which the knowledge on how to solve a task is separate from the processes required to 
manipulate that knowledge (Alty & Coombs, 1984). In this thesis, the latter definition is reserved 
for knowledge base systems and an expert system is considered to be a specialised knowledge base 
system, one which carries out a task expertly.
The first definition of an expert system was based on the concept of “a classroom of shrieking 
daemons'” proposed by Newell (Winston, 1977). He visualised human reasoning within the brain 
to be akin to a problem being solved line by line on a blackboard in view of many naive, simple 
solvers, or daemons, each of which knows how to go from one line to the next, but only for one 
step. It may be that for some steps, there are several daemons that believe they know how to take 
the next step. This is not a problem as a teacher or monitor can choose one of the daemons 
currently indicating, by shrieking perhaps, that they can solve the next step, to come up to the 
blackboard and carry out that step. If at any point there is no daemon to contribute a next step, then 
the monitor backtracks to a point in the problem solving process where there was more than one 
shrieking daemon and chooses another daemon, in the hope that this daemon will lead closer to the 
solution. Alternatively, if parallel computation is possible, then all daemons can be asked to 
contribute to the blackboard at the same time. Several hypothetical solutions would be investigated 
in parallel and, assuming infinite parallelism, no backtracking is required. This became the first 
model for expert systems and from this, for knowledge base systems.
This naive model emphasises the idea that the problem-solving process involves many chunks of 
simple knowledge, and that the knowledge is separate from the control of the process. Thus, the 
architecture of a KBS is usually defined as comprising three parts;
4.1.2.1 Knowledge Bases
The knowledge bases contain the information that is common to a type of problem: the heuristics 
used, classes of components or concepts and procedures. The knowledge base is the most problem- 
specific part of the system. The term is really a generalisation of the much better known term 
database. Unlike a database where a very specific type of information is kept in the form of
'The spelling here is of significance as the most usual meaning applied to “demon” is that it is an evil spirit 
or devil, while “daemon” is more usually associated with a guardian spirit. It is hoped that these “shrieking 
daemons” are more benevolent than malicious.
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records, a knowledge base could and often does contain all types of information. In practice, a 
KBS does not usually have a single knowledge base. Knowledge is separated into modules 
wherever possible for practical reasons. First of all, modularising enables the easy re-use of 
knowledge bases (Sticklen et al, 1987), for instance, knowledge of scheduling in the RISC System 
may be used in another scheduling KBS for another type of structure or another industry. Also 
each knowledge base may be loaded when needed to reduce memory requirements. Conceptually, 
it is irrelevant whether there is only one large knowledge base or several small distinct knowledge 
bases.
The main problem in the development of a KBS is in deciding on what knowledge representation 
scheme to use to construct the knowledge bases and how it should be implemented.
4.1.2.2 User-lnterface
In common with any complex computer program, a suitable man-machine interface or user- 
interface is required for any expert system. A user-interface will need to provide explanation 
facilities, prompt for input, let the user to control the reasoning process whenever possible and 
display results. In theory it is possible to have a semi-natural language interface, that is an interface 
which would understand certain key phrases and output English-like statements. An example of 
this type o f dialogue could be:
User Show me why the length is 10 cm.
Machine The length of the structure BLOCK is 10 cm
as a result of running analysis PROG.EXE
with datafile MYDATA.DAT
What is not practically possible is to be able to produce an interface which could understand all 
forms of input. In practice then, the interface is expected to deal with only a minimal vocabulary 
appropriate to the application and to the level of users.
The display of results is of course also important. Engineering applications nearly always best 
display data through the use of pictures, graphs and diagrams. The user should be able to 
interrogate the values for output parameters as and when results are achieved, that is derived, 
calculated, etc., and if appropriate change the route followed by the system.
The possible forms of interaction between a user and a computer system are initiation by the user 
or by the computer (Johnson & Keravnou, 1988). In the user-initiated mode of interaction, the user 
decides, based on the computer output, to proceed with the inference and provides the computer 
with the route to follow. In the computer-initiated mode, the computer alone decides, based on the
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user-input, to continue deriving more accurate conclusions and asks the user for the appropriate 
data. The most natural form of interaction is a mixed mode. Additionally, for engineering 
applications it is now not normally expected that a knowledge base system replace the engineer; 
instead it is expected that it act as a consultation system providing aid to the users as required, with 
the engineer making the final decision at each stage.
Apart from explanation facilities other important facilities are that the user be allowed to interrupt 
and store sessions, and produce reports. These allow time to find needed information that was not
at hand at the time and provide records for later inspection.
4.1.2.3 Inference Engine
In the same way that a human expert is required to reason with and deduce new information, a KBS 
has an inference engine to reason with the contents of the knowledge base and with the input data. 
Another description is that the inference engine is the program whilst the knowledge base and input 
is the data required by the program. In practice the distinction between inference engine, user- 
interface and knowledge base is not at all clear cut. It is not always possible to separate out the 
inference engine from the problem-specific knowledge and the user interface would make use of 
information in the knowledge base. As an example of this, consider the item
If input is not comprehensible
then give a message to the user "Sorry, I only
understand English." and stop.
The developer has to decide where best to include this information and the decision is made within 
the context of the application. Mistakes made at this point severely hamper future modifications 







Figure 4.2 Components o f  a KBS
The above gives a macro-level description of a traditional knowledge base system. It is necessary 
to consider more closely the nature of each part of a knowledge base system.
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4.2 Issues in Knowledge base systems
The problem which most frequently arises in KBS development is that of deciding what knowledge 
is required and how to select an appropriate knowledge representation scheme. The different 
formalisms which have been defined in the field of AI are explained in this section.
The next problem is that of choosing a reasoning scheme, which is often tied to the representation. 
Almost any form of reasoning involves searches at some point or another. Reasoning techniques 
are usually closely associated with a particular knowledge representation scheme and are outlined 
here. Searching techniques are also employed explicitly in the planning problem and hence these 
are described later on in chapter in greater detail.
4.2.1 Knowledge Representation Schemes
One of the main distinguishing features of knowledge base systems is that the problem-solving 
information used by the system is made explicit. This only becomes an advantage if the language 
and grammar used to represent this information is appropriate for its type, so that it can be 
represented in a natural form, by which it is meant a form which closely matches an expert's own 
definition and is also sufficiently complex to allow the representation of complex relationships. 
Many different formalisms have been proposed and this section describes these formalisms and 
explain their advantages and disadvantages. First, it is worthwhile attempting to define the 
different levels or layers of information required by any KBS.
4.2.1.1 Lavers of Knowledge
For practical reasons, it is necessary to distinguish between static  and dynamic knowledge. Static 
knowledge is the information used by a software system which will not change in the normal course 
of consultation with the system. For example, the inspection reliability databases used by the RISC 
system would not be changed whilst carrying out reliability analysis of a component which makes 
use of an inspection result. Dynamic knowledge is the information that is particular to the current 
session, for instance input data or results obtained from analyses. It should be clear that this is a 
fairly artificial distinction between the two types of data. For example, the data in the inspection 
reliability database would change as more information is gathered on the inspection technique, and 
certainly much of the dynamic knowledge on the stmcture would be stored as a history of the 
structure and hence become static knowledge. It is convenienL nevertheless, to view the two types 
as distinct as their requirements do vary slightly as described below.
The basic and practical requirements for a knowledge representation scheme are that it should be 
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easily accessible by the software system; understandable in that it is a close fit to language in which 
the problem is described; and finally expressive (Fikes & Kehler. 1985). By expressive, it is meant 
that the scheme must have a generalised format which can accommodate various types of 
information, such as
• documentation for the static knowledge
• heuristics that aid in narrowing down in the search for a  solution, that is "rules-of-thumb"
• algorithms and procedures
• classes of objects to describe, for example, components or materials
• information on the dynamic data, for example, at what point of the consultation it was
computed and how it was derived
• graphs and diagrams for input, output and explanation
M ore abstractly, the following layers of information for a KBS were proposed by Bobrow and 
Winograd, (1978):
• task domain which is knowledge specific to a problem, for instance about a fixed platform, 
or reliability analysis
• interaction domain refers to knowledge about the language for communication, for instance 
what queries and synonyms or general engineering term s may be input and understood
• common sense domain or general knowledge about time, sensible heuristics for dealing 
with unexpected errors, etc
• basic strategies or very general problem-solving strategies or knowledge to aid in system 
control
• computer language and environment, in common with any other software
These definitions are not hard and fast. For instance, the task domain can be split into
• the concept level that contains the knowledge about the ideas and physical objects which 
are particular to the problem
• the methods and mles level that gives the particular information on how to deal with the 
information about concepts, including non-general problem-solving strategies
Finally, a possible model for a knowledge base is given by Laurent (1987) as:
Knowledge Base = ( Objects + Actions + Halt condition )
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where the Objects are the defined concepts knowledge base or input and output data. Actions are 
procedures or deductions carried out on Objects and the Halt condition is satisfied when the 
problem has been solved. This model provides the missing link. In general problem-solving it is 
necessary to provide at least one Halt condition or goal. In RISC, there are likely to be many goals, 
since there will be a Halt condition for each stage of analysis, interpretation of results, and 
scheduling of actions.
The first three in the list of layers of knowledge above, namely the task, interaction and common 
sense domains, are made explicit in KBS. Thus, the problems of knowledge representation are the 
problems of representing and handling the information in these layers only. The following 
describes some knowledge representation schemes.
4.2.1.2 Logic
A basic axiom in logic is that if a fact derived from a particular set of propositions is both true and 
false, then anything at all can be derived from those propositions. Thus contradictions in the 
knowledge base and input must identified and removed as soon as they appear: in essence the 
knowledge base represents a closed world. But there can be no guarantee that all contradictions 
can be identified for any non-trivial system. Since any interesting engineering problem is definitely 
non-trivial and not a closed world problem, then formal logic alone will not be useful for an 
engineering expert system.
The above is an over-simplification: formal logic with its grammar and syntax cannot be used to 
represent and reason about all the information to be used by a software system (Addis, 1985). Still, 
knowledge representation based on first order predicate logic, that is, allowing the use of variables, 
does play a major part wherever formal deduction js required or in reasoning about time and 
beliefs, both of which are required for common-sense reasoning (Long, 1989; Reichgelt, 1989). 
First order predicate logic is often used in theorem-proving applications and in parts of the process 
of understanding language. It is also applied to the function of checking databases and knowledge 
bases for inherent contradictions. In these applications the number of logical statements is small, 
only a few hundred facts and tens of hypotheses, as compared to a realistic engineering application.
4.2.1.3 Production Rules
The first generation of expert systems, directly based on Newell’s “shrieking daemons” concept, 
were production rule systems, that is systems which used sets of rules as their knowledge, and this 
formalism was widely adopted for consultation KBSs (Davis et al, 1977a).
Almost any item of knowledge can be written in the form of a production rule (Frost, 1987). The 
basic form of a rule is shown in Figure 4.3:
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If condition(s)
then conclusion(s) or action(s)
Figure 4.3 Structure o f a production rule
where the conditions may be complex conditions formulated using Boolean operators, that is, 
AND, OR, NOT, FOR ALL, etc. Usually only one action or condition is applied, but several 
actions or conditions may be listed. Examples are shown below.
If the current probability of failure of a
component is greater than 0.5
then component must be inspected now
If the node under consideration is a T-joint
and its SIF is unknown
then apply the Newman-Raju parametric equation
Figure 4.4 Example production rules
As it is easy to express information as rules, they are also easy to understand. It is also easy to 
construct a knowledge base containing many rules, since a rule can contain one very simple item 
of information. Creating a knowledge base containing a large number of rules leads to huge 
problems in maintenance of the KBS, apart from the problems of actually executing the KBS. 
Thus, one disadvantage of production rules is that they provide too simple a format to represent 
concisely the large amount of knowledge typically required to solve a real-world problem. Another 
disadvantage is more fundamental: the user query
User Why should the component be inspected now?
would get the answer
Machine Because its probability of failure is 0.65
which is too superficial for the user to understand the basis of the reasoning. Production rules 
provide a method of representing only superficial information on the domain in question.
In general, rules are used for relatively simple or narrow domains and not considered suitable for 
the integration of information of many different types. Alternatively they are used to express 
heuristics for problem-solving strategies, which are sometimes only approximate and not to be held 
to be always the best solving method.
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4.2.1.4 Semantic Nets
As it became apparent to AI researchers that production rules did not always represent relationships 
efficiently, other formalisms were investigated. In particular. arious knowledge representation 
schemes were developed that are seemingly very different, but are based on associative nets or 
semantic nets (Chamiak & McDermott, 1985).
Semantic nets make explicit relationships between concepts and objects. For instance the platform 
Brent A is related to the general concept of fixed offshore platform s by the special relation is_a\
Brent A is_a fixed offshore platform.
Similarly, other relations between concepts and objects can be defined:
node G2143 is_part_of Brent A
chord 234 is_part_of node G2143
chord 234 is_made_of Material BSD2125
node G2143 is_a K_joint
K -joint is_a_kind__of tubular joint
Diagrammatically, these relations form a net-like structure, which could be extended to provide all 
the information required (Figure 4.5).
‘u b u la^ Jo in f^  «  kind o f  , fixed_offshore_stnicture
 — ' k jo in t  \
IS a
IS a
chord234 „ o d c a 2 U V ~ ~ ^ £ 2 n j l L ^  Bren,_A
is made o f
MaterialBSD2125
Figure 4.5 Example semantic r.et
To implement a net as above would entail setting down each  relation as a separate item of 
information. To be able to reason with such a knowledge strucm re, requires an understanding of 
the special relations is_a, a_kind_of is_part_ofio  provide more information about any one
object in the dynamic knowledge base. The is_a and relations describe specialisation,
which is described further in Section 4.2.1.5, and is_ p a rr_ r/tran sfers  information about one 
concept to another.
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Semantic nets are a most appropriate and powerful way of describing relationships between 
concepts and objects, that is, each connection between each item in the diagram. Unfortunately, 
there is no immediate way of making the meaning of each relation explicit or independent from the 
control mechanism. This problem poses a restriction on the development of systems using pure 
semantic nets as the allowed relations have to be predefined.
4.2.1.5 Schemas: Scripts, Frames and Objects
The format which best allows the construction of large knowledge bases that are not always 
complete is that of schemas, frames, scripts or objects. The names may be different, but the 
general principle holds: schemas are best described as a set of slots and they provide a framework 
for recognising and storing concepts, whether physical entities, abstract ideas or possible 
scenarios. The meaning or interpretation of these slots will vary implicitly according to the type 
of representation scheme and explicitly according to facets associated with each slot (Minsky, 
1972). Each slot is in effect a relation, as described for semantic nets. Thus a schema has the 
advantages of semantic nets, and also ensures that the knowledge is stmctured, that is, all 
information about a particular item is held in one place.
Scripts are used to identify situations or to follow a set of actions (Schank, 1977). A script might 
hold the set of events one may follow in scheduling the inspections for a structure. So with scripts 
the order of the slots is important. For instance, analysing the structure in the light of past 
inspection results must of course be carried out before interpreting the results, and this in turn must 
be carried out before ranking nodes in order of unreliability, and so on. Scripts could be also used 
to describe the procedure used to carry out a series of reliability analyses.
In contrast to scripts, frames are generally used to describe classes of objects and instances of these 
classes from a particular view-point (Bobrow & Winograd, 1978). One description of a frame is 
that it is a nested list of slots with associated lists of facets  which themselves have associated 
values. Slots are properties; facets are aspects of the property and thus give further meaning to the 
slot. Facets can be used to indicate any restrictions on the expected value for the slot. Some 
possible facets are value-type to indicate whether the value of the attribute is numerical, text, or 
even a procedure, default to allow a default value for the slot, and monitors that are procedures 
carried out when the slot is accessed.
A simplified example is the class of fixed  offshore platform, which have many attributes in 
common such as operator, number o f nodes, materials, and current IRM schedule. As a jacket-type 
platform would be expected to have more than 100 nodes, but less than 2000 say, thus the number 
o f nodes attribute may have an associated facet in range (100,2000) say, in addition to a facet 
indicating that this attribute is numeric. An if-needed monitor type facet associated to the current
Chapter 4 1 1 8
IRM schedule slot may trigger the RISC System to provide a schedule if one does not already exist. 
An instance of the class would be Brent A with its own values for each attribute such as number 
o f  nodes = 2547.
Objects are very similar in concept to frames and are now part of the main-stream of computer 
science where lower-level and industry standard programming languages have been developed to 
include the concept of encapsulating information into distinct objects. This is referred to as object- 
oriented programming (OOP). OOP has recently gained popularity in computing due to the 
convenience of class object abstraction as a representational tool, and the power of message passing 
as an information processing mechanism. Many languages are described as being object-oriented 
programming languages (OOPL), but there is no agreement on the fundamental principles of OOP 
ju st as there is no agreement on the basic principles of schema. Following Stefik and Bobrow 
(1984), Tello (1989), and Zaniolo (1984 and 1985), some of the most commonly understood and 
basic concepts or ingredients of an OOPL are
• Objects are complex data structures which combine properties of procedures and data. The 
structural object tubular joint, for instance, may be represented as a collection of related 
data elements with associated analysis methods.
• M essage passing refers to requesting an object to execute a procedure stored with the 
object (known as a method) and hence interpreted by the object. For example, a message 
may be passed to the stmctural object “tubular joint” to obtain its SIF value: the procedure 
to obtain the SIF is local to the object and so would know which parametric equations were 
applicable and what values to input into these.
• Specialisation refers to a feature where one object is a more specialised example or 
subclass of another. The tubular joint object may contain a default SIF calculation 
procedure, but the more specialised small T-joint may have a particular SIF equation that 
is best used. This is a very similar concept to that of inheritance which is explained below.
OOP is useful for the unification and simplification of the description of entities and their 
protocols. There is also an inheritance network set up, whereby an object which is a specialisation 
of a first object inherits all the properties and methods associated with this first object. An action 
is carried out by passing a message to an object requesting one of its methods to be executed.
In an OOPL, most, if not all, of the following or equivalent infix operators will be found: equals 
that associates an attribute and value to an object; sub and is_a, both of which define the 
inheritance network; with that associates methods to objects; and ; used to indicate a message. As 
examples, it could be stated that ”1100 equals the component with the lowest reliability” which 
would provide more information or identify a particular properry of interest more explicitly. “J 100
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is_a T-joint” and “T-joint is a 5wi?-ciass of tubular joints” provide a framework for inheritance of 
attributes of interest and methods, and default values or restrictions on values for some of the 
attributes. Stating “tubular joint with SIF calculation procedure" associates a method with the class 
of tubular joints, while “run JlOOiSlF calculation procedure” will execute the appropriate program 
for J 100.
■ Inheritance and Cross-referencing
Relationships between schemas can be represented by nesting schemas within each other. One 
schema can be a parent to another schema and this reduces information stored, as it allows 
inheritance of properties and values. Where the information required within one schema is 
described in much more detail in another schema, then cross-referencing between these schemas 
is carried out.
As an example of inheritance related to tubular joints, then the frame that describes an X-joint 
would contain a slot or attribute “superclass” with the value “tubular joint”. An X-joint would then 
take those properties and values represented in the tubular joint frame, unless overridden by the X- 
joint frame. As an example of cross-referencing, consider a frame representing tubular joints. The 
material property of an instance of an X-joint might be described as BS4360-50D within the X-joint 
frame. The detailed information on the material properties of BS4360-50D required for the 
analysis would be obtained from the BS4360-50D frame.
■ Stereotypes
A most important aspect of schemas is that default values for parameters may be represented. 
Default values represent stereotypical objects or situations, which can be used in several ways. At 
the simplest level the default values can provide aid to the user of a system by suggesting values 
to be input and hence a stereotype allows an expert to help the system when there is a gap in the 
user's knowledge. At a more complex level, stereotypes can be used to match actual situations or 
objects against expected situations and objects as part of the deduction process, or to provide the 
next step to be carried out, in the case of scripts, or more data for frames. Default reasoning is of 
great value in real-world situations since our knowledge o f a real problem is often incomplete 
(Reiter, 1978). Only by providing operators indicating defaults, such as may be used in frames, 
can default reasoning be carried out.
■ Summarising Schema
Schemas provide a powerful way of modularising the know ledge required to solve a complex 
problem. By predefining specialised slots, documentation can easily be stored with the information 
to which it refers. Inheritance and cross-referencing provides methods of re-using information and
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hence reducing information storage. The main disadvantage is that there are no well defined 
semantics for schema.
4.2.2 Reasoning and Induction Methods
There are many basic reasoning and control algorithms which may be implemented in a KBS. By 
"basic" it is meant that these algorithms tackle the problems common to all KBS and hence are 
found in nearly all intelligent systems. They are:
► Searching strategies are algorithms for controlling the order in which the solution space 
is searched when investigating a hypothesis or attempting to reach a goal state.
► Pattern-matching methods are procedures that take a  fact or hypothesis in the dynamic 
knowledge base and matches this against the static knowledge base. In effect two patterns 
are compared and if they match in the sense defined by the KBS itself, this indicates that 
the item of static knowledge can be used to add more information, either facts or 
hypotheses, to the dynamic knowledge base.
Searching techniques are of great interest in planning applications and hence will be discussed in 
some detail in Section 4.3. Pattern matching, which is to a certain extent akin to pattern 
recognition, is one of the most common ways of reasoning w ith frames, in that by matching an 
instance to a class, extra information in the form of default values can be provided (Minsky, 1972). 
First, the global reasoning or control strategies are discussed.
4.2.2.1 Backward and Forward Reasoning in Production Rule Svstems
A production system consists of a database or dynamic knowledge and rule base, containing 
production mles, and a mle interpreter or inference engine (Frost, 1987). The classical reasoning 
method originally proposed by Post in 1943 is data-driven or forward-reasoning  where the 
condition part of a mle is matched against the available data. If the conditions for a mle are 
satisfied then the conclusion can be added to the database. In goal-driven or backward reasoning, 
a goal is set and the conclusion parts of the mle-base are matched against this to eventually identify 
what data is required to attain the goal.
The advantages of a production system are that rules are modular, which eases maintenance but 
only if the mles are independent, and a natural form of knowledge representation; explanation 
facilities can be added; and uncertainty in the information can be relatively easily represented by 
the use of probability values associated with each mle. Some of these advantages are shared by 
the other representation schemes. The disadvantages of production systems include
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to be certain that a rule will be used only in a very particular circumstance ALL contextual 
information must be included in the conditions of each rule
dependencies are difficult to spot in large databases
the choice of mles and search strategy is not trivial
most production rale systems cannot handle generalised rales, such as
For all nodes,
if node has not been inspected in the past six years 
then include in next inspection schedule
In summary, a production rale system is only appropriate fo r narrow domains and not for the 
integration of information of many different types.
4.2.2.2 Models and Model-based Reasoning
To reason about complex systems, such as the degradation with time of a fixed platform, requires 
the use of deep knowledge. By deep knowledge is meant knowledge which contains the basic 
principles required to model a system (Cohn, 1985; Fulton & Pepe, 1990). Production rales usually 
contain only shallow knowledge^ that is, rales only associate an input fact with an output fact or 
action, but often this does not include the knowledge as to w hy the association exists. Thus an 
explanation for any reasoning based on rules is necessarily lim ited. The use of deep knowledge, 
on the other hand, allows greater flexibility in reasoning and better explanation facilities. In order 
to distinguish between KBSs which make use of simple heuristics to solve a problem and KBSs 
which model the behaviour of the system in question, to some extent, the term model-based system 
was coined (Fulton & Pepe, 1990). Reasoning in these systems can be carried out by making use 
of causal models which represent the structure and function o f  the domain objects and processes.
The problem remains to choose and define the structures used to model the domain. There is a 
need to have standard conceptualisations or data structures fo r this purpose. The use of concept 
discovery systems that carry out the process of extracting information automatically are described 
by Davis and Lenat (1982). Such systems would require a form al language which
• ensures fidelity, that is, that the model does represent the intentions of the knowledge 
engineer and for this the semantics need to be clearly defined
• provides a many-sorted logic to allow express taxonomic knowledge, such as is_a and 
other relationships between entities
• enables consistent knowledge bases to be created, and formal methods for this include the
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use of truth maintenance systems, the details of which are beyond the scope of this thesis 
but are given by Stanojevic et ai (1994)
• minimises unnecessary inference chaining, that is provides methods reliant on meta­
control information (Maes, 1988) to check the likelihood that rules or procedures leading 
away from the goal can being triggered and to detect circularities in the reasoning process
Standards require being formulated for such languages. Most o f these issues are advanced topics 
for research and discussion and hence are no longer discussed here.
4.2.2.3 The Blackboard Model
A blackboard system is a highly structured opportunistic problem  solving system that prescribes 
the organisation of domain knowledge and data, but not the control mechanisms (Nii, 1986a and 
1986b). A system can be called a blackboard system whatever its control algorithms. Thus the 
term blackboard describes a model or concept and does not specify the architecture of a system. 
The basic elements of a blackboard system are;
• knowledge sources that are modules encapsulating the problem-solving knowledge
• blackboard data structure or a global database that stores the dynamic knowledge of the 
current problem solving session
• control, although not prescribed, is of course required to control how the knowledge 




Figure 4.6 A simple blackboard architecture  
Historically, the concept of a blackboard system was outlined by Newell in 1962 (described earlier
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as “a classroom with shrieking daemons”) and became the basis for the first production rule 
systems, where the knowledge sources (or daemons) are production rules which responded to 
changes in the dynamic database of facts (Winston, 1977).
Nowadays, the term is most often reserved for an opportunistic KBS with a partitioned blackboard, 
each partition usually representing a level o f abstraction. As an example of this, consider the 
example used to illustrate the use of one of the earliest and classic blackboard systems, HEARSAY, 
that is image processing of photographs to detect and identify koala bears (Nii, 1986a). The lowest 
level of abstraction may be the raw vision data, the next level may be processed vision data, such 
as blobs and their parameters, then collections of blobs to make features such as circles or oblongs. 
Characterised features such as eyes and muzzles or heads, legs, torsos and paws, follow and the 
final level of abstraction would be the recognised bears. Thus, the higher levels of abstraction 
usually contain hypotheses inferred from the lower levels.
The blackboard model is most suitable for problem areas such as speech and image recognition or 
complex signal analysis, where the opportunistic behaviour is required in an attempt to shorten 
computation time and where the concept of different levels o f  abstraction fits in well with the 
language used to solve the problem.
A knowledge representation scheme is not prescribed just as the model does not prescribe the 
control required to implement a blackboard-based system. A knowledge source can be a production 
rale, or a schema with some implicit reasoning method associated with it, or a procedural program. 
As a model it lends itself very well to distributed processing, although how it is to be implemented 
for parallel processing is another research area in itself (Corkill, 1988).
4.2.3 Modelling Uncertainty
In an engineering domain such as inspection scheduling o f offshore structures, much of the 
knowledge stored will include elements which are uncertain. This arises from or because of
• random variables, such as wave loads, which can be tackled by using well-established 
methods from statistics and probability
• model uncertainties due the imprecision inherent in a  mathematical model of a physical 
system
• numerical errors which occur when using quantitative methods to evaluate mathematical 
models
• verbal or qualitative descriptions, which more often than not include an element of 
fuzziness or imprecision
Chapter 4  12 4
• non-monotonic logic, that is the use of reasoning which changes the conclusions arrived 
at according to the order in which deductions are made
• imprecision of knowledge, such as production rules representing experiential knowledge 
which are not always applicable, or default values employed in frames
• granularity of knowledge, where data is given to a certain degree of accuracy in one 
context, but which in another context may be required to a higher level of accuracy
• incompleteness of knowledge, where a belief can be stated about the truth of some 
statement, allowing for perhaps ignorance of other information
• human errors occurring during the construction of a knowledge base
The first three cases are dealt with by mathematical algorithms and have already been discussed 
and considered in Chapter 3. The last is a question of ensuring that good procedures are followed 
in the development of a knowledge base system and of providing tools with the knowledge base 
editor to allow the developer to check for errors. The remainder, however, are problems of 
knowledge representation. Several ways have been developed to represent uncertain knowledge 
for an expert system or KBS. The two main methods are Bayesian methods and fuzzy logic.
4.2.3.1 Bavesian Methods
In AI systems, Bayes’ theorem is often applied in an approximate manner (Saffiotti, 1987). 
Formulae are derived from Bayes’ relation between P(H,IE), the probability of the hypothesis H, 
being true given evidence E, and the known prior probabilities PCH,), P fH j),... P(H„) where H,, Hj, 
to are possible exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, and PCEIHj), the probability of the evidence 
given the Hj hypothesis occurring (see Chapter 3 for a description of Bayes’ theorem applied to 
decision theory).
One of the earliest attempts to employ Bayes’ theorem to model the uncertainties in reasoning was 
in the MYCIN system for medical diagnosis and in the geological system Prospector (Buchanan 
& Shortliffe, 1984; Duda et al, 1979). In these systems, conclusions could be qualified with 
certainty factors, but these are not Bayesian probabilities in the sense that exclusivity of all 
hypotheses was not required. In spite of this, the calculation o f the new uncertainties was based 
on Bayes’ mle. As this is an ad hoc method and only loosely based on Bayes’ theorem, the 
resulting numbers were not well-defined and hence difficult to interpret. This makes the basic 
method questionable. Other applications of Bayes’ rule, in expert systems shells such as SAGE 
and Micro-Expert are also ad hoc methods (Mamdani et al, 1985). Even when probabilities for all 
possible events can be found, there are practical problems. To apply Bayes’ mle requires being 
able to state and store all the probabilities (or certainty and belief factors) for each hypothesis, for
Chapter 4  125
each rule and for the joint probabilities. This requires a huge amount of data. Thus the Bayes’ 
approach has not been particularly successful and because of this, other methods have been 
considered which do not attempt a quantitative approach, and instead make use of linguistic terms 
to indicate uncertainty. These will not be covered here.
An extension of Bayes’ rule, which is theoretically more sound than the ad hoc methods outlined 
above, is the Dempster-Shafer Rule, which makes use of measures of belief in causal relations or 
the rules relating knowledge, and uncertainty in the evidence being provided (Chatalic et al, 1987). 
This method can be applied to fuzzy sets and used to describe fuzzy rules, hence fuzzy logic is next 
described.
4.2.3.2 Fuzzv Logic
An example was given earlier of a piece of knowledge representing qualitative information about 
a physical system:
A brace with a heavy load will buckle.
Consider a system which contains the above knowledge and information is given to it that a load 
of lOOOON has been applied to a brace. The system will require some understanding of what is 
meant by a heavy load to decide whether or not lOOOON will cause buckling. In this context the 
term heavy in the above example is an imprecise ox fuzzy  term. One method of dealing with such 
a term is to apply fuzzy logic, which originated from Lofteh Zadeh in 1965 (Zadeh, 1974 and 1988). 
It is applied in control theory and now also in business domains, as well as in KBS systems 
(Griffiths et al, 1987). Its purpose is to enable reasoning based on linguistic variables to be carried 
out in a systematic way.
It has been argued that the best way to approach the problem of linguistic imprecision is to do away 
with the linguistic terms altogether and to provide instead a range of possible values or a statistical 
distribution to model the variable (Kosko, 1992). An argument against this approach is that by 
requiring a precise numerical description, the representation of the knowledge becomes less 
comprehensible, that is, if an expert reasons qualitatively, then forcing the use of quantitative terms 
makes the expression of the knowledge more difficult.
Fuzzy logic provides a basis for the translation of qualitative terms to quantitative values and vice 
versa, by associating probability functions with terms such as heavy, to provide an estimate for a 
heavy load. To apply fuzzy logic requires the definition o ïfuzzy sets. This is done by assigning 
a probability value to the fuzzy term for associated numerical values. As an example, the fuzzy set 
“Normal Loads for this particular brace” may be defined as a graph representing membership of
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Figure 4.7 Membership values fo r  the fuzzy set "Normal Loads fo r  a brace”
The graph in Figure 4.7 has a typical shape for a membership graph. From it, it can be deduced that 
a load of 20000N is usual for a brace, whilst a load of lOOOON could be considered to be perhaps 
a little low. Other fuzzy sets can be considered which are related to this set. For instance the set 
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Figure 4.8 Fuzzy sets (a) ‘Heavy Loads' and (b) ‘Light Loads'
From these, the modified set of ‘VERY Heavy Loads’ can be defined, where the line is shifted in
some direction, ‘NOT Low Loads’, ‘NOT Low Loads AND Heavy Loads’ and so on. This 
combination of various fuzzy sets with other sets and modifiers is carried out by a series of fuzzy  
rules. Suppose that F represents a fuzzy term with membership function p(x), that is, for an object 
with attribute A set to value jc, then A is F with membership value p(jc). For a particular brace B, 
with applied load L=32000N, and membership functions for Normal, Heavy and Light loads as 
shown in the above figures, L is Heavy with membership value 0.2, Normal with membership value
0.8 and Light with membership value 0. Then example fuzz>- rules may be
1. For negation, that is, NOT F, where F is a fuzzy term with membership function p(x), a
common procedure is to take ( 1 - p(x)) as the membership values for the new set. This
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transformation does not always lead to consistent results. For example, if NOT Light Load 
is interpreted as Heavy Load, then the membership function for Heavy Load should be (1- 
P l ( x ) ) ,  where P l ( x )  is the membership function for Light Load, which is inconsistent with 
the graphs shown.
2. For the conjunction of two fuzzy terms F I, F2, that is FI AND F2, it is usual to take the 
minimum values of the combined graphs. So a membership function for a Heavy AND 
Normal Load would start at 0 for a load of 30000N rise steadily to a value of 0.5 at 
35000N and descend to 0 at 40000N.
3. For the disjunction of two fuzzy terms, FI OR F2, the procedure is to consider the sum of 
the two graphs, and if any values are greater than 1, the sum is truncated so that the 
maximum value is 1. For a Heavy OR Normal Load, membership values start at 0 for a 
load of 5000N, rise to a value of 1 at 15000N and stay at 1 for loads greater than 15000N.
4. For the use of modifiers, e.g, VERY, QUITE, the g r ^ h  may be shifted either up or down, 
above or below original line.
Note that a new fuzzy term made up of two or more combinations of the original fiizzy terms may 
not reach 1 on its graph, e.g. ‘Heavy Load AND Light Load’ is everywhere 0. If a single value is 
required, perhaps to be given to the user or to be used as a default value in a calculation, a method 
of ‘de-fuzzy-fying’ is required. Several strategies to do this are reasonable, such as “take the value 
with the highest membership value’’, or “calculate the central moments of area under the graph”.
A comparison of fuzzy logic with classical logic is given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Com parison of fuzzy logic w ith  classical logic
Classical Logic Fuzzy Logic
1 Values of propositions can be TRUE or 
FALSE only (Law of Excluded Middle)
A proposition can be partially true
2 Quantifiers are ALL or SOME (or There 
exists at least one)
Many quantifiers eg: MOST, 
ABOUT, FEW, SOME
3 Classical inference allows only reasoning 
based on absolutes, e.g., J 101 is a 
T_joint AND T Jo in ts have one brace) 
IMPLIES JlOl has one brace
Dispositional inference allows 
reasoning with probables, e.g., 
MOST tubular joints have cracks at 
installation AND JlO l is a tubular 
joint IMPLIES JlO l probably has 
cracks at installation
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A possible disadvantage of fuzzy logic is the requirement to define the set membership function, 
and how this is done can be very subjective. Fortunately, it has been shown that fuzzy systems are 
not sensitive to the exact form of the fuzzy sets. The technique is a robust way of allowing 
reasoning based on qualitative terms as might be employed by human experts.
4.2.4 Knowledge Modelling for RISC
It is expected that for an engineering domain, such as IRM scheduling, a model-based system may 
have analysis procedures which model the physical behaviour to various levels of detail. For 
example, a chord with a particular load may be modelled at a macro-level by considering the chord 
as a cantilever bending under a particular load, and to a micro-level by involving considerations 
o f the material deformation at molecular level. The use of qualitative reasoning makes use of 
knowledge representing qualitative information about a physical system, such as the previous 
example:
A brace with a heavy load will buckle.
There are various possible ways of dealing with such information, but in order to be able to 
integrate this type of information with quantitative knowledge requires the ability to transfer 
smoothly from one mode to another. To do this would need a method of translating from 
qualitative terms to quantitative measures, and vice versa, such as fuzzy logic. There is a 
requirement that the RISC System act purely as a consultation system, where the maintenance 
expert makes all final decisions. Thus, any uncertainties on what values may be used at different 
points would be presented to the user. Any inherent uncertainties in the knowledge of the problem 
would be expected to be incorporated into the stmctural reliability analysis. Thus the use of an A1 
based procedure for dealing with uncertainty may be wholly inappropriate for the RISC 
methodology.
The formalism which appears to be of value to the RISC System application is that of schemas for 
general data storage. Since the analysis process requires a great deal of data to be collected, the 
slot-and-filler representation provides a highly stmctured way o f storing and managing data. The 
use of methods or monitors, associated with each class, allows the definition of procedures to 
calculate missing data values, such as stress concentration factors, which will be particular to each 
structure type and perhaps even to an instance of a tubular jo in t. In addition, there will be some 
fairly unstructured information on heuristics which will constrain as well as aid the scheduling 
process. It is expected that these rules will be simple rules for data-driven reasoning, which can 
be stmctured into small mle sets and brought into play at very specific points of the RISC 
procedure. For instance, when choosing possible points in tim e for inspection, a simple m le will
Chapter 4  129
check for any data about the joint which indicate restrictions on the period for inspection.
Most of the RISC procedure is quite clearly prescriptive in that a particular set of steps is to be 
followed. Thus, scripts may be implemented to control the analysis process. If necessary, 
specialised schemas can be set up for the representation of the more complex heuristics used to aid 
scheduling as well as overall control of the RISC system. As one of the main tasks of the RISC 
System is to carry out scheduling, the next section considers the use of AI in scheduling and 
planning applications.
43  A I FOR S c h e d u lin g  and  P la n n in g
Scheduling and planning are decision processes which involve selecting the most appropriate 
sequence or set of actions to be carried in the future given an initial state. Yang (1997) 
distinguishes carefully between the two terms. Planning is the production of a description of how 
a sequence of events are interrelated, which would include the definition of the constraints on the 
sequence o f the events. The aim of scheduling, on the other hand, is to select an optimal set of 
events from a plan which satisfies certain conditions or constraints.
Scheduling and planning are real-world problems to which mathematical techniques borrowed from 
operational research and management science have been applied, such as dynamic programming 
for assembly scheduling employing robots (Jiang et al, 1997). Although these methods are often 
effective in certain situations, for the general scheduling problem they can fail (Berry, 1992b). AI 
has been applied to this area in an attempt to take into account all the problems that arise in 
scheduling which cannot be taken into account by the use of mathematical techniques. This section 
considers some of the issues and searching techniques which may be relevant to the RISC System. 
It also proposes a planning and scheduling algorithm for the RISC System.
4.3.1 The Scheduling and Planning Problem
Scheduling involves allocating resources to perform a series o f tasks over a period of time. The 
decision problem in scheduling is to how to assign actions to points in time, to achieve the goal of 
ensuring that all the actions are carried out within some stated objectives. This may require 
reasoning about time, resources and other constraints. Le Pape 11993) defines two basic categories 
of planning or, in this context, scheduling problems:
• pure resource allocation, in which the demand for each resource is known beforehand and 
the problem is to ensure that resources are allocated such that availability equals or
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exceeds the demand
• pure scheduling, in which the capacity of each resource is known beforehand and the
problem here is to schedule activities such that the demand on each resource is less than 
or equal to the availability
Realistic scheduling and planning problems are a combination o f the two categories.
Planning problems involve ordering the sequence of activities. This requires identifying 
precedences, that is, any relationships between activities which dictate the order of execution. For 
instance, if a detailed IRM schedule were required, it would be necessary to realise that inspection 
o f a jo in t must be carried out before a repair, thus inspection has precedence over repair. For 
activities with no direct relationship, it may be possible to run these in parallel. So, if two divers 
are employed in inspecting joints, then two inspections may be carried out at the same time. Plans 
in which some activities are carried out in parallel are termed non-linear plans since the plans can 
be modelled as a network, rather than as a linear sequence, or activities (Navinchandra et al, 1988).
The RISC planning and scheduling problem, on the other hand, does not require a detailed schedule 
that shows the order of the activities in each scheduling period. Thus, it is not necessary to 
consider precedences between inspection activity and only some parallelism may be considered for 
the possibility of more than one diver being employed. The decision to enable more than one 
inspection to occur at the same time is in fact not the operator’s, but the diving subcontractors and 
hence has little bearing on the operator’s problem. Thus, the general problem of network planning 
will not be considered here.
The researchers in the AI field are interested in planning on two levels. On the one hand the 
planning problem is one which occurs in many situations. The human is a planning animal that will 
formulate detailed programs of actions to achieve some goal. In addition, AI programs require an 
element of planning to achieve objectives that lead to the goal o f solving a particular problem. In 
both cases, there is the common aspect of intelligent agents trying to accomplish goals.
Planning can be considered as a searching problem, since the planning problem can be stated as 
requiring to find a solution out of all the possible actions, which achieves the required goals 
(Georgeff, 1987; Tate et al, 1985). Planning can also be carried out by applying case-based 
reasoning. If a past plan succeeded then the chances are that a  similar plan would succeed again 
, as long as the objectives remain the same and there have been only a few changes to the possible 
actions and constraints (Tate et al, 1985). This reflects the reasoning which is carried out in most 
industries when old plans are re-used, but if these no longer achieve the goal, then they are 
modified by trial-and-error until a new schedule is produced (Duchessi & O’Keefe, 1990). In this
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section, methods which are based on searching techniques and on dealing with constraints will be 
considered in some detail.
43.2 Tree-Searching Techniques
One way of searching through a range of possible combinations of decisions is to consider the 
solution space to be a tree of possibilities otherwise known as an OR tree (Tate et al, 1985; Bole 
& Cytowski, 1992). A node of an OR tree represents one event and the arcs from each node 
represent alternative events, only one of which can occur. In the tree of possibilities, each node 
is a decision and from each node, there is a another set of possible options from which to choose 
(cf. the decision theory tree described in Chapter 3 for the choice of best inspection). A general 
and incomplete search tree is shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9 A general search tree
As shown here, the root usually represents the decision to find a goal state. The leaves or end 
nodes usually represent a possible solution, or if not a solution, a point at which no further options 
exist. The route or path from the node to leaf node represents the order in which decisions are 
made. In the example tree, some paths appear to continue further and it is possible to have an 
infinite tree where some paths never terminate. Associated with each node is a cost or value. The 
basic problem now is to find a leaf node which represents the best solution or at least a good 
solution. The factors to be considered are the total costs for each route down the tree, and the 
computational effort required to generate each new set of decisions and to calculate the costs.
The issues to be considered are how to create such a tree and the best way to search through it. The 
first is particular to the domain of interest. The second issue is common to all tree-searching and 
some techniques are described here.
The ideal situation would be to use the tree structure to organise the solution space to carry out a 
systematic evaluation of the costs for all possible solutions, which is in effect an exhaustive search 
through the tree. It is only necessary to consider a very simple binary tree with a depth of three
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layers, as in Figure 4.10, to realise that this is not without problems. The number of possible 
solutions is 1?. An exhaustive search and evaluation of all the possible solutions for this simple 
tree requires at least (2+2^+2^) computations to generate each possible path.
Figure 4.10 A simple binary tree with 3 layers
For a tree with more than two options at each node and more than three layers, the number of 
computations increases exponentially and hence very rapidly. This is a classic example of what 
is called in computer science and mathematics an NP-complete or NP-hard problem, that is, it is 
computationally intractable since there is no algorithm which guarantees to solve the problem in 
polynomial time (Garey & Johnson, 1979; Atabaksh, 1991; Pearl, 1984).
Some classic brute force searching techniques are now described. These techniques do not 
guarantee finding a optimal solution, or even any solution in a specific amount of time for a general 
problem. By careful consideration of the type of treë and problem in hand, it is usually possible 
to apply one of these techniques fairly successfully. By exploiting the restrictions on the domain, 
it may be possible to find an algorithm which leads to a solution in polynomial time.
4.3.2.1 Depth and Breadth First Methods
Depth first and breadth first searches are the most fundamental tree searching algorithms. In the 
depth-first algorithm, the tree is searched in such a way that the nodes further down the tree take 
priority.
Consider the tree in Figure 4.11 and note that the form of the tree is not known beforehand, that 
is, nodes are identified only as the search proceeds. The figure represents a search which is still 
in the process of finding a suitable solution. The numbered nodes have been identified in the order 
of the numbers and four possible solutions, 1-2-3, 1-2-4-5-6,1-2-4-7 and 1-2-8 have been evaluated 
in that order. If any solution was acceptable then the search would have stopped at 1-2-3. The 
search shown in this figure implies that there is a requirement for some criteria be met, such as the 
cost of the solution be less than some value, that was not satisfied by the solution given by 1-2-3.
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3Figure 4.11 Depth first search
Where the tree is not infinite, that is all paths terminate, as in this example, then a depth first search 
is a feasible method as at least one solution will be eventually found. This example tree does have 
one rather long path yet to be traversed. If the solution were to  be a path lying on the right hand 
side of the long path, then this procedure would spend much corrçutational effort on one path only. 
If there is an infinite path, then depth-first may never come to a solution. This last problem is 
overcome by setting a maximum number of nodes in any one branch or path which may be searched 
and thus forcing the search to jump to the next branch.
Breadth-first searches prioritise searching through nodes closer to the root. For the same tree, and 
again remembering that the precise form of the tree is unknown until the identification of the node 
has taken place, a breadth-first search could be illustrated as in Figure 4.12.
5
Figure 4.12 Breadth-first search
Chapter 4 134
In this search, three possible solutions have been identified so far in the order 1-4, 1-2-5 and 1-2-7. 
Thus short paths are very rapidly identified and evaluated. This example demonstrates one 
advantage of this method, that is that if at least one path is non-terminating, the search for at least 
one solution will be successful. Yet it has been assumed so far that at each node the number of 
options are at least finite and ideally fairly small.
For a tree which may have many options at any one node, breadth-first may spend too much time 
in partial solutions and if the number of options is infinite, breadth-first does not terminate. This 
last problem is relatively easily overcome in that by setting a maximum number of nodes at any one 
level of the tree that may be searched, it is possible to force the search further down a path. 
Another disadvantage, although not as serious, is that for a tree with paths which are all 
approximately equal in length, this method will spend much time on the evaluation of partial 
solutions. In contrast, a depth-first search will reach one solution very quickly and very efficiently. 
The anticipated form of the tree then dictates which is the best method to use.
These two methods are brute-force methods in that during the searching procedure no knowledge 
of the problem state is utilised. For instance, costs of the partial paths are not taken into account 
to direct the searching procedure. Extensions to these methods are easily derived and are discussed 
next.
4.3.2.2 Best-First Search and Other Methods
One obvious extension to the above methods is to make use of the partial path cost evaluations at 
any one point and to search the next node on the least cost path. This is known as cheapest-first 
search. It is usually more interesting to find the best overall path and this requires an estimate of 
the cost of the remaining path. If the cost of the remainder of the search path can be estimated and 
the least costly of these selected, then this is best-first search.
Several variations exist of the basic cheapest-first and best-first searches. One could consider the 
very best of all the partial solutions found or to be found, the best path at any one level, which is 
an extension of breadth-first, or the best in the next level along the path, which is an extension of 
then depth-first algorithm (Korf, 1987). The basic disadvantage of these methods is that extra 
computation and storage of the costs for each path is required. This is often acceptable given the 
advantages of the methods. Other extensions include the A* and B* methods (Thornton & Du 
Boulay, 1992). The first method is a generalisation of cheapest and best-first, where the sum of 
the partial costs and estimated future costs for a solution are used. The B* method involves 
estimating optimistic and pessimistic values for complete path to a solution, based in the partial 
path costs and knowledge of the likely values of future costs (Berliner, 1979). As more partial 
paths are evaluated, the range of possible values for the paths changes, any path with an optimistic
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value below the best pessimistic value is no longer considered. The method corresponds to the 
operational research branch-and-bound method as described in Chapter 2.
Further heuristic-based and opportunistic methods based on making use of knowledge about the 
problem state and committing or not committing to certain paths are also described in the literature 
(Gaschnig, 1981; Pearl, 1984; Tate et al 1985; Fox et al, 1989; Bole & Cytowski, 1992). In 
particular, the best-first technique is easily generalised by including heuristics to define the best 
node to consider next or to estimate the costs. Additionally, the simple methods described above 
can be extended to deal with AND/OR trees, where AND nodes are partitions of the predecessor 
node to which they are connected. Figure 4.13 shows an example AND/OR tree where the AND 
nodes are indicated by the use of curved lines binding the arcs. For a solution to the problem 
modelled by this AND/OR tree, a path must be found from node 1 to nodes 2 or 3. If the search 
leads to node 2 then a solution path must be include all nodes below it, that is nodes 4, 5 and 6. 
Similarly if the search reaches node 9 then the solution must include nodes 12 and 13.
10
Figure 4.13 An AND/OR tree
More advanced methods include the use of distributed systems to allow several paths to be 
searched at the same time. These are beyond the scope of this discussion at the moment, but may 
be of value in future extensions to the RISC work.
43.3 Constraints-Based Planning
Scheduling problems can be dealt with by utilising constraints satisfaction schemes which exploit 
the declarative representation of the constraints on resources in which to carry out the activities to 
be scheduled (Dean & Wellman, 1991; Yang, 1996). M any researchers have made use of 
constraints-based ideas in scheduling systems for many different industries (Atabaksh, 1991).
A constraint represents a relationship between plan variables, as a condition which must be 
satisfied. So, “sub-sea inspections of tubular welded connections can only be carried out during 
the summer months” is a general constraint representing the nodon of a weather window. A more
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specific constraint may be “all joints to be inspected with eddy current techniques must be 
inspected in one weather window” representing the operator’s concern that the specialist divers 
trained to use eddy current equipment may be employed for one inspection period only. 
Constraints are modified during the planning process. As more inspections are planned for a 
particular weather window, there is less time available for further inspection actions to be assigned 
to that weather window. Certain constraints are dealt with implicitly by allowing only a certain 
possible set of values; others are dealt with by employing heuristics or by systematic methods.
One method of dealing with constraints is to carry out a generation, posting and satisfaction cycle 
(Stefik, 1981; Chandra & Marks, 1986). By generation, it is meant that new constraints are 
formulated based on the current state of the plan. As the plan becomes more refined, then the 
constraints are also refined. During propagation, constraints are associated with a network 
describing the scheduling process, which here may be a tree of possible IRM actions. Thus, the 
constraint “sub-sea inspections of tubular welded connections can only be carried out during the 
summer months” becomes “only one month remains free for inspection tasks in year 3" at the point 
where only the weather window in year 3 is under consideration and several inspection tasks have 
been allocated to the weather window. This process ensures that the searching is carried out 
efficiently and provides a method of reducing the search space at each point of the scheduling tree. 
The use of constraints to reduce the search space has been applied in many scheduling systems as 
well as in design systems (Sriram & Maher, 1986; Maher & Gomez, 1996). Finally, after reducing 
the search space, it is necessary to satisfy the constraints.
More systematic methods exist for general constraint satisfaction problems (CSP). Algorithms 
reviewed by Kumar (1992) and in Bole and Cytowski (1992) are based on describing a CSP as a 
set of variables with a finite set of discrete values each variable can take and constraints defined 
on the variables. The methods are based on describing the CSP as a network or graph where the 
nodes are the variables and the arcs between pairs of variables represent constraints between them. 
The methods allow systematic searching and reduction of the graph until no solution or one or more 
solutions are given. These methods treat every constraint in the same way as well as being 
restricted to only discrete valued variables.
It can be useful to categorise scheduling constraints to allow different treatments. In the ISIS 
system, constraints were categorised as hard or soft constraints (Fox & Smith, 1984). Hard 
constraints represent physical restrictions or legal requirements, which cannot be exceeded and 
hence these predominate in the creation of an initial schedule. The latter are preferences and can 
be exceeded if a solution is otherwise difficult to find. The CSP algorithms described by Kumar 
(1992) target hard constraints. Other researchers have considered ways of modelling soft 
constraints to allow uncertainties in requirements to be considered. Berry (1992b) describes a
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constraint satisfaction approach based on using statistical models of the constraints. For instance, 
models for the start times describe a range of possible times with a preferred start time, and a PCP 
(Preference Capacity Plan) for a resource gives a likely demand for the resource at different times 
based on a combination of the constraints, in terms of resource availability, preferences, and 
requirements.
43.4 Applying Tree-Searching and Constraints Satisfaction to RISC
In the RISC System, the planning problem is to decide on the possible inspection actions which 
may be carried out given certain constraints. The required output is in essence a very simple linear 
schedule, in that a window of time is allocated as a resource and a  list of inspection tasks for a year 
could be assumed to be a sequence of activities, albeit unordered. The IRM scheduling problem 
in the RISC procedure is to assign each future inspection task to a  node to an inspection period, in 
such a way that the constraints on resources and the constraints on the inspection tasks themselves 
are not exceeded.
The domain sizes of the variables are, in theory and at least initially, large, that is there are many 
possible IRM actions for each joint or node. The resource constraints on the resources are flexible 
in that an operator can decide to re-allocate resources from one year to another albeit within certain 
budgetary limits. The more systematic CSP algorithms were not considered in detail, instead a 
pragmatic approach involving a searching for possible schedules was taken.
As will be described in Chapter 5, the planning problem is solved by applying heuristics specifying 
hard constraints to narrow down the number of possible maintenance plans per joint and for the 
structure, then evaluating these by the use of reliability analysis. From this a subset of possible 
plans based on the analysis results can be selected and this is then the basis for the scheduling 
problem.
A two-stage procedure is suggested where an initial schedule is then modified to take into account 
softer constraints. The searching is carried out at this stage o f  the process. A proposed solution 
is to combine both constraints satisfaction and tree searching. This can be done by formulating an 
AND/OR tree representing the scheduling problem for RISC and applying tree-searches to find 
alternatives systematically whenever it is found that the inclusion of an action means that a 
constraint is exceeded. The constraints are stated and are easily checked at each stage of the 
search. Several search methods can be applied to find several possible solutions. Currently the 
simplest searching algorithms are implemented, that is the depth-first, breadth-first and best-first 
methods. The solutions found in this manner are complete schedules of inspection plans to be 
carried out on the stmcture which do not exceed stated resources and preferred constraints.
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4.4 R e v i e w  o f  A p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  KBS
AI concepts have been applied extensively to the whole range of real world engineering problems. 
A classic application of neural networks is in signal processing, such as in for the interpretation of 
sensor data during non-destructive testing, where data obtained from eddy current or ultrasonic 
equipment is processed by a neural network to abstract a classification of the possible defect 
(Windsor, 1995; Shyamsunder et al, 1995; McNab & Dunlop, 1995). As a contrast to the use of 
AI for low level data processing, neural networks have also been used in high level design tasks 
such as prediction of ship container capacity, and have been combined with fuzzy concepts, which 
enable the use of linguistic variables for input and output, for concrete pile damage diagnosis, 
concrete mix design and design of industrial roofs (Ray et al, 1996; Rajasekaran et al, 1996). 
Fuzzy reasoning has also been used in power system control for dealing with linguistic variables 
describing voltage settings, load demands and so on within a knowledge base system (Laughton 
et al, 1994). Concepts related to expert systems have been employed more extensively in 
engineering, than other ideas from AI. Frames have been used in continuous systems simulation 
modelling a set of first order differential equations, to aid data entry, consistency checks, and the 
interpretation of results (Nolan & McCarthy, 1986). Case-based reasoning, allowing human- 
computer cooperative decision-making, has been employed in job-shop schedule optimisation 
(Miyashita, 1995).
Expert systems have been proposed and developed to aid in the use of statistical analysis, to control 
the use of software systems and to support the use a collection o f analysis programs (Gale, 1987; 
Newell & Steier, 1993; Apte & Weiss, 1987; Peers, 1997). Object-oriented concepts have been 
widely adopted, such as in the work on the successor to the IGES CAD data standard, STEP or 
STandard for the Exchange of Product data, for the representation and storage of engineering data 
and have also been applied to analysis of NDT sensor data (Bloor & Owen, 1991; Bjork, 1991; 
McNab & Dunlop, 1995). This section concentrates on expert systems and knowledge base 
systems for general engineering applications or related to reliability-based scheduling and planning. 
Some typical applications of KBSs include
• diagnosis in medicine and of faults, for example M YCIN and CRIB
• design and configuration systems, such as HI-RISE and XCON
• provision of advice in the use of potentially complex procedures, such as codes of practice
and analysis programs, for instance, ELAS and PLAIM
• planning and scheduling for manufacturing, project management, or maintenance, such
as ISIS and MOLGEN
Chapter 4  139
The classic, early expert systems are now described, and a review of some recent application of 
KBSs to general areas in planning and scheduling and in engineering follows.
4.4.1 Early Examples of Expert Systems
Probably one of the first general purpose AI systems that would now be termed an expert system 
was GPS, or General Purpose System, which was, as mentioned earlier, based on production rules 
and intended to imitate human reasoning (Newell & Simon, 1963). From this work, the system 
Soar was developed. Soar was used to develop, in turn, several specialised expert systems (Newell 
& Steier, 1993). Another early general AI system, described as a  “meta-expert system”, Teiresias, 
was developed to provide expertise on methods of knowledge acquisition for the development of 
expert and knowledge base systems (Davis & Buchanan, 1977b; Davis, 1979). In particular, 
Teiresias carried out exhaustive depth-first searches to find the best rules from sets of data. This 
work extended knowledge on the application and limitations o f induction and the problems of 
knowledge representation. The AGE (Attempt to Generalize) system was another well-known 
meta-KBS and development system which aimed to provide A I scientists with a consistent 
framework to carry out systematic knowledge engineering (Nil &  Aiello, 1979). In other words, 
AGE provided programmers who were comfortable with AI concepts with guidance and tools to 
develop and test different representations and reasoning mechanisms.
The most well-known expert system applied to a real-world problem is MYCIN which was a 
production rule system for medical diagnosis (Shortliffe, 1980). One of the fundamental issues 
highlighted by this application was the problem of knowledge elicitation, that is how to extract 
from experts the required knowledge to solve the diagnosis problem correctly and completely, and 
how to represent knowledge to ensure that it was manageable. The MYCIN system was successful 
enough to be re-developed as E-MYCIN, or Empty MYCIN, that is MYCIN with no knowledge 
base, which could then be used to develop other production rule systems. Based on this, many of 
the early applied expert systems were production mle systems. Dendral was a system which aided 
in the interpretation of organic chemistry data to identify certain compounds (Buchanan & 
Feigenbaum, 1978). This was also a mle-based system, but the control strategy adopted was Plan- 
Generate-Test, which was comprehensible by the experts although it did not reflect the reasoning 
carried out by the chemists. From this work, further successful systems were developed including 
INTSUM for interpretation of mass spectrometry data.
An early, commercially successful system was Prospector (Duda et al, 1979). This system was 
built using E-MYCIN to apply knowledge of geology on the analysis of geological samples to 
indicate the likelihood and type of ore deposits. The knowledge representation was based on an 
inference network, with the relations between entities, or mles, being given plausibility values and
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measures of belief accompanying evidence. It was said to have successfully identified fields 
positively which were not identified by human experts and thus to have paid for its development 
very early on. Another early engineering expert system was Computer Retrieval Incidence Bank 
(CRIB), which was developed to find faults in a computer (Johnson & Keravnou, 1985). CRIB was 
remarkable for being able to learn from new cases presented to it and was also intended to aid the 
engineer rather than replace the engineer. This work explicitly restated the role of an expert system 
as a consultation system, that is, employed by the user as an adviser.
One of the first blackboard systems was Hearsay H, applied to speech understanding (Erman et al, 
1980). This system had a partitioned blackboard with the lowest partitions representing sounds and 
‘chunks’ of sounds (segments) and the highest levels representing phrases and the semantic 
meaning. From this work, HASP was developed for ocean surveillance (Nii, 1986a and b). HASP 
built up hypotheses of the existence of nearby submarines based on interpreted sonar data using 
the exactly the same concept of a hierarchical blackboard as Hearsay II.
4.4.2 G eneral Engineering Applications
Following on from the work on MYCIN and CRIB, early KBS for engineering domains were 
essentially diagnosis systems and much work has continued in this area, for instance in developing 
models of the structure or system in question and qualitative reasoning methods (Price & Hunt,
1989). Examples include FAUST for diagnosing faults in an electricity supply system (Bramer et 
al, 1988). FAUST monitors the grid system and can reason, with incomplete data if necessary, by 
carrying out simulations on an internal model of the grid.
As design is considered to be one of the most complex o f problems, many researchers have 
considered ways aiding designers by the use of AI based software. Design is an inherently open- 
ended problem, that is, different situations, new environments, new additional information will 
occur, so it is impossible to have an ideal or even complete knowledge base for design. This is 
particularly true for the creative or synthetic stage of design which is an indeterminate process 
(Yagin, 1989). Thus, design systems are required to be highly interactive to allow the user as much 
freedom to modify or add information to the database being built up on the design model 
(Rychener, 1985). At deductive, analytical stages, automation can be implemented effectively, and 
many expert systems exist for detailed design. In the area o f structural design, work has been 
carried out in trying to incorporate structural design codes in an explicit form to knowledge-based 
design systems, such as that reported by Topping and Kumar for steelwork (1989).
Arockiasamy and Lee (1989) carried out a comprehensive review of structural design expert 
systems. These included information on design standards, techniques to generate site layouts.
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knowledge of soil exploration, methods of construction planning including real-time operations to 
aid the design process for buildings, bridges and frameworks. One structural design system, HI- 
RISE, makes use of constraints to limit the design solution space (Sriram & Maher, 1986). HI- 
RISE is intended for the preliminary design of buildings and the output is a set of feasible spatial 
plans. The idea of constraints has also been employed in mechanical design combined with object 
oriented databases (Chakrabarti et al, 1992). During embodiment design, that is the stage after 
conceptual design and before detailed design, constraints placed on the mechanical functions of 
a physical system are identified and then propagated to generate a description of the physical 
object. The same idea of modelling with constraints has been proposed for CAD support (Anderl 
& Mendgen, 1996). Constraints satisfaction was combined with case-based reasoning in 
CaseCAD, a system for conceptual structural design (M aher & Gomez, 1996). A task which is 
related to design is that of configuration of a system, that is taking standard parts and combining 
them to provide a usable system. One well-known system, XCON, was used by Digital Equipment 
Corp technical salesmen to be able to configure VAX computers for their customers (McDermott, 
1981; Buchanan, 1986).
The Archon system is a distributed AI development software platform which is primarily employed 
in communications and control applications, such as electricity-transportation management and 
particle-accelerator control at CERN (Jennings et al, 1996). Archon allows the development of 
problem-solving entities or agents to control and act completely independently if necessary, 
interacting with other agents if they require more information. Each agent is made up o f two 
layers: the application layer carries out the necessary computation to solve a problem, carry out a 
process, or whatever; the Archon layer provides the interface between the agent and the rest o f the 
community of agents. This separation of the domain-level knowledge from the interaction between 
agents allows software developers to use both a bottom-up approach in design by concentrating on 
the solution of small sub-problems, and a top-down approach in looking at the overall requirements 
of the complete system.
Another system of interest, but which is very different in its approach, is the StAR risk adviser 
system which is applied to the toxicological risk assessment, although the methodology is 
applicable to other types of risk (Hardman & Ayton, 1997). StAR is a decision support system 
making use of production rules for both supporting and eliminating arguments or conditions. The 
rules allow multiple hypotheses to be built up based on the evidence. In addition to this system, 
Comerford and Stone (in Blockley, 1992) list many commercial and research heuristics-based 
systems for general risk assessment in different engineering industries, such as the evaluation of 
bridge safety, safety of construction projects and earthquake damage assessment for buildings.
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4.4.3 AI based Planning and Scheduling Systems
AI techniques have only relatively recently been used to aid planning and scheduling. The reasons 
for this may be that mathematical techniques provided many methods to tackle the problem. In 
addition, scheduling requires much information and computation and it is only recently that the 
level of computing resources generally available have been sufficient to apply AI based techniques 
with their heavy requirements for computer memory and rapid processing, to a problem which was 
also inherently memory hungry.
The early systems in the 80s concentrated in the problem of reasoning with constraints. One such 
system was the ISIS system, for job shop scheduling, which also provided a method of constraint 
relaxation (Fox & Smith, 1984). MOLGEN was another early constraints satisfaction planning 
system for laboratory gene-cloning experiments in molecular genetics (Stefik, 1981). It also 
approached the planning problem as a hierarchical task, where the system was nearly decomposable 
into sub-tasks. By providing constraint propagation, the sub-tasks are still linked to each other.
The OPIS system, an opportunistic scheduler based on a blackboard system, works by producing 
predictive schedules and refining these by reacting to opportunities as well as conflicts in resources 
requirements (Smith & Ow, 1990). Another scheduling system described by Anandhi et al (1993) 
is based on a blackboard architecture to allow multi-level reasoning to allow schedules to be 
updated as required. Extending the idea of distributing scheduling problems across knowledge 
sources, YAMS, or Yet Another Manufacturing System and DAS, Distributed Asynchronous 
Scheduler were two of several systems which employed agents for distributed processing of 
scheduling sub-tasks (Prosser, 1993; Berry, 1993).
Instead of providing a system for a particular industry, a very different approach was taken in 
creating PECOS (Puget, 1993). This is an object oriented and generic constraint satisfaction 
software library with which systems for planning vehicle routes and scheduling of crews can be 
developed.
A KBS for production planning in a light manufacturing company with seasonal variations, is 
described by Duchessi and O’Keefe (1990). This system builds search trees of the production 
plans and makes use of best-first searches modified by the use of heuristics to reduce the search 
space. Another production planning system, PCP, mentioned in Section 4.3.3, considers uncertain 
constraints by modelling them as statistical distributions and employs constraint relaxation 
alternatives within a blackboard system (Berry, 1992b). Planning o f assembly and other 
manufacturing processes has also been tackled by a mix of operational research and AI techniques. 
Jiang et al (1997) explains a two-stage procedure for planning a time optimal assembly sequence
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for robots in a workcell. An initial sequence is obtained by the use of dynamic programming and 
then this is optimized to provide a time optimal sequence and taking into account precedence 
constraints.
Most scheduling systems making use of AI techniques have focussed on constraints management 
techniques. A few examples exist, however, which make use of a broader range of AI planning 
techniques. GHOST is a project network generator for the construction industry (Navinchandra 
et al, 1988). Its knowledge base is made up of “critics” or knowledge sources that work on 
activities as input to find precedences between activities and from this builds up non-linear 
schedules incrementally. A practical system is Optimum-AIV, which was developed by the 
Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute in Edinburgh for the European Space Agency for 
project management of the assembly, integration and verification of spacecraft (Parrod & Valera, 
1993). The system drew on previous work on Nonlin and O-Plan, early experimental project 
management systems which attempted to take an interdisciplinary approach to planning (Tate, 
1977). Optimum-AIV incorporates object-oriented designs for the initial plans, hierarchical 
planning, consistency checking during plan specification, recording of rationale behind plans, plan 
repair assistance based on recovery plans as well as constraints satisfaction algorithms.
Other researchers have considered further the overlap between management science and AI. 
Operational research techniques have been integrated into a KBS to form an intelligent 
maintenance optimization system, IMOS (Kobbacy et al, 1995). IMOS is a decision support system 
to aid the formulation of optimal maintenance policies. It provides a general stmcture that includes 
a knowledge base of expertise on maintenance strategies, such as planned maintenance and repair 
policies, and a model base of mathematical analysis techniques to be able to evaluate schedules. 
The target area is that of large systems of components as might be found in the continuous process 
industry.
Other noteworthy work includes the development of a job-shop scheduling system, CABINS, which 
uses case-based reasoning to acquire scheduling knowledge (Miyashita, 1995). CABINS uses a 
search tree stmcture to carry out a generate-test-debug process to find an optimal schedule. 
Schedules are generated by focussing on one job-shop activity at a time. A generated schedule is 
then “tested”, that is, evaluated against a set of criteria including the user’s acceptance of the 
schedule. If the schedule fails to meet the set criteria, then it is “debugged” which here means it 
is modified by use of some schedule repair method. The user may also suggest a repair method, 
and this will be stored together with the user’s reasons for the repair, as a set of cases, where a 
“case” describes an application of a schedule revision decision on a single activity. The stored 
cases can then be used automatically in future scheduling by CABINS.
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4.4.4 Use of AI in the Oil Industry
The oil industry very rapidly grew interested in expert systems during the 80s following the early 
and very successful Prospector system. These early engineering applications of KBS were based 
on the production rule system architecture. One production rule based example is that of Gasoil 
(Guilfoyle, 1986) which provided advice at BP International on many engineering tasks on 
petrochemical rigs. Gasoil was reported to be the second largest expert system of its time in that 
it has a knowledge base of 2500 mles, which were extracted by induction on examples provided 
by experts. Another oil company, Amoco Production Company, provided programs used by well- 
logging analysts to be incorporated into ELAS (expert log analysis system), which is described as 
a hybrid system including experiential heuristics with mathematical methods (Apte & Weiss, 
1987).
Katsoulakos and Hornsby (1988) reported on various expert systems being developed for marine 
applications. FOCES is a marine fuel oil characterisation expert system developed to aid ranking 
of fuel combustion behaviour. The procedure is based on a two-stage characterisation, where the 
first stage identifies a property area within a fuel map and the second stage establishes detailed 
correlation measures based on an analytic procedure. A diesel engine expert diagnostic system, 
DEEDS, contains a database of symptoms and associated engine faults and an engine simulation 
model. Also developed were expert systems which carry out optimisation of maintenance 
schedules for hull and machinery of ships. Ship control systems and dynamic positioning expert 
systems were also considered.
Expert systems have been applied to the use of analysis programs, for example, SACON which 
advises on the use of a structural analysis package, and from  the work carried out on the ELAS 
system described earlier, a general system or expert system shell was developed for the control of 
software packages (Apte & Weiss, 1987).
At least one KBS has been developed for the assessment of flaws in welded components 
(Willoughby & Laures, 1990). The knowledge encapsulated by the system was based on the codes 
of practice specifying the procedures used to apply fatigue fracture mechanics. Another system, 
MATISS, provided fatigue failure analysis for structures and included knowledge bases storing 
mechanical and chemical properties of materials (Weiss, 1986). A fatigue advice system described 
by McMahon et al, (1994) makes use of hypertext within an expert system and is intended for use 
during design.
Also relevant to this thesis is the work described by Chen et al (1996) on using AI based searching 
techniques in evaluating structural system reliability. In this work, the systems models used in the
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p-unzipping Method for estimating system reliability of structures (described in Chapter 2), are re­
formulated as search trees. AI based searching techniques are applied to finding the probability 
of failure for a system more rapidly than by the basic P-unzipping Method.
Of particular interest to the work described in this thesis are the use of AI techniques in the 
reliability assessment of offshore structures and for deciding on an inspection strategy. Two 
systems have been developed in the past which attempt to do this. The RAMINO (Reliability 
Assessment for Maintenance and Inspection Optimization) system  aids in carrying out reliability 
analysis on offshore oil platforms and on pressure vessels of nuclear power plants (Khong & Lucia,
1990). RAMINO provides three levels of knowledge, the analysis programs, object-rules and an 
overview super-module. Its distinguishing feature is that it provides an non-prescriptive approach 
to the assessment of the reliability of a structure, which is unlike the approach taken in RISC where 
the reliability analysis has been carefully defined. It also aims to consider many different failure 
modes. The other system is PLAIM (Platform Lifetime Assessment through Analysis Inspection 
and Maintenance) which was developed using a frame-based Prolog system (Langdon et al, 1989; 
Ahmad et al, 1991). It is intended to provide assessments of fixed jacket platforms and to provide 
planning for inspection and maintenance tasks. PLAIM, in common with RAMINO, provides a 
non-prescriptive approach to the assessment of the reliability. Large rale bases, with more than 
1000 rules required for 1(X) tasks, are employed in PLAIM and this may result in problems in 
maintenance of the knowledge and in control of the reasoning process. The work carried out in 
developing these systems has succeeded in demonstrating the need to find more efficient and 
effective ways of providing reliability assessment for offshore platforms and to incorporate this into 
rational planning for inspection, repair and maintenance of the platform.
A more recent and more general decision support system for safety management developed for the 
offshore industry is ARMS (Advanced Risk Management System) (Besse et al, 1992). ARMS is 
an intelligent risk assessment tool which makes use of heuristics and decision theory to extract 
from the user the required information with which to build influence diagrams. These are analysed 
making use of a probabilistic approach to model random data and uncertainty reasoning to model 
uncertain cause and effect relationships. The system is intended to help operators carry out “what- 
i f  ’ analyses to identify areas of concern for any type of offshore structure.
4.5 C o n c l u s io n s
As for any other form of model, a computer model can only approximate the real system that it is 
modelling. In knowledge base systems, the accuracy of this model is in part influenced by the
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knowledge representation scheme. To summarise, the most promising representation scheme for 
RISC is the slot-and-filler formalism, that is, frames to represent physical objects, and concepts and 
scripts to guide and control the process of carrying out the reliability and fracture mechanics 
analysis. This will provide the mechanism for creating a highly structured knowledge base, which 
holds all additional information such as documentation, etc. In addition, the most appropriate 
reasoning mechanism may be that of model-based reasoning, combining quantitative and qualitative 
data. This final consideration will make the RISC system a practical system given that one of its 
primary requirements is to be able to combine reliability analysis results with commonsense data.
The RISC planning problem is mainly of the scheduling category in that constraints are assumed 
and thus activity planning is required in the first instance. If  it does become difficult to find an 
appropriate solution, then relaxing of constraints can be carried out by considering the problem to 
be closer to the resource allocation category. The required output is a linear plan, with few 
dependencies, if any, requiring identification.
A scheduling algorithm that combines the concepts of constraints satisfaction with tree-searching 
techniques was proposed for the RISC System in this chapter. By allowing several searching 
algorithms to be applied, several different schedules can be presented to the user from which the 
user may choose the most appropriate. The form of the tree is described in Chapter 5 and the 
searching algorithms are demonstrated in Chapter 6.
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5  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RISC KBS
The aim of the RISC project was to demonstrate the feasibility of providing offshore operators with 
a practical computer tool, the RISC System, for rational inspection scheduling for fixed offshore 
platforms. This RISC System will need to incorporate and integrate:
• reliability-based fatigue and fracture mechanics analysis modules
• external databases of material properties, and inspection techniques
• operators’ own procedures and resource constraints
• geometric and other design data, inspection and analysis results for the structure
In Chapter 4, techniques from applied AI were presented and it was proposed that some of these 
would be useful in designing and implementing a usable RISC System. This chapter describes the 
work carried out in the design and implementation of a demonstrator knowledge base system. The 
demonstrator forms the basis for a complete RISC System for the rational reliability-based fatigue 
fracture mechanics scheduling of IRM for fixed offshore platforms.
The first task carried out was to identify and specify the requirements for the RISC System. This 
specification and a knowledge of the available analytical tools allowed functional subsystems of 
the KBS to be identified. Issues and problems relating to these modules are discussed and 
algorithms from applied AI techniques are explained. A complete Scheduling Model was then 
proposed and is described here. This model encapsulates the assumptions made when applying the 
reliability fatigue fracture mechanics analysis. Design details for concepts and the knowledge 
sources required for the RISC System are explained and some examples given. A user interface 
was also designed which defined the interaction between the user and the final RISC System. 
Finally, a description of the implementation of the prototype RISC System, or RISC Demonstrator, 
is given.
5.1 Req uirem ents OF AN IRM  PLANNING SYSTEM
The requirements of the RISC System were based on the information given by the Working Group 
of engineers from operator organisations. In addition, consideration was given to current 
procedures to ensure that a pragmatic and workable system was designed and the current IRM 
procedures were reviewed and described in Chapter 2.
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5.1.1 Conceptual Model
The requirements for the conceptual model include what information should be included in the 
RISC System and what functions and results it must provide. In addition, the RISC System is one 
that needs to be expandable and extensible. For instance, new information and changes relating 
to guidelines will be required to be input. The reasoning behind derivation of input data to the 
analysis, the interpretation of analysis results, and the generation of schedules needs to be made 
explicit. This allows users to question results and to interact with the system.
These basic requirements suggest a knowledge base system approach be appropriate. The base 
decision procedure is rooted in structural reliability analysis, which requires much data. 
Interpreting the analysis results and combining of possible inspection actions into a rational 
schedule requires many forms of information. The RISC System includes external analysis 
modules and databases integrated with knowledge bases with information on the use of the 
modules.



















The knowledge bases contain information to be used by the analysis and scheduling procedures. 
In particular, it is the explicit data and information for the structure in question that will enable
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rational decisions to be made during the production of a schedule. The requirements for these 
knowledge bases are outlined below.
5.1.1.1 Structural Knowledge Base
The structural model used by the RISC System requires data that can be broadly classified as that 
arising from design and manufacturing or the results of inspections and environmental data. Design 
and manufacturing data would include the geometry of the structure at macro and micro levels, 
design assumptions on environmental loads and conditions, weld details and other information 
relating to changes made to the design at manufacture and installation.
The RISC System cannot and should not hold all inspection information in detail; only information 
that will be used by the system in analysis and scheduling should be held. The reasons for this are 
that computer users tend to believe that all information held by the system is used, which could lead 
to possible error in interpretation of the results. On the other hand, providing various means of 
entering data in operator-defined forms is particularly important for data on cracks in welded 
tubular joints, as there is significant variation in the information recorded by operators as described 
in Chapter 2. Ideally, the inspection data should be stored in a format closely associated with 
methods of reporting inspection results, such as direct input from AUTOCAD drawings, written 
reports, and, in the future, direct input from inspection equipment. Another requirement is to allow 
data to be stored according to existing or future standards, such as STEP, or STandard for the 
Exchange of Product data (Bloor & Owen, 1991).
For most non-critical joints little detail is required. Not every weld needs to be listed out and only 
the outline data on the existence and size of a defect or crack would evei be used (Rivers, 1986). 
In general, it is supposed that this would be a matter for the data structures internal to the RISC 
KBS and that detailed inspection data as recorded should be stored to be accessible by the RISC 
System if needed. Inspection data to be stored for a node includes the inspection technique used, 
procedural details, such as dates, and by whom, and the defects and cracks found, such as size and 
location. In addition, it may be of interest to store marine growth thickness as measurements at 
sample points on tubular members. Other inspections such as after incidents and swim-round 
surveys would include data on general structural damage:
• type and position of damage found with a classification, which may be unknown in the
case of finding debris on the sea-floor damage during a swim-round survey, but the
position on the structure of the damage has not been identified
• position of indication of damage relative to the global structure
• procedural details, such as when, how and who found the damage
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Environmental and other loading data may be updated with experience gained on the actual weather 
conditions suffered by the platform. Depending on the existence of on-line monitoring, types of 
data may include wind and wave loading for the global structure and structural loading on 
individual joints and members. Data on the loading on the joints may be updated due to changes 
in the superstmcture or changes to the substructure. Updating may be carried out either by direct 
structural analysis after making changes to the geometrical data or from on-line monitoring data. 
Records of reported incidents, such as heavy items dropped overboard, can be kept to provide some 
indication of areas of the structure which require inspection after these incidents (Dunn, 1983).
5.1.1.2 Analvsis Procedures
A knowledge base containing information on the analysis modules which are available for use is 
also required. This KB would include:
• Analysis routes: the expected overall analysis route as defined by the operator and expert 
engineers
• Reliability Fatigue Fracture Mechanics Analysis and the Loading Analysis modules
• Database access and handling
• Cost Evaluation for Scheduling module
Information for the analysis modules is required on what input is needed and how to derive it, how 
to execute the module, how to read the analysis results, including, for instance, any errors 
associated with the results. Once reading of the results has taken place, they are to be evaluated 
to decide on the future repair and inspection strategies, for instance, or on the time to the next 
inspection. On updating the inspection data held on the structure, re-analysis must take place in 
order to update the state of the structure, given the new information.
5.1.1.3 Reliability-based Fatigue and Fracture Mechanics Analvsis
The RISC System will carry out reliability analysis which has, at its core, fatigue fracture 
mechanics routines making use of realistic loading analysis for the prediction of a joint's remaining 
life. The analysis carried out must take into account the operator’s preferences as an operator may 
require only certain methods to be used at certain times. The input for this analysis is
• jo in t dimensions including the initial crack size and the crack size at failure, which is
derived from information in the structural model and has associated uncertainties
• maintenance plans in the form of a proposed inspection technique, together with its
associated reliability from an inspection technique database, a repair strategy stored with 
the joint, and a range of possible inspection times based on global structural data
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• stress concentration factors (SCF) and the stress history information from the structural 
model and databases
• material properties from a database
• analysis options, which are stored with the joint information, or as global structural data 
or as default operator’s preferences
Loading data is either stored in databases for the structure or provided by loading analysis using 
nominal loads, loading bias factors, wave height PSD and cyclic rate/frequency and the response 
or transfer functions for a joint. The output from the reliability-based fatigue fracture mechanics 
analysis is an initial deterministic assessment of the crack growth, the cost evaluation of 
maintenance plans probability of failure and reliability measures and reliability sensitivity measures 
for a joint and over a period of time. A detailed design of the required input data, the interface with 
the analysis modules and the output reliability data and a description of the how it is dealt with by 
the system, is given in the Section 5.3 Detailed Design.
5.1.1.4 Scheduling and Planning
The scheduling of inspections and repairs requires information on guidelines and regulations, 
scheduling heuristics, resource constraints and costs. Cost information can be difficult to obtain, 
but actual costs are not required, however, since a relative measure of cost is sufficient.
5.1.2 Outline of the Functional Subsystems
The required functions for the RISC System can be summarised as the evaluation of reliability and 
costs associated with IRM plans for the tubular welded joints of the platform, based on fatigue 
considerations; interpreting the analysis results; carrying out scheduling and planning and, finally, 
updating the structural data given the inspection results.
The Reliability and Cost Evaluation Analysis subsystem chooses the most appropriate overall 
analysis route to follow, given the current state of the structural model and operator's preferences. 
Input datafiles are created for each joint and analysis module, the analysis module is executed, and 
the output from the analysis module is redirected to the structural model. Closely linked to the 
Reliability and Cost Evaluation Analysis is the Analysis Results Interpretation subsystem. This 
is required to choose some appropriate inspection plans to consider for the component in question. 
The choices will be dependent on operators’ preferences, as well as the regulations and guidelines, 
and the past history of the node in question. The decision is also affected by information on the 
reliability of the inspection technique used, which in turn may be affected by the geometry of the 
node.
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The Scheduling & Planning subsystem is required to produce a usable schedule of IRM actions for 
the complete structure, by combining inspection plans for each joint. This subsystem will provide 
an initial suggested schedule and generate new schedules which take into account the operator’s 
requirements and procedures. It may provide warnings in the case of joints which are primary or 
critical, but for which inspections cannot be fitted into the required weather window. It also needs 
to allow the user to make modifications to the schedule and re-evaluate its utility or cost, on 
request. The required final schedule will be lists of actions for the scheduling period. Each list 
will correspond to the IRM actions recommended to be carried out during one weather window or 
inspection period in the scheduling period. The detailed time-tabling of these actions are carried 
out by the inspection subcontractors.
The Structure Updating or Observations subsystem is required to aid the user in entering inspection 
and other data. The data entered includes interpreted inspection data from engineering assessment 
reports, repair and damage data from platform damage status register and changed properties of 
individual nodes of the structure, including minor changes in geometry. In addition, it may be 
necessary to allow changes to be made here to the operator's subjective measures of any node's 
importance to the safety of the structure, preferences for choice of analysis modules and databases, 
and to inspection constraints, such as length of weather window. Any major changes to the 
geometry of the structure because of major damage or repairs can only be input after re-analysis 
o f the structure has taken place outside the RISC System, as certain parameters can only be 
obtained from external analysis and only via the System Management interface. As an example 
o f this, the measure of criticality of any node, dependant on the geometry of the structure, is 
obtained through redundancy analysis which is not currently part of the RISC System. In the short­
term, an operator's subjective measure representing requirements to always inspect or to always 
include in analysis, can be used to overcome lack of complete information on the structure.
5.1.3 User Interfaces
The RISC System is intended to be used by the maintenance engineer in charge of scheduling 
inspection for the platforms in question, but under the control of the operator. Five levels of 
potential RISC System users were identified:
► Schedulers are the main users of the system. They are in charge of producing an inspection
and maintenance schedule for the following weather windows to be agreed upon by the 
classification authorities. The main requirements for this type of user are ease of use, 
guidance in choosing the most appropriate analysis routes and in producing an inspection 
and repair schedule or plan with adequate justification to be submitted to regulatory 
bodies.
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► Offshore inspection engineers supervise the inspection procedure and repair actions. They 
receive initial reports on the detection of anomalies and require the RISC System to 
provide them with guidance on entering inspection and damage data and with rapid 
re-analysis of the stracture for immediate advice on repair.
► Repair specialists are usually members of the maintenance department. They are the 
recipients of information on anomalies, which they then confirm or deny. If the anomaly 
has been confirmed as a weld-toe crack or defect, then repair specialists carry out the 
re-analysis of the structure to decide on a course of repair action.
► Maintainers update the information in the RISC System which is dependent on the 
procedures which the operator organisation carries out. Guidance is needed in changing 
information which may be highly sensitive. Procedures for storing and recalling 
knowledge bases and for testing the effect of changes to schedules and analysis procedures 
as required must be included. These users require a System Management interface.
► System developers change the reasoning and analysis routes available within the RISC 
System. These users must have very detailed knowledge about the RISC System’s internal 
structure and hence in the first instance will have no special requirements.
5.1.3.1 Interactive Use
The requirements for running the system will vary slightly for each level of user. It has been 
decided that offshore engineers need not be direct users of the RISC System as it is foreseen that 
they pass onto the maintenance department details of anomalies found. If confirmed, the 
maintenance department then enters this information. The expected interactive users are the 
scheduling and repair engineers in the maintenance department, who have a good understanding 
o f the scheduling process.
A  particular user interface is required for the Observations subsystem which includes interfaces 
for externally held data to be accessed. This interface should be graphical to allow the users to 
point at the parts of the stmcture for which data needs to be updated. In order to enter inspection 
data, the interface should mirror the paper reports used. The design for the user interface should 
provide a consistent interface which follows industry standards. It should also reflect the 
underlying data stmctures, that is, the object hierarchy (Bjork, 1991).
5.1.3.2 Reports and Schedules
There are two main reports which will be produced by the RISC System: the schedule of inspection 
and repairs, and a detailed log on the analysis results including remaining life of joints. Other
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reports may be required on the system itself. An example of this is a report on the stored data and 
its structure; another example is on the Scheduling heuristics, to provide the users with background 
information on the knowledge bases making up the system.
5.1.3.3 Modifications of Knowledge Bases
The ways in which users may interact with the knowledge bases are in viewing stored knowledge, 
incorporating temporary or user-preferred constraints or heuristics and in modifying the knowledge 
bases permanently. Maintainers of the KBS may need to make permanent modifications to 
accommodate:
• changes to the structural KB, reflecting major changes in the structure and results of
analyses carried out outside the RISC System
• new analysis methods, including cost functions, to be incorporated
• databases with the operator's own data appended
• changes to regulations and guidelines which may affect constraints on scheduling
All changes to the knowledge bases need to be monitored and checked for discrepancies and logical 
errors. The user will be informed of any of these errors.
5.2 A S c hed u lin g  M odel
This section describes the rational scheduling model implemented by the knowledge base system 
(KBS) for RISC. The model is based on the decision procedure described in Chapter 3 and in 
Faber et al (1994). The RISC KBS controls the use of the analysis modules and combines 
interpreted results to provide a rational schedule for inspection. The details of this process are 
given here.
5.2.1 Outline of Scheduling Procedure
One of the tasks prior to the analysis is to create a list of joints to be considered as it would be time 
consuming to analyse all the joints (see Figure 5.2). The KBS will create input datafiles for the 
reliability analysis by accessing the database containing individual joint data and gathering all other 
required data.
Cost evaluation analysis is carried out for given maintenance plans for a joint to provide expected 
costs for each maintenance plan. The KBS interprets the results to give proposed actions for a
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joint. After interpretation, a schedule is produced which incorporates the proposed actions as well 
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Figure 5.2 The scheduling procedure 
5J2J2 A RISC System Session
During a typical user session, the RISC System would be used to carry out cost evaluation analysis 
on the structure and to support scheduling. The general procedure is shown in as a flowchart in 
Figure 5.3 overleaf.
As the analysis is carried out on a joint-by-joint basis and analysing every jo in t in the structure is 
not practical, the joints making up the structure are ranked. It is important to realise that the 
ranking procedure is not meant to identify which joints require inspection, instead it provides a 
priority listing for analysis only. In principle, the user may modify the ranked list to ensure certain 
joints are definitely analysed. Each joint is then analysed in the order given in the ranked list.
The output from the analysis includes the expected costs for inspection, repair and failure for each 
joint for each possible inspection period or weather window over the considered number of years 
which is usually five years. From these results the optimum time for next inspection in terms of 
expected costs can be deduced.
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Figure 5.3 A flowchart fo r  a session
A  proposed halting condition for the analysis is to stop analysis of joints further down the ranked 
list when a joint is found to have an optimal inspection time which is long after the end of the
Chapter 5 157
scheduling period of interest. This strategy represents the heuristic that all joints of interest are 
likely to be above that joint in the ranked list. This can be generalised to consider any halting 
condition, such as “Stop when 100 joints have been analysed”.
An initial schedule is created from the optimal inspection plans for all analysed joints. This 
schedule is modified to take into account the available resources to ensure that the use of resources 
is levelled across the schedule period. It is at this point in the session that the user’s interaction 
with the system is particularly important. The user will be presented with proposed schedules. If 
the user is not satisfied or wishes to carry out “what-if ’ analysis, suggestions as changes to the 
resource constraints can be made. New schedules are then created based on the suggestions.
5.2.3 The Ranking Algorithm
The purpose of ranking joints making up the structure is to suggest the order of priority for 
analysing the joints. Analysis then takes place for as many joints as is possible, given the available 
time for computation, or until evaluation of the analysis results indicates that the remaining joints 
are likely to have optimum inspection points well beyond the scheduling period of interest.
Several parameters or factors could be used for ranking. In the RISC System, these ranking factors 
are predefined by the operator. Factors to be considered are
• legal requirements - this criterion will override any other ranking factor
• safety requirements, based on the reliability index (P ) given by reliability analysis carried 
out at set-up and updated according to the latest inspection information
• criticality of joint, based on analyses carried out outside the RISC System
• ratio of exhausted life to predicted fatigue life
• location of joint, including whether joint is a primary member or secondary member
• earlier inspection results
Each factor is weighted and a composite ranking measure is obtained as shown in Figure 5.4. The 
ranking procedure is applied to all joints of the stmcture as applying it is very rapid and easy. The 
normalisation function may be individual to each factor and ensures that the resulting value for the 
normalised measure lies within the range 0 to 1.
General forms for the normalisation functions Fg(.) for desirable factors, and Fy(.) for undesirable 
factors, could be
(a) F (b) (5.1)
max(m) -min(m) max(m) -min(m)
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where mm(m) and max(An) are either constants or other measures stored about the structure. This 
Fp(.) ensures that when m has a desirable high value, then n is close to one, similarly ensures 
that when m has a low value, then n is close to 1. Any factor that the operator may wish to be taken 
into account is normalised according to this scheme where the maximum and minimum values, 
whether constants or values provided by databases, are defined by the operator at system set-up. 
The weights given to each factor are also input at system set-up.
End
Calculate ranking m easure r « £  r\wi
Normalise each factor F,(m,)= n
Get factors (m i)  and weights (W i)
Figure 5.4 Calculation o f  ranking measure
It is necessary to consider how to deal with factors, such as legal requirements, which if applicable 
to a jo in t indicate that the joint must be analysed and/or inspected within the scheduling period. 
It is proposed that any joint that has a ranking measure at or above a  preset threshold value will be 
analysed and an inspection action proposed for it within the scheduling period. Then the factor's 
weight is set higher than the threshold value to ensure that a joint for which such a factor is 
applicable has a ranking measure above the threshold value. This procedure is particularly 
important for considerations of safety. Alternatively, these factors, which would normally be of 
a logical type, that is, have values TRUE, equivalent to 1, or FALSE, equivalent to 0, could be 
considered separately. This is not a favoured solution as it increases the complexity of the ranking 
task beyond its usefulness.
5.2.4 Analysis of Joints
Usually, the RISC System produces for each joint an input datafile for the analysis module, runs 
the analysis and interprets the results given in the output file as shown in Figure 5.5. It is possible 
that analysis is inappropriate for some joints and heuristics need be applied to propose actions for
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a joint. For example, certification authorities may require certain damaged nodes to be inspected 
at regular predefined intervals; so for joints on such nodes actions are proposed by applying a 
simple "If damaged, then inspect every N years" rule, in which case detailed reliability based 
analysis may be inappropriate for the joint and instead heuristics would be applied. Here the 
choice and extent of the analysis is explained.
Start of Analysis
Yes
Apply heuristics to 
" \ i o i n t ?
U se heuristics to 
p ro p o se  action(s)
C om pute  n u m b er of 
inspection periods for joint
H euristics only 
joint? ^No
Yes
C rea te  input file an d  run 
analysis  m odule
Find minimum cost action 
from  resu lts an d  propose
No
ly o th e r p lan s^
Yes
C alcu la te  cost difference 
for inspection plan
Yes
C ost difference > 
CDT? ^
No
P ro p o se  a ltem ative action
End of Analysis of Joint
Figure 5.5 Analysis o f  a single jo in t
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5.2.4.1 Cost Evaluation of Maintenance Plans
The reliability-based analysis module calculates expected costs for various given maintenance 
plans for a joint. The maintenance plans are given as the set of inspection times to be considered, 
the inspection technique to be used and a repair criteria representing the chosen repair strategy. 
Inspection techniques and repair criteria are assumed or derived directly from the information 
stored on the joint on preferred, or allowable options. The set of inspection times are derived by 
taking into account reliability.
The number of inspection periods in the scheduling period of interest are denoted here by to 
To be able to gauge whether the optimum inspection time for a jo in t is beyond the end of the 
scheduling period, the possible inspection times must be increased beyond the scheduling period, 
up to r^ +k» where k could be set at 5. The default values for the number of inspection periods for 
consideration in anyone schedule and the value of k as defined above is given by the operator at 
set-up. As safety is one aspect that should not be compromised, the following rule is applied:
I f  the reliability index of the joint falls below its allowed threshold value by
inspection period where n < N+k 
then the set of possible inspection periods will be r, to r„.i
else the number of possible inspection periods will be to fx+k-
Figure 5.6 "Inspection tim es” rule
As an example, consider a scheduling period set to the next five years, each year having one 
inspection period, f, to t ,^ and reliability analysis has been carried out over t  ^ to r,o for two joints 





Figure 5.7 Determination o f  inspection periods
Chapter 5 161
Joint JlOO has a reliability index value of 3.6 at the end of 3.2 at the start of and a reliability 
threshold of 3.5. This data indicates that times to are all possible inspection periods. Joint 
J200, on the other hand, has at the start of a reliability index value of 4.5 which is above its 
allowed threshold value of 4.0. Hence for J200, f, to r,o are all possible inspection times. In this 
way, inspection actions are proposed only at times that ensure the safety of the structure.
5.2.5 Interpretation of Results
Usually, the output from the analysis module is easily interpreted. The minimum expected cost 
maintenance plan is selected and this is the proposed action for a joint. If other plans have costs 
not every much greater than the minimum expected cost plan then these could also be proposed as 
altemative actions. These alternatives will be considered only if the incorporation of the minimum 
expected cost plan in the complete schedule is impossible given the resource constraints.
A simple way of ensuring that only a reasonable number of altemative actions are considered is to 
assume a maximum number for each joint. A second and more rational method of choosing a 
reasonable number of altemative actions is to set a threshold value for the maximum difference in 
expected costs between the optimum action and the altematives. An expected cost difference 
threshold value (CDT) could be given by
CDT= Cy/KNip (5.2)
where Cy is the yearly inspection budget, Ng, is the expected number of inspections in an inspection 
period, and K is greater than 1. The actual value of K would be chosen by the operator such that 
the total number of altematives does not become too large and once experience has been gained 
using the RISC System.
5.2.5.1 Heuristics-based Evaluation
In any stmcture and at anyone time there are likely to be a small subset of joints for which full 
cost-evaluation of maintenance plans as carried out in the RISC System is inappropriate. This 
would usually occur if there is no reasonable model or analysis module within the RISC System 
that could be used to predict the behaviour of the joint. The reasons for this may be that the joints 
have damage such as buckling, denting, but not fatigue crack growth, or they have had major 
repairs such as grouting, or clamping. Altematively, the node may have been defined by the 
operator or certifying authority as a high priority for inspection, that is the joint is highly critical 
or primary. Inspections at predefined intervals will be specified. For this group of joints, the 
operator is likely to wish to analyse these joints in order to determine the effect of forcing 
inspection at predefined times on the schedule and on the integrity of the stmcture. The results of
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this analysis may be used to present a case for allowing a longer interval to next inspection to the 
certifying authority.
If a joint has been defined as one for which a heuristics-based approach is required, then heuristics 
associated with the joint on appropriate intervals of time for inspection are triggered to suggest 
possible actions. The proposed actions for these are specially signalled at the scheduling stage. 
For “heuristics-only” joints, cost evaluation of maintenance plans is not carried out. Instead, 
inspection actions for these joints are included in the schedule at the appropriate inspection period. 
For the rest of the joints, analysis is carried out and all actions resulting from this are classified as 
altemative actions.
5.2.5.2 Halting of Analvsis
Analysis is carried out on the ranked list of joints until the minimum expected cost plan is for an 
inspection period after the end of the scheduling period, that is, that the time for the cost minimal 
plan is at r„, where n > N+5, say, and is the last inspection period in the schedule period of being 
considered. The actual value of n would be given at set-up by the operator. Altematively, the 
analysis may stop at some point in the list of ranked joints given by the user or if the number of 
proposed actions on the joints requires resources which far out weigh the given resources. These 
two last halting conditions may be set at mntime.
At the end of this procedure, minimum expected cost actions have been proposed for highly ranked 
joints. In addition some altemative actions are also given for each joint.
5.2.6 Com bined Scheduling of Actions
The final stage is to combine the proposed actions into one schedule for the stmcture as in Figure 
5.8. The schedule gives the actions to be carried out at each discrete inspection period and takes 
into account global resource constraints. An initial schedule is created by combining the proposed 
actions, that is, by listing the proposed actions for each inspection period within the scheduling 
period. This schedule has to be modified to take into account resource constraints such as global 
safety requirements, length of time available for inspection and number of divers, available 
inspection equipment, location of diving vessel, and guidelines and recommendations.
To carry out modifications to this initial schedule, it is necessary to be able to measure the quality 
of the new schedule. For instance, a schedule which is unusable is a low quality schedule. 
Furthermore, in the case where there is a choice of modifications, a measure of quality enables the 
system to choose the best options.
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Figure 5.8 Combined scheduling 
5.2.6.1 Schedule Utility Function and Resource Deficits
The quality of a schedule may be measured by two related factors: cost and satisfaction of resource 
constraints. Initially, these two factors may be considered separately. Since the cost of inspection 
and repairing for each action has already been evaluated, an estimate for the total cost for each 
schedule is simply estimated as the sum of the individual costs. This cost does not include the 
added costs of exceeding any scheduling constraints. As there is no direct method of evaluating
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the exact overall cost for the complete schedule, it is necessary to consider resource constraints.
The satisfaction of resource and regulation constraints is measured by how many constraints are 
violated. This is indicated by any positive resource deficits. The utility function is then some 
combination of the resource deficit measure(s), where the resource deficit, RD(i), for inspection 
period i is given by
RD(i) = resources used - available resources (5.3)
In general this is not one measure but a vector of M measures, each representing a particular 
resource. For a schedule to satisfy completely all constraints requires that
RD /i) <0 (5.4)
for ally = 1 to M and all inspection periods i in the schedule. To take into account more than one 
resource, the user is required to enter which resources are to be used as the criteria for scheduling. 
A schedule utility function S( ) can also be defined in the same way as the ranking function, with 
each resource having a particular weighting and each resource deficit being normalised, but here 
allowing values in the range [-1,1]. Thus the value of S( ) is used as a rapid method of deciding 
between schedules, but closer consideration of schedules, their associated costs and sensitivities 
must be carried out by the user to make a final decision.
The RD(.) vector function is used for levelling the use of resources to ensure a rational use of 
resources. Initially the RISC System will only consider levelling of resources if both
• any inspection period has too many actions assigned to it (i.e. RD(i)>0)
• the total resources required for all actions to be carried out is less than or equal to the
total amount of available resources over the scheduling period.
At the end of this procedure, a schedule with no (if possible, if not, then fewer) inspection periods 
with RD(i) > 0 is output.
This procedure has been implemented as a searching mechanism that generates schedules which 
satisfy resource constraints.
5.2.6.2 Constraints Satisfaction Scheduling
Constraints Satisfaction (CS) scheduling is the combination of inspection plans for joints ensuring 
that constraints are satisfied. This is carried out by considering altemative actions in the initial 
schedule, until all or most of the constraints are satisfied. To perform the scheduling task in a 
consistent and controlled way it is necessary to implement algorithms which combine the search
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methods and constraints satisfaction concepts from applied AI described in Chapter 4 (Dean & 
Wellman, 1991; Stefik, 1981; Tang et al, 1994). The method involves structuring the scheduling 
objects into a search AND/OR tree and then applying simple brute force searching techniques to 
obtain solutions. The tree is constructed as is shown in Figure 5.9.
quality  o f sc h e d u le  
 ►
re so u rc e  b a lan ce  
for e a c h  period
jo in t allocation
ta s k  specifica tion  
 »
TRD
RD 1>0 RD2<0 RD3=0
TRD=Total R esource  Deficit 
RDi = RD a t  period  i 
Ji = Jo in t IDi 
Ai =Action ID iA21 A22 A23
Figure 5.9 RISC constraints satisfaction scheduling tree
The root node indicates the total resource deficit (TRD). The scheduling procedure decomposes 
the problem to allow parts of the schedule to be considered in turn and hence the next two levels 
are AND nodes. The first set of nodes below the root represent different action periods and each 
has an associated resource deficit value. Below each of these are the nodes representing 
components, here the joints, to be inspected. Each component in turn has a default action as well 
as a number of altemative actions and these are the leaf OR nodes.
The search tree stracture is constructed while assembling the initial schedule. The task of adjusting 
the initial scheduling then becomes a problem of systematically searching for altemative actions 
that are consistent with the current resource constraints to reduce the resource deficit. The 
techniques employed are breadth-first, depth-first and best-first methods. The best-first option was 
implemented as a heuristics-based search to allow a generalisation of the criteria for searches. This 
is explained in greater detail in Chapter 6 when example schedules are given. At the end of each 
search, the tree should be balanced so that RD(i) ^ 0 for each inspection period ft and an action is 
chosen for each component.
5.2.6.3 Neighbouring and Similar Joints
After levelling the use of resources, it is convenient to consider if any other joints should also be 
considered for inspection. This is desirable only for those inspection periods that have not had all 
of the resources used up by the already scheduled actions. These additional joints may be
Chapter 5 166
neighbouring, and hence it would be convenient to include these. Additional joints may be similar 
joints to those already included for inspection so should also be of concern. For these, actions may 
be added at the appropriate inspection period. The inspection and expected repair method will be 
derived from the available equipment in the inspection period and any stored joint information. 
This procedure is controlled by the user.
5.2.6.4 User Modifications
At the end of the searching process, the user has a selection of feasible schedules from which to 
choose a final schedule. Based on the resulting proposed schedules, the user may wish to make 
changes to the resource constraints and then ran the searches again to generate further proposed 
schedules. Further, the user may wish to make additional changes to the generated schedules by 
making modifications to scheduled actions, or by suggesting new actions or selecting more joints 
for additional analysis.
At the end of this process, a rational combined schedule for the complete scheduling period is 
output for which total expected costs have been calculated. This scheduling procedure is mainly 
under the control of the user.
5.3 D esign  and  Data  Structures fo r  the RISC System
The detailed design of the RISC System took place over several, iterative stages. It was highly 
dependent on the reliability-based cost evaluation analysis module: only when this was close to 
completion could the details of the data structures and knowledge sources required for controlling 
the analysis module be finalised. The following describes the RISC System architecture and the 
knowledge sources required, before giving designs for the knowledge sources and data structures.
5.3.1 RISC Software Architecture
Having identified the functions required for the Scheduling Model described, it was possible to 
identify the basic architecture of the RISC System. This software architecture, as illustrated by 
Figure 5.1 on page 149, consists mainly of
• knowledge bases holding knowledge on the stracture, scheduling and the analysis
modules
• a system controller that controls the way the various databases, knowledge bases and 
analysis modules are used to provide an IRM schedule
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• analysis modules, or knowledge sources, containing reliability-based fatigue fracture 
mechanics, the loading analysis and other analytical routines required in the setting-up 
process, and heuristics representing operator preferences
• databases containing probabilistic data on inspection reliability and on material 
properties, and deterministic data on stress concentration factors and on costs
• a user interface which is graphical and interactive
• a module to allow new information, such as environmental data from on-line 
monitoring, to be added to the system
The knowledge bases provide global data structures by which the different knowledge sources or 
analysis modules interact. When an analysis and scheduling session is started in the RISC System, 
data of different formats is gathered and converted using the knowledge base to form an internal 
structural model. The knowledge bases are also used to contain to hold skeleton text files used to 
generate the input files for the analysis modules.
Knowledge sources (KS) of the RISC System include a number of existing analysis modules and 
a number of heuristic reasoning support programs. The latter perform the tasks of intelligently 
selecting relevant joints, evaluating analysis results and combining optimal and rational scheduling 
etc. KSs do not call each other but are invoked by the System Controller, and the KS read data 
from the shared dynamic knowledge base. External analysis modules are coupled with rule bases 
which transfer some of the data in the shared object base into text files in a format that can be 
understood by the analysis modules.
Users have control of the whole scheduling process and are allowed to override the decisions made 
by the knowledge sources. A user's decision will be particularly important when the information 
about the history or the installation data of a joint is unavailable.
5.3.1.1 RISC Svstem Tasks
The RISC System is tightly integrated with the user interface, allowing the users to control the 
system. The tasks it can carry out are presented to the user as a structured hierarchy of Windows 
and these are shown in Figure 5.10 overleaf.
The structure of the knowledge sources and the design of the user interface is based on this 
hierarchy. Users control the performance of the RISC System through an event-driven mechanism.
5.3.1.2 RISC Svstem Components
The main group of knowledge sources are those for the View & Run subsystem containing the 
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analysis modules, in particular RISCREL, and the sets of heuristics and procedures for ranking and 
scheduling. The identification and the development of these knowledge sources are essential in 
providing the problem solving power for the RISC System. View & Run subsystem contains three 
groups of KSs to carry out Ranking, the IRM Analysis with RISCREL and for Scheduling. Other 
knowledge sources are required to set up, update and maintain the data for the RISC System.
Table 5.1 lists and classifies the components making up the complete RISC System. In the table 
the RISC System components are divided into five major categories: KB (Knowledge Base), DB 
(Database), IR (User Interface and other Interface Routines) and AM (analysis modules).
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V iew  & R u n
O b s e rv a t io n s
S e tu p
S tru c tu re
V iew  & R e p o rt 
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S tru c tu ra l & 
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Figure 5.10 RISC hierarchy o f  tasks
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Table 5.1 RISC System components
No Com ponent Function Category
1 System Controller Overall control of other components KB
2 Set-Up KS Sets up new structural model and the KB that stores 
this
KB
3 Pre-analysis KS Runs SCF, ULDAN and initial reliability analysis KSs 
after setting-up of the structural model
AM
4 SCFKS Calculates or obtains an SCF value for a joint KB
5 Ranking KS Selects joints for consideration and cost evaluation 
analysis
KB
6 Maintenance Plan 
Formulation KS
Proposes maintenance plans to be considered for a 
joint
KB
7 Cost Evaluation 
KS
Calculates expected costs for maintenance plans and 
reliability indices for a joint by running RISCREL
AM
8 Input Files KS Creates text input files for an AM KB
9 Propose Actions 
KSs
Finds minimum cost action and altemative actions 
from cost evaluation results file
KB
10 CS Scheduling KS Generates schedules based on Constraints Satisfaction 
and different searching mechanisms
KB
12 Observations KS Runs text file interpretation for entry of inspection 
results, stores data in internal format and in database 




Editing functions and KBS checks for maintenance of 
the system
KB
12 Database access Runs routines for access to data in databases IR
13 Structural DB Structural data is stored as a set of DBs for efficiency DB
14 Inspection 
Techniques DB
Contains inspection reliability data for each technique) DB
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No Com ponent Function Category
15 Materials DB Contains material properties data (Paris’ Law C and m 
parameter values)
DB
16 SCF DB Stores SCF values DB
17 User interface Runs the graphical user interface IR
5.3.2 System C ontroller
The System Controller is at the core of the architecture of the RISC System and it provides the 
following basic functions
• control of tasks, which includes managing the use of KBs and storing control data for 
later reporting to the maintainers of the KBS
• interfaces for the user via a graphical user interface, and for the analysis modules and
databases by creating suitable text datafile and reading the text output files
► rule-based reasoning support and rule set control facilities
► error-handling and tracing of reasoning processes
The implementation of the RISC System Controller adopted a task-driven control scheme to carry 
out the tasks specified by a user through a graphical user interface. In the main, the System 
Controller controls two different types of knowledge sources, rule-based KSs and analysis KSs.
An internal structural model is used as the data structure for all the knowledge sources, including 
analysis modules. It is dynamic in the sense that it is in working memory and is modified 
continuously as the analysis and scheduling progresses. The mle-based knowledge sources use this 
stmctural model directly. On the other hand, external analysis modules use this internal model in 
an indirect way, in that the input text files are created from the internal model. Using text files to 
provide interfaces to the analysis modules ensures the independence of the architecture of the KBS 
from the analysis modules. The use of intermediate files is shown in Figure 5.11 overleaf.
5.3.2.1 Control of Rule Set Knowledge Sources
The role of a rule set is to group mles for a particular task and can be enabled or disabled. If a rule 
set is disabled, it will not be used when the inferencing is started. The reasoning process is more 
efficient and hence faster if there is only one enabled rule set in the system. The System Controller 
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Figure 5.11 The use o f  intermediate files
If a particular task is to be performed by a rule-based knowledge source, the System Controller 
enables the rule set associated with that knowledge source and starts the rule-based forward and 
backward chaining reasoning.
5.3.2.2 Interfaces to Analvsis Modules
The control of analysis modules is concerned with preparing text datafiles, running the analysis 
module and reading of output text datafiles. When an analysis module is to be used, the System 
Controller checks the preconditions of the task. Preconditions may include that the module should 
not have already been run, that previous tasks have been carried out, and that an input datafile has 
been prepared. If the preconditions of an analysis module are confirmed by the System Controller, 
then the Controller invokes the analysis module, and waits until the results are produced. An 
analysis module is executed, its output is directed to a text datafile and the file name of the output 
is fed back to the System Controller.
If the task has already been carried out, then the analysis is not run but the data added to the 
structural model. This ensures that no redundant work is to be carried out. For example, if the 
reliability index value for a joint for the required point in time has already been calculated before, 
then RISCREL is not executed again. If the datafile does not exist or seems incorrect, the process 
of creating a text file is carried out. The results in the output file are read into the system and
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stored as dynamic data. This data is then interpreted at a later stage.
5.3.2.3 Database Interfaces
The System Controller can access databases of pre-specified formats. The data is then stored 
internally to be used as required. For most analysis modules, the System Controller needs to 
abstract data from databases through the database interface and this data is then stored in the text 
input files. The access routines for the databases are external module KSs. The databases and the 
routines have been developed as part of the database tasks.
5.3.2.4 Documentation and Reports
During the whole process of analysis, interpretation, and scheduling, the System Controller 
maintains the knowledge base and gives users the full access to the information that has already 
been derived by the KBS system. At any stage of the process, particularly at the end of a 
scheduling session, a document containing schedules and the relevant information which explain 
the schedule can be provided by the KBS.
The final reports are a Schedule Summary and Analysis Output. The latter collects together the 
input and output files for each analysed joint, with a header giving the ranking criteria and 
weightings. The first contains a list of the joints considered and those scheduled for inspection. 
The schedule itself is given as a structured table, as in Table 5.2, where the rows are ordered 
according to the Year of inspection, then by Node-ID. The Joint-E) indicates the weld and model 
of the node which was analysed.
Table 5.2 Schedule list structure
Year List of required IRM resources General region of inspection
Node-ID Joint-
ID
Inspection Technique Repair Criteria Comments
5.3.3 View & Run Subsystem
The main module is the View & Run subsystem in which the analysis and scheduling is carried out. 
The goal of performing maintenance plan cost evaluation analysis is to identify for the joints 
considered which maintenance plan is the most rational in terms of cost. The analysis makes 
intensive use of existing software and it is carried out for a particular joint, producing costs for 
each maintenance plan and joint analysed. The data flow for View & Run is given in Figure 5.12.
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Figure 5.12 Dataflow in the RISC View & Run subsystem  
The tasks carried out here are
1. obtain general parameters for schedule (e.g. schedule period) from the user
2. select joints to be analysed
3. create input file, carry out analysis, evaluate results for each joint
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4. create initial schedule
5. modify schedule to make better use of resources
Additionally, the View & Run module is used to view and query data stored on a structure. The 
problem solving procedures in View & Run are provided in part by knowledge sources that make 
use of the existing analysis modules and heuristic knowledge. Rule-based KSs are implemented 
for each task which may be carried out by the application of heuristics. The advantages of using 
rule-based approach are that they can be easily understood and therefore can be possibly modified 
by the domain experts, that is the operators and managers, and they are independent of the KBS 
architecture and the System Controller. It is also expected that the RISC System would have only 
a few, that is 10-20, rule-based KSs and hence it is not expected that the interdependencies would 
become too complex to trace. Because of these factors, rules are particularly appropriate for 
representing regulations and guidelines. As these requirements change, the appropriate rule-base 
KSs may be modified without re-implementing the whole KBS system software.
The following KSs with associated rule sets have been developed for View & Run.
5.3.3.1 Ranking KS
As the cost evaluation analysis is computationally expensive, it is not practical for the RISC System 
to perform an exhaustive analysis for all the joints of the structure. A more intelligent approach, 
which takes into account the past history and geometric information of the structure is used here 
to analyse the joints on a selective basis.
The selection or ranking task has been implemented as described in Section 5.2.3. In order to carry 
this out, data on the joint for each ranking factor is gathered from external databases, text-files on 
the joint data and from internal data structures.
5.3.3.2 Maintenance Plan Formulation KS
The task of maintenance plan formulation is to choose the most appropriate strategy or set of 
maintenance plans to adopt for a component in question. The input to this subsystem is the 
reliability values for selected joint over the scheduling period and information on its past history. 
This task is carried for all joints in turn prior to cost evaluation. The output from this step is a set 
of possible NDI techniques, repair criteria and possible inspection periods, which will be used to 
create an input file for the analysis module. This subsystem relies very much on the heuristic 
knowledge that operators use when evaluating structural analysis results and making initial 
decisions. The rules are used in the interpretation process to find possible maintenance plans for 
any one jo in t in terms of the allowable times for next inspection, possible inspection techniques
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and repair criteria for light-grinding versus heavy-grinding or other method. The main work here 
is in setting the inspection periods for consideration, and mles for this have been described in 
Section 5.2.4.1.
5.3.3.3 Cost Evaluation KS
The analysis process is also described in Section 5.2. Before carrying this out, maintenance plans 
have to be generated for the joint and the remaining analysis data gathered from external databases 
and the joint datafiles. The Cost Evaluation Analysis mle set encapsulate these pre-conditions for 
mnning RISCREL and error conditions after mnning modules. If an error has occurred, the user 
is notified.
5.3.3.4 Propose Actions KS
This KS in effect carries out analysis results interpretation. The output of the cost evaluation 
process is a set of cost data for a joint from which an initial minimal cost plan and alternative 
actions can be selected. The KS identifies possible plans of actions by use of the rules which set 
the cost difference threshold value as described in Section 5.2.5. This KS also indicates whether 
or not to continue onto the next joint in the ranked list of joints.
5.3.3.5 Constraints Satisfaction Scheduling KS
The goal o f scheduling is to establish how to place actions and resources in order to reduce the 
costs. The procedure of CS scheduling can be divided into two major activities: to produce the 
initial schedule based on least cost or proposed actions for each joint, and then satisfy the resource 
constraints, regulation, and requirements etc. to produce a usable schedule. The first activity is 
straightforward. The second is more complicated and needs intelligent support to produce the final 
schedule effectively. Attempting to consider all the constraints and requirements for five years at 
one time would be computationally too expensive. The strategy employed is to consider the 
inspection periods with a resource deficit, and the schedule is modified by considering alternative 
actions which reduce the resource deficit.
The process has been implemented as a scheduling mle set combined with a searching procedure 
for automatic schedule generation as described in Section 5.2.6.3.
5.3.4 Data Flow, Structures and Storage
The problems of reducing the memory requirements and of representing data are closely interlinked 
in that use of a representation scheme that allows inheritance of data will reduce the dynamic 
memory requirements. The data storage problem is explained here and an example of knowledge
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representation for the RISC System, the structural objects, are now described.
5.3.4.1 Data Storage
One of the major practical problems is for RISC is in memory requirements for both dynamic and 
long-term storage of data. The knowledge bases are modular which ensures that structured data 
may be loaded only as and when needed. Furthermore, specialist modules may be re-used as 
required in different parts of a system. Thus memory requirements are reduced. Traditional flat 
table databases have been used for storage of data as these can be more efficient in terms of space 
requirements: when data is required the databases can be easily accessed, the required subset of the 
databases is then read. The disadvantage of this, on the other hand, is that the data in the databases 
has to be interpreted as objects to be reasoned within the KBS and this is obviously not as efficient 
as storing the objects as such in an object-oriented database in the first place. The availability of 
many industry standard relational database management systems, that is, based on flat tables, and 
the lack of standard object-oriented database packages obviate this argument against storage of the 
object data as flat tables. Figure 5.12 on page 174 shows the data flow in the RISC View & Run 
module, where it can be seen that the structural databases are accessed at two stages: initially for 
brief data for all the joints in the structure, secondly to retrieve the detailed data required at the 
analysis stage for each joint.
A KBS can provide flexibility in interaction and in extension of the system. The concept behind 
KB systems is that the knowledge required to carry out a procedure is kept explicit wherever 
possible. Thus for instance, should the constraints for scheduling change in time, the architecture 
is such that it should be possible to make the required changes to the system.
Another important role for the KBS in RISC is in reducing the problem size. The shadowed 
processes in Figure 5.12 (numbered 2 ,4  and 6) reduce the number of components which have to 
be considered. The Ranking procedure reduces the analysis to be carried out. Interpret Results 
incorporates a procedure for selecting the most promising (in terms of costs) possible inspection 
actions for further consideration. The Constraints Satisfaction Scheduling module generates 
rational schedules from the many possible combinations of maintenance plans, and provides rapid 
measures of schedule quality.
5.3.4.2 Structural Objects
The basic geometry of the structure consists of a collection of components. Thus the structure 
object points to component type objects. The basic structural model as a hierarchy of objects is 
shown in Figure 5.13. Each component of an offshore structure is either a member or a joint which 
is a welded connection. In the RISC System, for convenience, a further type of component, a node.
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is identified. The analysis is carried out joints based on detailed consideration o f node geometry 
and loading. Each node is a collection of members and connections, so a node object will point 


















Figure 5.13 Outline structural model
The data held on components can be considered to be granular, that is, the information required 
varies from a global perspective of relative positions of components to exact dimensions of 
individual components and welds and materials used. Thus, the structural data is in three layers:
• a beam model of the structure held as point co-ordinates in the node objects
• dimensions and materials of structural members
• connection details such as weld profiles, and materials
Each physical node may be modelled in several forms depending on the loading mode being 
considered. A node object points to joint objects.
The models of nodes, or joints, can be classified according to the number and placing of the 
considered braces as T, Y, X, K and KT joints. The allowed parametric equations for SCF 
calculations depend on the classification of the joint. In addition, the model represents objects 
representing the concepts required for the scheduling procedure.
Figure 5.14 shows details of the structural concepts and the attributes provide most of the input 
data for RISCREL within the Cost Evaluation module. The detailed data required to be input into
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the RISCREL module is given in Chapter 6
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The figure also shows how the structural objects are linked to the objects related to the planning 
and scheduling procedure. The raw output from RISCREL on the p values and costs are stored in 
instances of RISCREL results and a list of these are associated with the appropriate jo int object. 
For each jo in t analysed there is an instance of the class plan, and this is associated with a set of 
alternative actions for the joint.
5 .3 ^  Set-Up, Observations and System M anagem ent KSs 
Figure 5.15 shows the overview of the process of setting up a structure.
Start
End










Figure 5.15 Overview o f  set-up process
Each phase may require collection of information from different sources, such as analysis results 
obtained by using different computer systems, for example, pushover analysis, detailed finite 
element analysis, etc. These results will need to be interpreted prior to their use as input to the 
RISC System. This process is similar for Observations and for System Management. The 
Observations KS supports the user in entering inspection results and other relevant data into the 
system, after which re-scheduling may need to be carried out. This subsystem is mainly concerned
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with providing flexible and interactive ways of entering information into the RISC System so that 
data of different formats can be transferred from one to another and are held in a consistent and 
common structure.
5.3.5.1 Set-Up Tasks
Set-Up refers to the tasks that need to be carried out before any analysis of the structure is possible 
by an expert within the operator organisation. The first task is to set-up the Structural Information. 
This is platform specific information which is likely to be unstructured, and as a result, the RISC 
System will extract it from the user interactively. It will include:
• platform data, including name, location and date of construction
• temporal information, that is, the dates of inspection periods, expected dates of 
weather windows, default scheduling and analysis periods
• resource constraints, such as the number of inspection vessels and of divers permitted 
to work on the structure, allowed or preferred inspection techniques, initial inspection 
requirements, etc. which are identified as either hard, that is, cannot be modified by 
the user during a session, or soft, which can be modified during “w hat-if ’ analysis
• global cost information on inspection techniques, repair methods and for failure, which 
are employed if detailed costs for an individual joint are not specified
The execution of the RISC System requires certain operator specific information:
• ranking information, that is, factors for ranking of joints, associated ranking weights, 
desirability of each factor and the maximum and minimum values for normalisation
• cost evaluation analysis information, specifying global analysis options for the 
structure and default distributions for data
For the analysis, certain data is required for the Analysis Control parameters. Component Fatigue 
Analysis options. Structural Default values and distributions for joints, cracks, weld and grinding 
repair. Interpretation of the results requires information on the number of alternatives or the cost 
difference threshold value to reduce the number of actions to be considered when scheduling. 
Criteria and heuristics to decide how to search through the alternative actions for a feasible 
schedule are defined by the user based on a list of priorities. Logistical information on the RISC 
System, such as, what journal files are to be stored and in what directories and filenames is also 
required.
Ideally, a finite element (FE) data-file containing the geometric information for a space-frame 
analysis should be read by the RISC System and from this the connectivity and beam geometry of
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the structure can be modelled. Alternatively, this data can be read in using a predefined text-file 
interface. This information is used for displaying the stmcture as a whole. In addition, the same 
information is used for identifying locations of structural nodes. It should be noted that Finite 
Element analysis itself is not part of the RISC System. The FE datafile should contain a node 
identifier and node point co-ordinates, that is numeric data only. A further file contains the FE 
node identifier and the corresponding operator-defined node identifier with text information to 
provide information on connectivity. Each joint will have the following information associated 
with it:
► Joint Identifier, which specifies one analysis model for a physical node.
► Node Identifier, which is an operator defined identifier and links the joint to the 
physical node and hence to the location of the joint in the structure.
► Joint Classification, required for the purposes of analysis, by which complex multi- 
planar joints are split up into simpler, usually single plane joints, based on the load 
experienced by the joints. This classification is normally carried out during the design 
phase. It is assumed in RISC that this information is readily available.
► Joint Geometry, which is given as chord and brace diameters, thicknesses, and lengths, 
and the brace angle.
► Local Weld Geometry, which is sometimes known and, if available, should be stored. 
This information can be used by some of the stress intensity factor solutions required 
for the fatigue fracture mechanics analysis. The information stored for each weld is 
length of weld, and weld profile.
► Material Properties for the material used to construct the joint. The required data are 
Paris’ Law m and C constants. As the RISC System contains a database of material 
properties, the data is a material DB reference. If actual data for a particular joint is 
available then a separate feature adds this to the database.
► Loading, which can in RISC be specified as a weighted average stress range (WASR), 
or as a hot spot stress exceedance diagram in the form of a Weibull curve, or as a 
combination of sea states and stress transfer functions (SRPD). The sea states 
information or SRPD is converted to stress exceedance diagrams by relevant analysis 
modules.
There may be prior inspection results indicating cracks or defects present on the structure. The 
inspection history is stored in the form crack location, length and/or depth. Repair details may also
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be stored, with dates and procedural details in text form. Cost information is required for each type 
of inspection technique, repair method and for failure. Information specifying local analysis 
options, such as default distributions for data, may be required for the joint. All local data override 
global options.
Once the basic data has been input for the structure, an initial analysis is performed to set up the 
loading information by executing, if necessary, the ULDAN module; to find an appropriate SCF 
value, either from the SCF database or by running SCF routines; and to obtain an initial crack 
growth curve and base level reliability indices, by initial execution of RISCREL. The final set-up 
task is to carry out checks on the data to ensure that all required data is complete.
5.3.5.2 Observations Features
In this module the results of confirmed anomalies have to be stored, re-analysis (updating of 
reliability measures) is carried out and changes are made to status of node, i.e. damaged, repaired, 
critical, which will affect how the joints are treated in future analyses. The first and second steps 
are interactive procedures requiring graphic views of the structure. The first requires forms 
designed so as to reflect the paper reports.
To enter this module, the user is required to enter security data. The main type of information 
entered in this subsystem relates to inspection results and includes dates of inspection, NDI 
techniques employed, the interpreted results and repairs carried out. Some joint properties, such 
as its classification, geometry, weld details, loading data, may also be changed at this point if 
monitoring provides different data to that at set-up. After new data has been entered, a re-analysis 
is performed to update loading information, the SCF, and if necessary the base level reliability 
index and crack growth curves. At the end checks are made on the data to ensure that all required 
data is complete.
5.3.5.3 Svstem Management Features
In the System Management subsystem, an expert user may make modifications to the user 
information on the allowed users and levels of users, databases and analysis modules, the report 
formats, the structural model, and the global operator’s information. Only expert users can use this 
subsystem.
During System Management, the user may modify any data for a structure entered during Set-Up. 
Information required for the execution of the RISC System may require modification. This 
information includes which analysis modules and database access routines may be executed and 
where they exist on the system, what default journal files are to be stored and in what directories 
and filenames. Any heuristics based on guidelines or standards set by certification authorities are
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liable to change. Rules embodying heuristics for scheduling are also available to be modified. The 
default forms of reports and displays should be modifiable to allow new file locations, varying 
formats and different details of analyses to be stored. At the end of the procedure, checks are made 
on the data to ensure that all required data is complete.
5 3 .6 The User Interface and other Interfaces
Interfaces are required primarily between the analysis modules and the KBS. As rule-based 
knowledge sources are internal to the development tool, they can directly operate on the internal 
structural model and so do not require interfaces. In this section, the user interface is also 
discussed.
5.3.6.1 Datafile Interface
M ost of the data for setting up, or entering observations into, the RISC System will be contained 
in ASCn datafiles. For general platform data and other unstructured information, the user will be 
required to enter information interactively. Both sources are taken as starting points for the 









Figure 5.16 Datafiles processing
The data specified in the ASCII text files and by the user will be used by the RISC System to 
convert to internal objects for the dynamic database. Data for each object is then stored in database 
tables for rapid initialisation at the runtime stage of the RISC System. Input files required by the 
Set-Up process are defined as ASCII text files to ensure that data from a wide variety o f sources 
can be used by the RISC System, and producing these Set-Up files are the responsibility of the user. 
Three text files which need to be interpreted by the Set-Up module are the finite element data, the 
connectivity data linking the joints to the node, and joint properties and data, representing one 
model of the node.
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5.3.6.2 The User Interface
The RISC System is in effect a decision support system. Hence a feature of the RISC Scheduling 
Module is that it relies heavily on the user to make final decisions. The rescheduling process, in 
particular, is highly interactive. Users are allowed to modify a schedule by either delaying or 
putting forward actions. In any case, the system gives support to users by checking the consistency 
of the change and calculating the new costs rapidly and displaying the results to the user. This task 
requires an interactive graphical interface for the user to view the schedule produced and to modify 
the schedule by making the following decisions:
• re-planning for a joint, which may involve, for example, changing the inspection
method or the repair criteria
• rescheduling, by shifting an action from one weather window to another
• planning inspections for new joints which are similar or neighbouring to the joints that 
are to be inspected
• modifying resource constraints
In each of the above cases, an interface is required to aid the user in making a decision. For 
instance, the system needs to reason about the consequence of the change, report and display the 
results of the change, give warning messages if an action is to be delayed. In addition, the Cost 
Evaluation KS needs to invoke analysis modules when an analysis of a new joint is considered by 
the system as necessary.
A suitable Windows graphical user interface was designed in detail. The structure of the user 
interface is based on the RISC hierarchy of tasks in Figure 5.10 on page 169 and provides buttons 
and commands for the user to control the process. Graphical images in the control panel are 
consistently updated as the system changes status.
Examples of the designed screens are shown in Figures 5.17 and 5.18 overleaf. Figure 5.17 shows 
the screen seen by the user when viewing the stmctural model and general analysis data. The user 
would need to be able to select components to view according to certain criteria, such as low 
reliability measures. The selection box allows the user to enter which joints are to be viewed. To 
start off the analysis and scheduling process, the user is required to input specific analysis control 
data, such as the scheduling period of interest and the time between weather windows or inspection 
periods. Some of the control data may be pre-set by the operator during set-up, but the user may 
wish to over-ride the default values in order to perform speculative analysis and scheduling for 
future scenarios..
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Figure 5.18 shows the screens showing the output from the complete planning and scheduling 
process, that is, ranking of joints for analysis, viewing the latest analysis output and then the final, 
interactive scheduling process.
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5.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RISC DEMONSTRATOR
For the implementation task, an initial review was carried out of software tools for the RISC KBS 
development. The packages considered were CASE tools, expert system shells, and database 
management systems. The choice of tools was restricted by availability for different computer 
hardware platforms and by requirements laid down by the offshore industry on the platforms for 
software for the industry.
Following the review, an initial simple prototype was created to aid the design of the object 
hierarchy described in Section 5.3. Work started on the RISC Demonstrator in parallel to the 
development of the RISCREL package and as the details of the Scheduling Model in Section 5.2. 
Some of the details of the implementation of the RISC Demonstrator are given here with some 
examples of the code from the implemented KBS modules.
5.4.1 Review of Software Tools
There are many different types of software tools currently available: CASE tools, application 
development systems, languages and libraries expert system shells and the more general Al-based 
tools. The choice of what combination of tools to use for any software project has become 
increasingly complex, as it is often difficult to make a clear distinction between their respective 
capabilities and features. For example, languages are often sold as packaged with standard libraries 
and specific development tools, such as code generators and debuggers; application development 
systems may be tied or targeted to particular languages; Al-based tools, expert system shells and 
application development tools increasingly share common functionality. For the purposes of this 
section, the following definitions are assumed:
► A programming language is a very general tool; it is intended to be applicable to a 
wide range of problems. Often libraries of routines or other self-contained modules 
can be obtained which help shorten development time.
> CASE (Computer Aided Software Engineering) software development tools often have 
one or a combination of particular function in the software development cycle, e.g. 
producing diagrams and documentation for specifications, generating code from 
specifications, aiding the testing of code, automatic generation of accompanying 
documentation. These are best used in a commercial environment and are not 
discussed fully in this report.
>• Applications development systems, which provide many functions and facilities to the
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programmer. The interaction between the programmer and the system is carried out 
throughout the development cycle and hence an application development system is 
often almost inextricably tied to a language. The reverse is also true in that the use of 
certain programming languages presupposes an environment.
► An expert system shell is a very specific form of an application development system. 
It is an expert system with the problem-specific knowledge removed, and it is intended 
to aid rapid development of new expert systems. A shell will have its own very 
high-level language, though any commercial shell will also be loosely coupled to the 
language in which the shell was written.
► Easier to define is a database management system: this is for the storage and retrieval 
of large amounts of structured data.
This review is restricted to computing tools particularly suited to implementing AJ concepts. It was 
decided to distinguish between programming languages with or without associated environments, 
libraries and other tools, other independent libraries and miscellaneous tools such as code 
generators, expert system shells and problem specific application development systems and finally 
database management systems. There are many programming language and tool variants, so only 
commercially available products and fully supported products are considered.
5.4.1.1 AI Programming Languages and Associated Tools
The reasons for choosing a language with any associated tool for engineering software fall into the 
following categories;
► Purpose of language/tool: For what type of problem is the lar guage or tool intended?
► Speed of development: What features does the tool provide to ease development? And 
does it increase productivity?
► Correctness and support: Is the language or tool known to be a well-developed 
product? Is sufficient training and, more importantly, support given? Are there any 
standards related to the tool?
► Graphical user interfaces: How easy is it to develop a graphical user interface?
Languages which are suitable for implementing AI techniques have been developed both by the 
pure AI community as well as the computer science community (Baron, 1986). The pure AI 
languages have their roots in attempting to be able to code programs which reflect the theoretical 
representation schemes designed by the AI community. The languages developed by this
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community then can be classified as being either production languages or functional languages. 
The computer science community, in contrast, are more concerned with developing efficient 
languages, which would aid them in developing large complex programs. With this aim, 
object-oriented programming languages were developed. The languages considered are given in 
Table 5.3 on page 200.
■ Production Languages
These are the most well-known AI languages which made use of production rules. Requirements 
for a production language are that the pattern-matching, that is, the mechanism by which a rule is 
matched against the known or required to decide if it may be applied, should be rich to allow 
generalised rules and to provide a great measure of control over which rules are used when; and 
the rule structure be complex enough to provide a flexible knowledge representation scheme. 
Modem production mle languages allow many conditions and many actions in each mle, such as 
in 0PS5. Some languages, for example, CLIPS and ART-IM, also provide procedural constmcts 
to be included in mles. Finally, reasoning using the mles is usually carried out using 
forward-reasoning, though backward reasoning is also expected if required. Other examples of 
production mle languages are OPS83 and Prolog. Production languages do not provide the flexible 
form of knowledge representation required for engineering software.
■ Functional Languages
This family of languages were the original AI languages, developed by the first group of people 
working in the new research field of Artificial Intelligence. To understand the basis for functional 
languages it is necessary to understand the mathematical concept of a function. A function is a way 
of relating elements from one set, the domain, to the elements of another set, the range. The range 
and domain need not be sets of numbers nor need they be of the same type of data. A function may 
represent a relationship between any form of data or of other functions. In computing terms, a 
function is a program and hence functional languages allow recursion: the ability to define a 
program in terms of another program or itself. The classic example is LISP and variants of it, such 
as CommonLisp, etc. LISP and other functional languages for the development of realistic systems 
fell out of favour in the late 1980 s, as they do require a great deal of processing power.
■ Hybrid Languages
Hybrids of the two types of production mle-based languages and functional languages exist. One 
of the most well-known is Poplog which combines functional and production elements. Hybrid 
languages never became particularly popular. One possible reason for this is that they tend to have 
been developed as research tools and hence do not have the features which are associated with
Chapters 1 9 0
languages developed and commercialised by the computer industry.
■ Object-Oriented Programming
Object-oriented programming (OOP) languages were not developed by the AI community, but the 
similarity of objects, associated methods and message passing, to the concept of frames, scripts and 
schemas and their associated daemons, make OOP an appropriate methodology to adopt in 
implementing an AI frame-based system commercially (Kemp & Saran, 1991). Some 
frequently-used object-oriented languages are
► C++: This is a very powerful, now much used language in the software industry, which 
is based on the language C. In 1990 it was the closest to being standardised and thus 
there were many available libraries of C++ classes to shorten development time.
► Smalltalk: One of the original object-oriented programming languages and a very 
mature language (standards: 72, 74, 76 and 80). It was also the original windows, 
icons, mouse and pointer language and thus has probably influenced the present 
computing world more than any other language.
► Actor: This is intended as an environment for writing Microsoft Windows 
applications., although it is powerful and has received good reviews.
5.4.1.2 Libraries and Miscellaneous Tools
Libraries of subroutines are commonly available for standard procedural languages. Many 
commercial compilers and/or environments will provide sets of libraries to be integrated into a 
programmer's own applications as and when required. Object-oriented programming lends itself 
very well to the concept of class libraries. These are as the name suggests sets of ready-made 
classes of objects which can then be used by your own application and thus shorten development 
time. As for procedural languages, many object-oriented programming languages will come with 
class libraries, as standard or as an option.
Another class of tool which if used carefully may lead to shortened development times is that of 
code generators. These allow the developer to "describe", usually through some interactive means, 
parts of the program. Some details will not be required to be specified and default values are 
assumed. The generator will then use this "description" to automatically produce the source code 
which will carry out the task/function required. In the case of implementing AI concepts, the code 
generators available are part of a packaged AI based development system.
These tools will help implementation of tasks or classes which are most frequently used or difficult 
to program. Example task and object areas are graphics and user interfaces, such as ready-made
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windows, dialogue boxes, and databases, with creation and access routines.
■ Class libraries
As C-H- is not a standardised language, class libraries for C++ require careful selection. Some of 
the considerations to be taken into account are:
► Cosmic versus non-cosmic: A library is cosmic if it has one superclass, that is, all 
objects in the library share one common superclass and hence there are common 
properties. If the library is cosmic then the library itself is easier to use and maintain. 
A disadvantage is that if any changes occur to the superclass, the new library objects 
may cause a program to behave in an entirely different way.
► Support and continued development of the libraries: This is a common requirement 
with all other development tools and is more important in the long-term if a cosmic 
library is chosen.
An example of class libraries is Common View for developing window and graphical interfaces.
■ Code Generators
The major problem with these tools is that the code produced is someone else’s idea of "good", 
whether in terms of efficiency or maintainability, code. On the other hand, a code generator can 
shorten development time considerably, and ensure a minimum standard of code. Most expert 
system shell and application development system provide code generators.
5.4.1.3 Expert Svstem Shells and Application Development Svstems
An expert system shell is merely an expert system without a knowledge base (Mettrey, 1991). A 
shell will have its own high-level language, based on the knowledge representation scheme, in 
which to code a knowledge base. A commercial expert system shell is also expected to provide an 
interface to at least one programming language to allow the incorporation of procedures. Other 
points to note are that shells often will only provide the control mechanisms and data structures, 
or knowledge representation, particular to very specific problem types and/or problem areas.
In spite of early predictions that any given shell could and would be used to implement expert 
systems of all sizes and in all areas, it has been found that in fact most shells are far too restrictive. 
These restrictions placed on expert systems developers may, only now, be lessening with the 
changing face of Al-based products. Furthermore, in the case when a software system is developed 
using some of the techniques developed for expert systems or general AI techniques, it is often 
over-restrictive to require the system to be able to solve a problem completely and as a human
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expert would. Non-expert systems may also be very useful without necessarily being able to solve 
a problem completely. For such systems, it is better to classify them as knowledge base systems.
Reviewing the expert system or knowledge base system tool market is also rather problematic in 
that the market is in a state of flux. Companies supplying KBS software appear and disappear. 
Additionally, the rapid changes in hardware have a dramatic effect on the functionality which can 
be expected from such a tool. Further, the traditional definition of an expert system tool does not 
cover the more recent Al-based or intelligent application development systems that can be used to 
develop Al-based programs or systems. Most Al-based systems are not necessarily based on the 
traditional expert system architecture. They may contain an embedded expert system or systems 
which do particular tasks, they may utilise searching and data stmcturing techniques inherited from 
expert system technology, they may have an element of self-knowledge. The Al-based 
development tools reviewed are given in Table 5.3 on page 200.
It is also becoming difficult to distinguish between Al-based application development systems and 
some of the highly sophisticated application development systems. A good commercial Al-based 
application development system will be expected to provide external language interfaces, user 
interface development tools, debugging tools, whilst application development systems are now 
required to provide some unstructured problem-solving typical of expert systems. Some of the 
considerations to make when choosing an Al-based application development system are
► Knowledge representation and inference: How easy to use is the problem description 
or data structuring language? And how extensible is it?
► Rules: Are these allowed? How rich is the pattern-matching? And what constmcts are 
allowed (eg, several conditions and actions)? What control is provided over the 
inference procedure: can backwards as well as forward reasoning be used and can the 
system move from one to the other? Can the mles be made modular?
► Objects or frames: What ready-defined slots are there? What reasoning is provided? 
Is there any frame-matching to allow reasoning about stereotypes? What facets are 
provided? And how extensible and flexible are the frames?
► The development environment: In developing any complex knowledge base system 
with many and large knowledge bases, it will be important to have sufficiently 
powerful debugging aids, to be able to view how any one item of information may 
affect the reasoning carried out. The debugging aids should provide methods for 
detecting inconsistent information and if possible, allow the developer to see any 
overlaps (such as items containing similar information) in the knowledge bases.
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► Interactive development: In addition, it essential to be able to view the structure of the 
knowledge bases in diagrammatic form: what "view-points" are allowed? This is not 
a trivial matter since a good interface has been shown to significantly lower the 
amount of time spent on development (Jones, 1988), What facilities are provided for 
interactive development of an application? Or put another way: what functions can 
the in-built code generator provide?
► Extensibility and add-ons: What tools are available to help shorten the development 
time? Examples are ready-made modules, libraries, built-in procedures. This would 
be of particular use for developing the user interface.
► Delivery environments: To deliver software as a packaged system requires the
availability of run-time versions of the original system. How easy is it to produce such 
a package? And what costs are associated?
► Documentation and support: Are there user groups and journals available? Other users
tackling similar problems?
■ Production-Rule Development Systems
Examples are of production rule-based CASE tools are CLIPS and NEXPERT Object. These 
systems assume that most information is best described as a set of rules. NEXPERT Object is 
highly extensible and can handle a set of external objects (Aiken & Liu, 1990). It does this by 
reading an object into memory as a standard item of data and not as an object with links to other 
objects. This makes it not feasible for reasoning with many objects which are continually up-dated.
■ Object-Oriented Development Systems
Examples of object-oriented or frame-based CASE tools are Art, KEE, LOOPS, KnowledgeCraft, 
Kappa PC and ProKappa. These systems provide all three formalisms: rules, objects and 
procedures, and they generally support multiple reasoning and control paradigms. Yet they do not 
provide reasoning involving the use of stereotypes to classify objects. This sort of reasoning has 
not been found by the reviewer in any commercial object-oriented system. Of these examples. 
Kappa PC is the least sophisticated in terms of the development interface reflecting its PC 
environment and hence limitations, while the remainder are workstation KBS development 
systems. In common with most other PC based shells. Kappa PC provides viewing facility in the 
form of simple knowledge trees showing the hierarchy of objects or dependency between rules.
The first four in the list were originally Lisp-based environments and hence usually require Lisp 
workstations, although they are now available for some other platfoims, whilst Kappa PC and
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ProKappa are C-based. ProKappa is in fact an embeddable system as it comprises a set of modules 
which may be included in or excluded from the developers software system as required. This 
makes ProKappa a powerful base from which to start developing a complex system (Evans, 1991).
5.4.2 Requirements for Implementation
As the RISC System is intended for use in a petrochemical industry, decisions on the 
implementation of the System were based on the standards described in the Software Integration 
Platform Specification report by the Petrotechnical Open Software Corporation (POSC, 1991). 
These specify, in the areas of interest to this work, the use of an operating system complying with 
POSIX standards, a user interface complying with X-Windows and Motif standards and the 
Computer Graphics Metafile format for picture description storage.
Other and more general requirements related to development software tools can be summarised as
► Support: RISC was a large project where much of the KBS development was carried 
out in parallel. Hence the quality of the support which was to be provided was very 
important.
► Extensibility: It was not always possible at the start of the work to foresee every
function expected of the RISC System. Thus a highly extensible set of tools was 
needed.
► Portability: There are two aspects to this. At the development stage, software
development was carried out on a variety of platforms (analysis modules on PCs for 
example) although all the major work on the System Controller was of course carried 
out on the chosen development platform. At the delivery stage, it may have been 
necessary to be able to port the demonstration system onto other platforms.
In conclusion and given the software review in Section 5.4.1, Kappa PC was selected to carry put 
initial design work for the RISC Demonstrator (IntelliCorp, 1992). For the major part of the 
development of the demonstrator system, the C-based knowledge base system development tool, 
ProKappa, (Intellicorp, 1991) was selected. A standard DBMS, RAIMA, was also to be used for 
external databases (RAIMA, 1991).
In view of the POSC requirements, the chosen development platform of the complete KBS was the 
IBM RS/6000 with AIX operating system. Parallel development of the analysis modules and 
database access routines was carried on a variety of other platforms. ProKappa was available for 
a limited range of computer base hardware at the start of the work, beta version was supplied for 
the IBM AIX Window environment. Development of the RISC Demonstrator including the
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Scheduling Module was carried out using ProKappa on the IBM RS/6000 platform,
5.4.3 The KBS Development Tool, P roK appa
The CASE tool ProKappa fully supports both object-oriented programming (frame-based 
representation, methods and daemons) and rule-based programming (forward chaining and 
backward chaining). These two paradigms are unified in a high level environment within which 
the knowledge base and knowledge sources can be developed, either using a higher level language 
called ProTalk or using C. In both cases, ProKappa provides good supporting facilities for quick 
prototyping and software debugging and maintenance. Other languages can be used as external 
modules to be called as necessary with a suitable interface.
In ProKappa, a class hierarchy with object instances may be defined to describe a complex system. 
Within the classes and objects, slots are used to characterise the relevant parameters, and methods 
are defined to express their behaviour. Slot options and monitors are used to impose constraints 
on parameters. ProKappa also has an active graphical image system and an interface workbench 
for developing.graphical user interfaces. This was used for the prototype user interface.
In addition, ProTalk, a high level rule-based language, is built into the ProKappa system and this 
was used to develop the RISC System Controller and the rule-based knowledge sources. In 
ProKappa, rules can be invoked through functions and methods; functions can be triggered and 
messages can be sent from rules. This makes it easy to embody both procedural and heuristic 
knowledge into rules to carry out complex tasks. As example of ProTalk rules, consider the 
Maintenance Plan Formulation KS. In the initial prototype, the rule set object EvaluationRuleSet 
performed the task of deciding if it is necessary to consider inspections at all based on reliability 
considerations only. The System Controller triggers theses rules by a C function call, 
ForwardChain(EvaluationRuleSet). In ProTalk syntax, as expected each rule has two parts, the 
precondition part (If) and action part (then). The two examples of rules in the EvaluationRuleSet 
given in Figure 5.19 and 5.20 are written in ProTalk syntax.
In the NoActionRule, the first line of the preconditions binds variable ? Joint to the SelectedJoint 
stored in the Control object. In the second line, a message is sent to the object ReliabilityResults 
which has an attached method function called FindBetaValue! to obtain the value of the reliability 
index. The third line compares the found (3 value with a threshold hold value defined in the Joint 
object. If p in the current year, that is the year under consideration, is larger than the threshold 
value, the statements in the action part of the rule is carried out. In this case, a NoAction symbol 
is assigned to the slot Action in the Joint object through the statement ?Joint.Action = NoAction. 
The function InformUser is called to notify the user.
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ferule NoActionRule in EvaluationRuleSet priority 1000
{ if
?Joint . = = Control.SelectedJoint;
?BetaValueOFJoint = SendMsg(?Joint.ReliabilityResults, 
FindBetaValue!, Control,CurrentYear);




Figure 5.19 NoAction ProKappa rule




?BetaValueOf Joint = SendMsg ( ? Joifit. ReliabilityResults , 
FindBetaValue!, Control.CurrentYear);
?Critical == Yes;
?BetaValueOfJoint <= ?Joint.BetaThreshold; 
then
?Joint.Action = InspectNow;
?Joint.InspectMethod = FindlnspectMethod(?Joint, 
InspectNow);
InformUser(InspectNow, ?Joint); }
Figure 5.20 InspectNow ProKappa rule
The second rule suggests an InspectNow action for a selected joint if the reliability index value of 
the Joint at the current year falls below the threshold value and the joint is a critical one. These two 
rules demonstrate the integration of rule-based programming, functional programming and object- 
oriented programming in the ProKappa tool.
Future versions of ProKappa would allow executable independent KBS system to be developed and 
distributed on different platforms.
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5 .4 .4 The RISC Demonstrator
The RISC Demonstrator confirmed the feasibility of combining analysis modules within the 
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Figure 5.21 The complete RISC System
Implementation of the prototype for the RISC KBS, the RISC Demonstrator, was carried out in 
parallel with the work on modifications to the stmctural reliability analysis modules. The 
reliability analysis modules were combined with the FACTS and CFA limit states to provide a first 
version of the RISCREL analysis module, COMREL (COMponent RELiability system) which 
carried out reliability based fatigue fracture mechanics analysis per joint only. COMREL was later 
extended to produce RISCREL which carried out both reliability based fatigue fracture mechanics 
and cost evaluation of maintenance plans. For the RISC Demonstrator, COMREL was integrated 
into the ProKappa system and combined with the Ranking and Execution KBS modules with the 
use of the ProKappa system. COMREL is mn as a separate process and its execution is controlled 
from ProKappa. The complete RISC System would control execution of RISCREL instead.
The Ranking module and CS Scheduling modules were developed and the basic design for these
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tested. Simulated RISCREL output files were used to demonstrate displays to the user, assumption 
of the availability of expected costs per maintenance plan. The CS Scheduling module was 
developed. The design for the CS Scheduling KS was tested. This work demonstrated how the 
RISC System containing all the required components could be constructed. Screens from the RISC 
emonstrator showing a schedule in preparation are shown in Figures 5.22 to 5.25 on pages 207 to 
210. The first shows the output from the Ranking module. The next shows the output from three 
runs of RISCREL for one joint and three different inspection methods displayed by the KBS 
prototype user interface. In the third screen, an initial schedule is displayed for which too many 
inspections are planned for year 3, as shown by comparing the required resources (in green) to the 
available resources (in white). The user may choose one or all possible searching methods to find 
schedules that are usable, that is that satisfy the constraints. The user may investigate what 
happens if the resources are distributed differently across the weather windows. Based on the 
initial schedule, the user would probably decide to change the resource distribution so that no 
resources are allocated to year 2 and the resources for year 3 are doubled. The output of a search, 
a usable and rational schedule, is then created, as shown in Figure 5.25.
5.5 Sum m ary
In this chapter, the specifications for the RISC System, including the data structures, that is object 
hierarchy, and the user interface, were given. The Scheduling Model developed for RISC was 
described. The scheduling procedure, in effect the main function of the RISC System, can be 
summarised as follows:
1. Ranking or selection of joints to be analysed
2. Cost Evaluation analysis of joints and maintenance plans
3. Interpretation of the analysis results to provide an initial schedule based on the least
cost maintenance plans for each joint
4. Scheduling which makes modifications to the initial schedule to provide a rational
schedule satisfying resource constraints into account
A review of available software tools was carried out and fi*om this a set selected for the 
implementation of the prototype of the RISC System KBS modules. The RISC Demonstrator was 
developed using ProKappa on an IBM RS/6000 platform and includes modules for the Ranking, 
Evaluation and CS Scheduling procedures. Its use is described in Chapter 6.
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î Table 5.3 Software packages and languages reviewed
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I Figure 5.24 An initial schedule with the RISC Demonstrator
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Figure 5.25 A usable and rational schedule after resource allocation
6 A  Ca se  S t u d y
Earlier chapters explained the basis for the RISC methodology, gave specifications for the RISC 
System and described the development of a prototype RISC System. In this chapter, a case study 
is given to illustrate the RISC methodology. The use of RISCREL is explained and details of the 
joints and cases investigated are given. Values for the random variables and the parameters are 
specified for the example joints, with explanations as to how this data was derived or with 
references to other work using similar values. An important input to the RISC analysis is past 
inspection information and this requires some understanding of how to make use of the appropriate 
information on inspection reliability. The problems that arise from this are touched upon here.
Section 6.2 describes the data required and gives example values. Section 6.3 explains how the 
RISCREL analysis is executed with the data gathered in the earlier section. Finally, the problems 
of interpretation of the results still remain. The results from RISCREL were interpreted to give a 
reasonable set of possible maintenance actions for each joint. The interpreted results must then be 
combined to form a rational global solution for the structure which takes into account constraints 
which may not have been included (implicitly or explicitly) into the analysis. Section 6.4 shows 
how the scheduling algorithms are applied to give a complete schedule for the structure.
6.1 T h e  Exam ple  Structure
This section explains some of the problems and considerations to be made in collecting data 
required for executing RISCREL. The case study data and further examples of realistic data 
collected are also given.
M ost of the information on the appropriate distributions and data for the second or higher order 
moments, that is the standard deviation and other measures of distribution, was collected from the 
literature and studies carried out by others during the RISC project. In practice, it was found that 
apart from some very specific information, such as monitored environmental data and the history 
of inspections and repairs carried out on the structure under consideration, operators do not have 
all the required statistical data. Some of this data will need to be found, as is described in this 
section, either by using independent studies or by approximation.
Some of the example data on the representative or characteristic values, related to the first moment, 
on random variables was obtained from actual structures. The structure considered in the case 
study, however, was a fictitious structure with an assumed service life of 25 years. The service life 
has no effect on the reliability analysis of a joint, since reliability is only affected by past events.
Chapter 6 211
On the other hand, it does affect the costs evaluation of any planned maintenance action, since the 
economics depend on the future of the structure.
6.1.1 Notes on the use of RISCREL
Input variables for RISCREL can be one of three types:
• control parameters for the structural reliability analysis
• random variables which represent data for which there are uncertainties
• parameters used to input data which is inherently non-random or which signals a 
fatigue fracture mechanics analysis choice
Apart from a few exceptions, the control parameter values are not varied; the exceptions are 
explained in Section 6.3.2. The parameter and variables are given in Table 6.20 at the end of this 
chapter. This table indicates that these sets of data are stored as the values of the attributes of joint 
type objects. Unless specified otherwise, where no units are given in tables or data below, an 
appropriate S.I. unit should be assumed. Time variables, however, are in years and angles are given 
in degrees.
In describing the case study data, only the random variables and the most relevant parameters are 
given. For the random variables, RISCREL allows four moments or distribution parameters to be 
given to model each variable, but for the purposes of this exercise, the distributions selected for the 
random variables only required two moments.
As an example of a RISCREL parameter, L_TIME represents the service life of the structure. For 
this case study L_TIME was set to 25 years. Other parameters include the choice of stress intensity 
factor method, loading, and so on.
6.2 M o d ellin g  Cases fo r  RISCREL
The data was obtained from various sources. Several similar past case studies have been carried 
out based on IMREL, as given in, for instance Goyet et al (1994) and other probabilistic analyses, 
such as Faber et al (1992) and thus the data for these is re-used and discussed. Other data was 
derived from information from past work carried out in the NDE Centre at UCL on inspection 
reliability and fatigue fracture mechanics.
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6.2.1 Geometry
The geometric information required by RISCREL includes values for random variables modelling:
• member thickness, that is the thickness of the tubular member, which can be either the 
chord or the brace through which the crack is growing
• the assumed initial crack size, before the results o f any inspection and both in terms 
of depth and length
• the weld geometry, that is, weld toe radius, angle and leg length
These may be modified by any repairs carried out. Hence for each of the geometric random 
variables, there are corresponding post-weld repair and post-grind repair random variables. The 
effect of repair on the geometric variables is considered in more detail in Section 6.2.2.
In this section, the values of these variables are given for each example joint. The complete list 
of random variables is as follows:
T_CHORD Thickness of the tubular member of interest, usually the chord (units in metres).
This is set to the brace thickness if it is known that a crack is growing through the 
brace.
AO Initial crack depth (m)
CO Initial crack length (m)
T_R1 Chord thickness after weld repair (m)
A0_R1 Initial crack depth after weld repair (m)
C0_R1 Initial crack length after weld repair (m)
T_R2 Chord thickness after grind repair (m)
A0_R2 Initial crack depth after grind repair (m)
C0_R2 Initial crack length after grind repair (m)
W_T_R Weld Toe Radius (m)
W_LEN Weld Leg Length (m)
W_ANG Weld Angle (degrees)
W_T_R_G Weld Toe Radius after grind repair (m)
W_LEN_G Weld Leg Length after grind repair (m)
W_ANG_G Weld Angle after grind repair (degrees)
W_T_R_W Weld Toe Radius after weld repair (m)
W_LEN_W Weld Leg Length after weld repair (m)
W_ANG_W Weld Angle after weld repair (degrees)
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In addition to the geometry, the last inspection result is also of significance. This data is introduced 
by setting Y_INSP, representing the year in which inspection took place, and A_INSP, the depth 
of the observed crack. Different values for these were set for each joint of interest.
Weld geometry variables, W_T_R, W_LEN and W_ANG, were not given values for most of the 
example joints, as they were not required for the selected analysis route. In general it was assumed 
that these values were unchanged after repair.
The initial crack sizes AO and CO represent the depth and half-length of the cracks in the 
component at the start of the life of the structure. Since the fatigue fracture mechanics modelling 
implemented for RISCREL does not model the initiation phase of the fatigue process, the value 
given to AO is of great interest since it will have a direct impact on the predicted fatigue life of the 
tubular connection and hence on the reliability analysis results.lt is assumed in general that initially 
there is only one microcrack at the hot-spot area of the joint. If no other information is known or 
has been given, common practice has been to employ an exponential distribution with mean value 
0.12mm (Diamantidis et al, 1991) or mean 0.11mm (Kirkemo 1988) as a model for the initial crack 
depth. The Marine Technology Directorate report suggests initial crack values for flat plates under 
different loading cases, ranging from 0.12 mm for a plate 16mm thick under membrane tension or 
0.22mm, to 0.57mm for a 107.95mm thick plate under bending (MTD, 1989). For a plate of 
thickness 38.1 mm, the MTD report suggests a suitable initial crack depth of 0.18nun and 0.34mm 
for loading under tension and bending, respectively. Very recent work has suggested that a more 
realistic model may have a mean value of 0.38mm (Moan et al, 1997). For the RISC project, a 
value of 0.15nun was assumed (Dharmavasan et al, 1994b).
Finally, AO may be updated with the past inspection result. That is, if a crack has been previously 
detected and not repaired, as in joint J02 below, then AO may be set to the detected crack size. 
Thus this variable may be used to represent in some way the past history of the joint.
Several tubular geometries were chosen for the fictitious structure and some are illustrated in 
Figure 6.1. Values for their geometric parameters are given in Table 6.1. Where values for the 
post-repair variables are not specified, it can be assumed that they are the same as the pre-repair 
values.
Table 6.1 T ubular jo in t geom etric da ta
V ariable Dist. M om ent 2"** M om ent R em arks
Jo in t A From RISCREL Manual
T_CHORD weibull 0.040000 0.005000
AO normal 0.000800 0.000100
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V ariable D is t 1®* M oment 2"** M om ent R em arks
CO normal 0.008000 0.000800
Jo in t B From Goyet et al (1994)
T_CHORD lognormal 0.038100 0.005720 AO is based on the results
AO lognormal 0.006000 0.000500 of inspection in the first
CO lognormal 0.008000 0.000800 year.
Jo in t C Example joint from actual
T_CHORD lognormal 0.021437 0.000214 structure
AO lognormal 0.000150 0.000015 M edium sized member with
CO lognormal 0.000750 0.000075 no cracks
A0_R1 lognormal 0.000100 0.000010 Repairs are expected to
C0_R1 lognormal 0.000500 0.000050 reduce initial crack sizes
A0_R2 lognormal 0.000100 0.000010
C0_R2 lognormal 0.000500 0.000050
W_ANG normal 45 1.000000
Jo in t D Larger members
T_CHORD lognormal 0.038100 0.005720 No cracks
AO lognormal 0.000150 0.000015
Jo in t E
T_CHORD weibull 0.040000 0.005000
AO normal 0.000800 0.000100
T_R1 weibull 0.038000 0.005000
A0_R2 normal 0.001000 0.000500
Jo in t F
T_CHORD lognormal 0.038100 0.00571
AO normal 0.000600 0.000060
A O .Rl normal 0.001500 0.000150
T_R2 lognormal 0.036100 0.00541
Jo in t G
T.CHORD lognormal 0.038100 0.00571
AO lognormal 0.000150 0.000015
AO .Rl lognormal 0.001000 0.000100
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Figure 6.1 Case study tubular connections (a) General notation (b) from RISC Final report 
(1994) (c) in Goyet et al (1994)
Modelling of Repair
Two methods of repair may be considered at one time in RISCREL. The modelling allows the 
possibility of grinding being carried out if a small crack is found, or welding if the crack is 
considered to be too large to be repaired by grinding alone.
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RISCREL allows changes due to repair actions to the geometry of the joint, that is the thickness 
of the member, initial crack sizes and weld toe radius, leg length, and angle. For instance, in the 
case o f welding it is expected that the wall thickness be the same as at the start of the life o f the 
jo in t, but with added uncertainties as to the initial crack sizes, since underwater welding is 
necessarily of lower quality than welding in fabrication. Additionally, after grinding repairs, the 
wall thickness is reduced by a few millimetres, although the uncertainties in the initial cracks will 
be as at the start of the life of the joint. The chord thickness after weld and grind repair is modelled 
by the random variables T_R1, T_R2 respectively. Similarly, the initial crack size, that is depth 
and width, after weld and grind repair are modelled by the random variables A0_R1, A0_R2, 
C0_R1 and C0_R2 respectively. The toe radius, leg length, and angle of the weld after repair are 
m odelled by W_T_R_G, W_LEN_G, W_ANG_G, W_T_R_W, W_LEN_W, and W_ANG_W, 
where the suffixes G and W represent grind repair, or R2, and weld repair, or R l, respectively. 
These variables were assumed for the purposes of this case study to have the same values as for the 
corresponding pre-repair variables.
The costs of the two repair methods are introduced by way of the parameters C_Repl, 
corresponding to welding, and C_Rep2, corresponding to grinding. The cost of welding is usually 
significantly higher than for grinding only, since grinding is usually carried out by the inspecting 
diver if any crack is detected. If welding is required, this would require a new team of divers with 
the appropriate equipment.
Table 6.2 Default da ta  fo r modelling of repairs
RV D istribution 1st Param eter 2nd P aram ete r
T_R1 as T.CHORD as T_CHORD 10%T_R1
A0_R1 as AO as AO 10%A0_R1
C0_R1 as CO as CO 10%C0_R1
T_R2 asT_CHORD T_CHORD-0.002m 10%T_R2
A0_R2 as AO as AO 10%A0_R2
C0_R2 as CO as CO 10%C0_R2
W_T_R_G as W_T_R asW _T_R as W_T_R
W_LEN_G as W_LEN as W_LEN as W_LEN
W_ANG_G as W_ANG as W_ANG as W_ANG
W_T_R_W as W_T_R as W_T_R as W_T_R
W_LEN_W as W_LEN as W_LEN as W_LEN
W_ANG_W as W_ANG as W_ANG as W_ANG
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Finally, the repair criterion parameter R_Rep is used to indicate when each repair is carried out. 
For instance, if R_Rep is set at 0.005m, then this means that grinding is carried out if a crack is 
detected and has depth less than 0.006m, otherwise if the crack depth is greater than 0.006m then 
welding is employed. This example repair criterion value is appropriate since it is expected that 
if more than 6mm has been ground away, then welding is more likely to take place. In Faber et al, 
the repair criterion was set to 0.01m, but this is higher than may be expected in practice. A more 
appropriate value can be set by considering the original thickness of the joint: if the total material 
already ground away during previous repairs is 0.002m then R_Rep would be set at 0.004m, that 
is by deducting 0.002m from the total maximum grinding depth permitted, say 0.006m.
Repair may also affect the material properties. This is discussed in the following section.
6J23 Material Properties
Since the failure of a tubular joint is modelled using Paris’ Law as described in Section 2.3, the 
data required to define the corrosion fatigue properties of a material is
• the Paris constant C
• the Paris exponent m
As described in Section 2.3, it is important to enable a multi-segment Paris Law relationship to be 
described to model crack growth in a corrosive environment. In RISCREL, up to five values for 
C and for m  are allowed, each pair of values corresponding to each segment of the Paris Law curve. 
Paris_C l, Paris_C2, Paris_C3, Paris_C4, and Paris_C5 are random variables, whilst the 
corresponding Par_M l, Par_M2, Par_M3, Par_M4, and Par_M5 are parameters. The number of 
segments to be used is given by the parameter D_Seg. In order to make use of the different values 
of C and m, the loading must be modelled as a stress range probability distribution and this is 
explained in Section 6.2.4.
Welding, that is, repair type R2, may change the material properties, in which case the random 
variables Paris_l, Paris_2, Paris_3, Paris_4, and Paris_5 may be set to different values to reflect 
this. In general, however, these variables are set to the same values as for before welding. The 
values for the above are stored in a database.
Actual materials considered were
• E46 steel with modulus of elasticity 210000MPa and Poisson coefficient = 0.3 (Goyet 
et al, 1994)
• BS4360-50D steel as used in an example in Kam (1989a)
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The remaining example values are for materials not identified in the original reference. The values 
used in the case study are in the table below. The Paris constant C after weld repair can be 
assumed to be the same, unless otherwise given, and the default number of segments is 1.
Table 6 3  M aterial properties
M ateria l C dist C m ean C s.d. P ar_M R em arks
E36 LN 5.00E-12 5.00E-12 3.320 From Goyet et al, (1994)
BS4360-50D LN 4.50E-12 1.35E-11 3.30 Kam (1989a)
M l LN 1.37E-08 0.95E-08 3.019 Material in use in Mexico
M2 N 5.00E-12 5.00E-12 3.100 From RISCREL Manual
M3 LN 1.13E-10 2.825E-11 2.00 From Faber at al (1992)
M4 LN 4.50E-12 3.10E-12 3.100 From RISCREL Manual
The M arine Technology Directorate report on underwater inspection procedures also suggests 
values for C and m for different conditions (MTD, 1989). For example for steel tubulars in 
seawater and under cathodic protection, m is given a value as high as 5.96 and C a value of 3.5 x 
10'*  ^in MN, m units.
6 3 A Loading
Two methods of defining the loads are provided. The first method describes the load as one 
W eighted Average Stress Range (WASR) random variable; the second method allows the 
modelling of a stress range probability distribution. If the crack is being modelled in 2 dimensions 
or if corrosion effects are to be taken into account, that is a multi-segment Paris Law is to be used 
requiring several stress values, then the WASR load model should not be used, instead the stress 
range probability distribution model is required.
The Weighted Average Stress Range is a single stress value which gives the equivalent damage to 
that produced to all the random stress cycles applied to the structure: the total crack growth 
produced by the WASR is equal to the total crack growth produced by all the different stress 
ranges. A value and distribution for the random variable W ASR is required. This variable 
represents the so-called hot spot stress for the joint, which, as described in Section 2.3.3.1., is the 
product of the nominal stress and the stress concentration factor. Reasonable values for the mean 
of WASR lie in the range 30-40MPa, which corresponds to a design S-N curve for tubular welded 
structures with a required 2.3% or less probability of failure for a fatigue life limit of 10  ^cycles 
(Maddox, 1991; Dharmavasan, 1995).
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The stress range probability distribution (SRPD) model allows a more accurate corrosion fatigue 
crack growth model. As described in Section 2.3.3.1, a two-parameter Weibull distribution is used 
to model the applied stresses and thus two variables Weibull_A and Weibull_B have to be set. The 
loading analysis program, ULDAN, will provide the W eibull parameters for the stress load 
distribution and for this, the spectral moments are required. As the case study made use mainly of 
W ASR method of load modelling, ULDAN was not executed during the case study. Two cases 
included the use of the Weibull model as a comparison, and these Weibull parameters were taken 
from  past examples. In addition, the number of loading cycles per year, represented by the 
parameter Cyc_Y, is required. Realistic values for Cyc_Y range from 10 thousand to 10 million 
(Faber, 1992; Kam, 1989b).
■ W ASR
To select this method, the parameter L_Meth is set to 0. The W ASR models long-term loading on 
the weld of the joint. The mean value for WASR represents the hot spot stress given by;
WASR = Nominal Stress x Stress Concentration Factor 
Table 6.4 Loading m odelled as a  W ASR
(6.1)
D istribution 1st M om ent 2nd M om ent R em arks
normal 18.0 1.50 From RISCREL Manual
normal 30.0 4.00 From RISCREL Manual
normal 20.0 6.000 From RISCREL Manual
lognormal 61.6 18.48 From Goyet et al (1994)
lognormal 10.0 3.00 Mean value from Goyet et al (1994), 
s.d. from 18.48/61.6=0.3
Realistic mean values for the WASR lie in the range 30-40MPa and a good estimate for the 
standard deviation is that which gives a coefficient of variation of approximately 0.3. As the 
WASR cannot take on negative values, a particularly suitable model is the lognormal distribution, 
although, for sufficiently large mean values and small coefficients of variation, the normal 
distribution is a reasonable assumption.
■ W eibull M ethod
For this method, L_Meth is set to 3. As the two variables Weibull A and Weibull B have to be set 
together, in the following table each pair defines the load.
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Table 6.5 Loading modelled as a Weibull distribution
W eibull P . Dist. 1st M om ent 2nd M om ent R em arks
W eibull_A normal 1.5300 0.3220 From RISCREL
Weibull_B normal 1.0190 0.3220 Manual
6.2.5 Fatigue C rack G row th M odelling
For the fatigue fracture mechanics element of the analysis, it is necessary to consider two aspects:
• the stress intensity factor (SIP) solution
• modelling of the crack-growth in one direction only (depth) or in both the depth and
length directions
For the purposes of the case study, it was decided to concentrate on 1-dimensional modelling of 
cracks. In this section then, only the choice of SIF solutions are discussed in detail.
6.2.5.1 SIF Method
The choice of SIF equation is made by setting the parameter SBF_M to
1 for A verage Stress SIF method (AVS)
2 for the Two Phase Method (TPM)
3 for the Holbrook-Dover solution
4 for the Newman-Raju solution
Both A VS and TPM are empirical SIF relations for tubular joints, which are based on experimental 
crack shape developments in tubular joints. Newman-Raju and the Holdbrook-Dover solutions, 
in contrast, are flat plate models. Hence, this case study has concentrated on the use of AVS and 
TPM.
■ AVS
For the AVerage Stress SIF method, it is necessary to set parameter values for the hot spot stress 
concentration factor HS_SCF, and the average SCF AV_SCF. The valid ranges of values are given 
by 2.66< HS_SCF <9.1 and 1.55< AV_SCF <6.35. The ratio HS_SCF/Av_SCF is the actual 
measure used in the AVS equation, and this is normally close to 1.0. For the purposes of this case 
study, values o f 1.0 have been generally assumed for both AV_SCF and HS_SCF.
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Table 6.6 Data for the AVS SIF solution
HS_SCF AV_SCF Rem arks
Default 1.00 1.00 Used in the RISCREL Manual
3.14 6.28 From RISC Final Report
■ TPM
For the Two Phase Method, it is necessary to set parameter values for the hot spot stress 
concentration factor HS_SCF, the average SCF AV_SCF and a geometric parameter Geo_P. 
Geo_P corresponds to the tubular joint geometric ratio p =d/D, where d is the diameter of the brace 
and D is the diameter of the chord. Thus Geo_P is always less than 1 in value. The valid ranges 
o f values are 0.21< Geo_P<1.0. The default value of Geo_P was taken to be 0.71 when the full 
geometry of the joint was unknown. The same validity ranges as for the AVS method for HS_SCF 
and AV_SCF values apply. As TPM, like AVS, makes use o f the ratio HS_SCF/AV_SCF only, 
the same comments on default values apply. When the TPM option is selected, the analysis is 
sensitive to the exact loading input values and does not converge for high loading values. Thus, 
this option was not used for the study.
6.2.5.2 2-Dimensional Crack Modelling
As an alternative to the 1-dimensional crack growth model, which relies on direct information on 
depth, a 2-dimensional model of the crack growth was included in RISCREL. This model assumes 
a semi-elliptical crack shape development, which models fairly well the case under tension or 
bending, of depth a and length 2c. The crack growth is calculated by carrying out integration in 
two dimensions: along the length c and the depth a. Hence two crack growth laws are employed 
and are specified by the parameters D_G_L, the depth growth law, and L_G_L, the length growth 
law. Default values for these are 1.00. In addition, the parameter representing the W eibull bias 
factor Bias_F is set. Kirkemo (1988) reported a typical value for the bias factor mean to be 0.70. 
In the RISC project, a bias factor value of 0.71 was employed. The geometry function is here 
represented by the parameter Mk_factor. This is set to a value which indicates the 2-D model to 
be used. For these, values for other factors, such as the half_plate_width, are required. This option 
was not used in the case study.
6.2.6 M odelling of Inspection
One of the fundamental requirements is to be able to model accurately the effect of inspection. As 
already mentioned in Section 6.2.1, RISCREL allows one previous inspection result to be taken
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into account by setting the parameters A_INSP, the crack depth at the last inspection, and Y_INSP, 
the year of this last inspection. An error condition occurs when the inspected crack size is smaller 
than at the beginning of the life of the structure: therefore A_INSP must be greater than AO. 
Additionally, RISCREL allows modelling of inspection reliability by employing random variables:
POD Probability of detection of the inspection technique employed in year Y_INSP.
Epsilon The sensitivity of the technique employed, which is also known as the probability of
sizing (PCS).
POD_P The planned inspection technique POD
Epsilon_P The planned inspection technique POS
To be able to measure the POD and POS requires the production o f extensive data on detection of 
many cracks of different sizes. This introduces the problem of ensuring that sufficient and 
representative samples exist. Furthermore, the tendency of a  technique to detect spurious cracks 
should also be considered. At the present moment, the false-call rate is as yet not incorporated into 
the RISC system. This is acceptable as the current assun^tion is that detected defects are 
immediately checked, which would have the effect of reducing the false call rate. In a practical 
situation, once a crack has been detected, often a separate inspection technique may be employed 
to size the crack. In effect two inspection techniques may be used, one for detection, the second 
for sizing, and the input POD and POS values for both the performed and planned inspections need 
not correspond to the same technique. Some information was available from previous work and 
used in the RISCREL Manual (see Dharmavasan et al, 1994b) on the following representative 
inspection techniques
above water magnetic particle inspection (AWMPI)
underwater magnetic particle inspection (UWMPI)
above water eddy current inspection (AWEC)
underwater eddy current inspection (UWEC)
above water close visual inspection (AWCV)
underwater close visual inspection (UWCV)
In addition, up-to-date data was collected for the alternating current field measurement (ACFM), 
the Thorbum electromagnetic detection system (EMD HI) and the Hocking A V I00 (AVIOO) 
inspection techniques. Further work on inspection reliability has been carried out within the 
InterCalibration of Offshore NDT (ICON) project at University College London and some results 
have been used for this case study (Rudlin & Dover, 1996; Rudlin, 1996).
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6.2.6.1 POD and POS
W ork has been carried out in modelling POD for these techniques using the exponential, logit 
model and Weibull distributions and the results of this were modified to be able to be used in the 
RISCREL program (Ximenes & Mansour, 1991; Rudlin & Wolstenholme, 1992). Fictional data 
was also included in the study to represent levels of expected sensitivities for different quality 
techniques. The exponential distribution was assumed for all techniques, as this corresponds to 
much of the evidence. For the exponential distribution, the relationship between the mean and the 
standard deviation is given by
mean = y + 1/X (a) s.d. = 1/X (b) (6.2)
where X and y  are the first parameter and the second parameter, respectively. Results for the 
ACFM technique indicate that the detection capacity of ACFM is very similar to that of MPI. The 
following tables shows the data used in the case study and the corresponding mean values (correct 
to 4 decimal places) for the depth of the undetected crack.
Table 6.7 Inspection POD data
Technique D istribution 1** P aram eter 2"** P aram eter M ean(m )
AWACFM exponential 0.000010 2000.00 0.0005
UWACFM exponential 0.000010 1000.00 0.0010
AWMPI exponential 0.000010 1000.00 0.0010
UWMPI exponential 0.000010 770.00 0.0013
AWEC exponential 0.000010 667.00 0.0015
UWEC exponential 0.000010 500.00 0.0020
AWCV exponential 0.000010 167.00 0.0060
UWCV exponential 0.000010 76.90 0.0130
The values for the standard deviation of each can be easily deduced and are conservative. The 
mean values of the undetectable crack size seem to correspond to the intuitive estimates given by 
inspection experts informally. Additionally, the parameters for the POD using the EC technique 
underwater (UWEC) correspond well with the results reported by Moan et al (1997) o f a mean 
value of 1.95mm.
Information on the sizing accuracy or POS was not immediately available for all inspection 
techniques. Some limited data from the ICON project has been published for the ACFM technique 
indicating that a normal distribution with mean 0.0 and standard deviation 0.001 is a conservative
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model (Dover et al, 1994). The data in the table below was used.
Table 6.8 Inspection POS data
Technique D istribution M ean S.D. (m)
ACFM normal 0.00 4.00E-04
AWMPI normal 0.00 4.00E-04
UWMPI normal 0.00 8.00E-04
AWEC normal 0.00 1.20E-03
UWEC normal 0.00 1.60E-03
UWCV normal 0.00 2J0E -03
6.2.7 Costs Data
Costs are required for failure, each repair method, and for inspection. The range of cost values 
used in the case study are given in Table 6.9.
Failure costs are determined by considering the redundancy or criticality of the component 
combined with the costs associated with stopping production to allow emergency repair work. If 
systems reliability were implemented then of course redundancy would not be taken into account 
at this point. Costs of welding are always high in comparison to grinding repairs. The latter can 
be assumed to be of the same order as the costs associated with inspection. Inspection costs vary 
according to the technique employed and the location of the component. Beyond a certain depth, 
saturation diving is required and this will increase the costs considerably. If the inspection rate is 
one node per day, then the cost per node would be the same as the diving costs per day that is 
£30,000 (MTD, 1989).
A fuller study may be required which identifies the separate costs more accurately, such as what 
part of the inspection cost is due to the location as opposed to the technique employed. Inspection 
costs can be modified if it is be assumed that in one diving session more than one component can 
be inspected, such as in the situation where groups of components are physically near to one 
another. This modification can be difficult to assume at this point since it makes the assumption 
that several neighbouring joints will be inspected at the same time.
The effects of inflation may be considered by setting the parameters R_RATE, representing the real 
rate of interest, and Y_CAPI, for the year of capitalisation. For the case study, this was not 
considered.
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Table 6.9 Case study costs
Event Cost (£) R em arks
Failure of critical node 100,000,000-
10,000,000
Estimate provided by reliability and 
NDI experts (MHF, JR)
Failure of a non-critical 
but not redundant node
10,000,000-
1,000,000
Estimate provided by NDI expert (JR)
Failure of a minor node 1,000,000-100,000
Weld Repair 50,000-100,000 Lower values was used by MHF, higher 
value estimated by JR
Grinding 5,000-25,000 Lower values are for easily accessed 
nodes
Inspection costs 3,000-50,000
Close visual inspection 3,000-25,000 The lower values correspond to above 
water inspections, the highest value 
assumes deeper location.
MPI inspection 3,000-50,000 This includes cleaning costs.
EC techniques 4,000-50,000 Lower estimate given by expert for 
EMD m  and for the AVIOO ACPD 
technique.
ACFM 5,000-50,000 Revised estimates
6.3 T h e  RISC A n a l y s is
The RISC analysis includes ULDAN and RISCREL. The load analysis program, ULDAN, will 
produce the two parameters of a Weibull curve modelling the stress range distribution. As it was 
not used for the case study, it is not described further in this chapter. The issues related to 
RISCREL are covered in greater detail.
6.3.1 T he T u b u la r Com ponents and M aintenance Plans
The actual structure used as a case study is a fictitious'one taken from the MTD report (1989). The 
structure is shown in Figure 6.2. In this structure, several critical joints can be identified. There 
are joints which share geometry, but may be under different loads, or indeed may have different
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defects. This a fairly typical example of the type of structure to which the RISC methodology may 
be applied.
\
C R IT IC A L  M C M O C R S
L O S S  O F ONL o r  T H E S E  M L M I I tH S  IN 
EACH GWOl^l* I E  AN X HR AC I  O fJ K - U R A C t 
D O ES N O T  RESULT IN tX C C S M V f JA C K E T  
O V E R S T H L S S
I I R L tX JN 'O A N I
Figure 6.2 Case study structure
The nodes on the structure are identified by noting the level (1 at the top, 5 at the bottom). Then 
on the horizontal plane: A denotes nodes on the side closest to the observer, B denotes nodes those 
furthest away and C for nodes in the middle of the structure, and 1 to 4 from front to back of the 
structure. Thus the node ringed in the diagram is identified by 2C1. The largest and critical joints 
are part of nodes 1A1 to 4, 181 to 4, 3A1 to 4, 3 8 1 to 4, 5A1 to 4, and 581 to 4. Nodes 2C1 to 4 
and 4C1 to 4 will contain only non-critical but not minor joints. Joints at nodes 5C1 to 4 may be 
safely ignored as they are very minor nodes. Of the primary and non-redundant nodes, some are 
very similar, not just in terms of their geometry bpt also in terms of the loads applied.
The joints are identified by considering the brace member. A member can be identified by its two 
end nodes. So for a node, giving the node at the other end of the member identifies the weld or 
joint of interest and adding “c” or “b” differentiates between a crack through the chord wall or the 
brace wall. For example, at node 2C1 there are two welds joining members 1A1-2C1 and 2C1-3B1 
to the chord 1B1-3A1. These welds can be named lA l and 381. The possible joint cases which 
can be considered for analysis are lAlc ,  1 Alb,  3Blc and 3Blb.
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lA lI B l
w eld  lA
node 2C1
w eld 3B13B 3A1
Figure 6,3 Example joint identifiers
There are a total of 64 joints to consider for this structure (ignoring all redundant members), in 
addition to which, cracks may grow in either the chord or brace wall for each joint, making a total 
of 128 reliability analyses. Because of this and to reflect what would occur during the use of RISC, 
joints with the similar geometry and service history are not analysed individually.
The geometries identified in Section 6.2 were augmented by considering joints which had the same 
initial geometry, but different past inspection results. In total, over fifteen joints were analysed. 
These corresponded to some of the nodes and their correspondence is shown in Table 6.10, which 
also indicates which nodes were considered to be similar and hence each joint and maintenance 
case was analysed once. To make the table easier to read, joint case 6 is for a small member with 
low loading; cases 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,7  and 8 have all the same medium sized geometric dimensions and are 
for the same load or similar load case; case 15 has the same medium geometry, but higher loads; 
cases 9, 10, 11 are for large members and low loading; 12 and 13 for medium loads on a large 
member and 1 and 14 are for high loads and a large member. Case 6 corresponds to the minor 
nodes not considered in the tables below.
Approximate fatigue lives at design of the joints were known and only eight had low fatigue lives: 
the welds on nodes 4C1-2 had fatigue lives between 10 and 30 years, nodes 4C3 and 4, between 
30 and 100 years. For the purposes of the study, some of the joints are assumed to have been 
inspected in the past and some cracks found. The ranking would be carried out based on the 
criticality of the members making up the joint, the design fatigue life, and the results of past 
inspections.
For some joints, more than one maintenance plan was considered. Approximately fifty cost 
evaluation analyses were executed to test the case study and sample cases are shown below.
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Table 6.10 Nodes and joints for the example structure
Node Sim ilar Nodes and R em arks Jo in t IDs Jo in t Case
lA l lA 2-3,lB l-3 3B lb and 3A2b 3
3Blc and 3A2c 9
1B2 Crack detected in year 5 3A2c 10
1A3 Crack detected in year 4 3B3b 4
1A4 1B4 3B4b 3
3B4c 9
1B4 No previous inspection 3B4b 5
2C1 2C2-3 lA lb  and 3B lb 2
lA lc  and 3B lc 2
3A1 3B1 IB lb  and 4C lb 5
No inspection at all IB lc  and 4C lc 9
3B1 Two cracks found in year 5 and 5A lb 15
3 respectively 3Clc 11
3A2 3A3-4,3B2-4 2A2b and lA lb 3
4C2b and 5A lb 7
2A2c, 1 A le , 4C2c, 5A lc 1
3A4 Crack found in brace lB4b 8
3B3 Crack found in chord lB2c 14
4C1 4C2-4 3A lb and 5B lb 2
3A lc and 5B lc 2
5A1 5A2-3,5Bl-3 3B lb and 3A2b 3
3B lc and 3A2c 1
5A4 5B4 3B4b 3
3B4c 1
Table 6.11 Sam ple analysis cases
Jo in t Case 1 Geometry A and material M2
Loading and  FFM WASR = LN(30.0,4.0), 6,000,000 cycles/year
Perfo rm ed  inspection In year 1, employed AW MPI and no crack detected.
Costs Failure £1000000, grinding £25000, welding £500000
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IR M  P lan  1 AW MPI at cost of £15000, weld when >0.0Im
IR M  P lan  2 As above, weld when > 0.005 m
IR M  P lan  3 ACFM, £25000, weld when > 0.005 m
Jo in t C ase 2 Geometry F, material=Ml
L oading  and  FFM SRPD Weibull(1.53,1.019), cycles 20,000
P erfo rm ed  inspection Crack depth 0.023m detected in year 4, with ACFM
Costs Failure £100000, grinding £25000, welding £50000
IR M  P lan  1 £15000 UWMPI, weld when > 0.005m
IR M  P lan  2 £15000 UWEC, weld when > 0.005m
IR M  P lan  3 £10000 UWCV weld when > 0.005m
Jo in t Case 6 Geometry C, material M l
L oading and  FFM SRPD Weibull(1.53,1.019), cycles 20000
P erfo rm ed  inspection In year 4, AW MPI employed and no crack detected.
Costs Failure £1000000, welding £20000, grinding £60000
IR M  P lan  I AW MPI cost £15000, weld when > 0.005 m
IR M  P lan  2 AW EC cost £30000, weld when > 0.005 m
Jo in t Case 8 Geometry G, material M l
L oading and  FFM SRPD W eibull(l.53,1.019), 20000 cycles per year
P erfo rm ed  inspection Crack of depth 0.01m was detected in year 4, withMPI
Costs Failure £1000000, grinding £20000, welding £50000
IR M  P lan  1 ACFM £35000, weld when > 0.006
IR M  P lan  2 UWMPI at £25000, weld when > 0.006
Jo in t C ase 9 Geometry E, material M2 .
L oading  and  FFM WASR N( 18.00,1.5), and 6000000 cycles per year
P erfo rm ed  inspection None
Costs Failure £1000000, grinding £25000, welding £50000
IR M  P lan  1 ACFM £35000, weld when > 0.006m
IR M  P lan  2 As above, weld when > 0.003m
IR M  P lan  3 MPI £25000, weld when > 0.006m
IR M  P lan  4 As above, weld when > 0.003m
Jo in t C ase 11 Same as Joint 9 but crack detected
P erfo rm ed  inspection Crack depth 0.003m in year 3, ACFM
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IR M  P lan 1 £50000, MPI, weld when >0.005m
IR M  Plan 2 £50000, CV, weld when >0.006m
Jo in t Case 12 Geometry E, material M2
L oading and FFM WASR(24,2), 6000000 cycles
Perform ed inspection Crack depth 0.007m in year 3, 0.04 1000
Costs Failure £10M, grinding £50000, welding £100000
IR M  Plan 1 £50000, MPI weld when > 0.001m
Jo in t Case 14 Geometry A, material M2
Loading and FFM WASR (24, 1.5), 60,000,000 cycles
Perfo rm ed  inspection Crack depth 0.03mm found year 4 inspected with UWEC
Costs Failure £1000000, grinding £25000, welding £100000
IR M  Plan 1 £25000, MPI, weld when > 0.002m
IR M  Plan 2 £35000, ACFM, weld when > 0.002m
IR M  P lan  3 £25000, MPI, weld when > 0.006m
IR M  P lan  2 £35000, ACFM, weld when > 0.006m
Jo in t Case 15 Geometry D, material BS 4360-50D
Loading and FFM WASR N(30,4), cycles= 200,000
Perform ed  inspection Crack detected of depth 0.003m in year 5 with 0.016, 500
Costs Failure £1000000, grinding £25000, welding 100000
IR M  Plan 1 £25000, MPI weld when > 0.006m
IR M  Plan 1 £5000 CV, weld when > 0.002m
IR M  Plan 1 £35000 ACFM, weld when > 0.005m
Jo in t Case 16 RISCREL Manual example, geometry A, material M3
Loading and FFM WASR LN (30,4) with AYS with hot spot SCF = 1.00 and 
average SCF = 1.00, 6,000,000 cycles
Perform ed inspection Crack depth 0.001m observed in year 1, ACFM
6.3 J, Execution of RISCREL
To execute the analysis module RISCREL, a text input file is created with the data collected and 
described in the earlier sections of this chapter. RISCREL is run with this input file and several 
text results files are output by the module. RISCREL may be executed in two modes: updated 
reliability analysis or cost evaluation of maintenance plans. The mode of running RISCREL is
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controlled by setting the control parameters as described in Table 6.20 at the end of this chapter. 
For each joint, at least two analyses were run. The reliability analysis provided the reliability index 
from  which possible latest inspection times was identified. Cost evaluation was carried out for 
each maintenance plan selected for the joint. The analysis is carried out based on the assumption 
that the current year is year 5 and an inspection strategy for the next 5 years is the aim.
6.3.2.1 Updated Reliabilitv
To demonstrate the result of different past inspections on the same type of joint in the same 
environment, one geometry and loading case was chosen for three different joints: the first with 
no crack detected using MPI, the second with crack found using MPI and the third having a crack 
detected with ACFM. These results are shown in Figure 6.4 overleaf.
As can be seen, the greater accuracy of the ACFM technique means that the reliability index is 
updated to a higher value, since there is a reduced uncertainty. The surprising result is that no 
crack detected does not necessarily mean that the reliability index is updated to a higher value than 
if a crack has been detected. This could be because the sensitivity of a technique may be such that 
little information is provided by no crack detection. A detected crack however is likely to be very 
carefully sized, which leads to more information, or reduced uncertainty.
In the course of this study, it was found that p values are highly affected by uncertainty in material 
properties, that is in Paris’ Law constant C, and to the uncertainty in WASR.
6.5.2.2 Cost Evaluation
The output of cost evaluation includes for each inspection point, the expected costs of failure, 
repair and inspection, and the probability of failure corresponding to the particular maintenance 
plan as a function of time to the inspection. Of most interest of course is the expected total cost, 
that is the sum of the above costs, since the minimum total cost for a joint identifies the optimal 
maintenance plan for the joint. Examples of results are shown in Figure 6.5.
The expected cost of failure tends to have a greater effect on the total costs than the costs of repair 
and inspection in particular for critical joints. O f the three graphs shown, graph (b) displays the 
most typical shape based on the results for the many example joints analysed, in that there is a 
minimum and after this point in time the total costs start increasing.
The expected costs output cannot be compared easily with any other work since few other 
reliability studies have included expected costs. It is to be noted that the costs vary widely 
according to the type of joint, whether critical or non-critical, and the probability of failure.
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Figure 6.4 Reliability index values 







































500000 - Failure Costs
450000 -
400000 - Repair Costs
350000 -
300000 - Inspection Costs
250000 -
200000 - Total Cost
150000 -
100000 - ------- -  n n n
50000 -
0 -— H -----!-----1----- i-----1-----1-----1— 4 — 1----- i-----1-----i-----1-----1-----1-----
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Years
Figure 6.5 Costs fo r  joints with maintenance plans
(a) 01 and CV, weld>0.006, (b) 04 and EC, weld>0.006 (c) 15 and EC, weld>0.002
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If only costs are being taken into account, the constraints satisfaction scheduling then need only 
be considered explicitly for the most expensive joints. The joints for which the expected costs are 
very low can be included into the final schedule directly, wherever there are resources available. 
This is because it makes little practical difference to the total costs of the schedule if  a joint with 
maintenance plans costing in the order of 100 times less than the main joints is included in the 
schedule at its optimum minimal costs period.
6.4 C o n s t r a in t s  S a t is f a c t io n  S c h e d u l in g  in  t h e  RISC S y s t e m
The use of RISCREL, or any other software providing some form of utility measures, provides the 
initial data from which scheduling can be carried out taking into account constraints and available 
resources. This section discusses some of the constraints and then gives possible schedules and 
a combined schedule based on the expected costs information from RISCREL.
The main constraint is to ensure the integrity of the structure. For this reason, target reliability 
levels are set. The next constraint is the available time in which to carry out IRM activities. 
Finally, the estimated total costs are also considered to make a final decision on the best schedule 
to implement.
6.4.1 T arget Safety Levels
In the use of reliability analysis to decide on maintenance actions, it is necessary to set target 
reliability levels. Although in the RISC methodology decision-making is based mainly on costs 
evaluation, it is important to be assured that the final schedule of inspections does take threshold 
minimum reliability levels into account. The possible inspection times based on threshold 
reliability values are easily decided as was discussed in Section 5.2.4. The difficulty is in deciding 
what is a reasonable minimum allowable reliability value.
Much work has been carried out in setting appropriate target levels based on diverse considerations 
such as the consequences of failure, the value of the operation and the public perception of risk. 
One example of a set of reliability targets is that recommended by the Nordic Committee on 
Building Regulations (NKB) based on the consequences of failure and the mode of failure (Thoft- 
Christensen & Baker, 1982). If a component suffers brittle failure resulting in instability, which 
the NKB termed ‘failure type HI’, then this is more serious than if it suffers ductile failure, and in 
turn, ductile failure resulting in no reserve strength, termed “type II failure” is more serious than 
ductile failure with reserve strength due to strain hardening, or type I failure. A component which
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is important to the structure in that failure may lead to the collapse of the structure requires a higher 
reliability, relative to a failure for which the consequences are minimal.
The values in the NKB table were chosen to reflect the maximum probability of failure values 
acceptable. By considering the approximate relationship between reliability index p and the 
probability of failure POP as explained in Section 3.2 and given as
POP = 1 - 0 (p )  = 0  (-P ) 
the corresponding probability of failure values range from 10'^ to 10’^ .
Table 6.12 Nordic Building Com m ittee reliability  index ta rg e t levels
(6.3)
Failure Consequences Failure Type I Failu re  Type II F ailu re  Type III
Not serious 3.09 3.71 4.26
Serious 3.71 4.26 4.75
Very serious 4.26 4.75 5.20
In the offshore industry, the target levels for reliability have often been derived by reference to 
existing structures. An acceptable maximum probability of failure for production structures is 
considered to be 10^, which corresponds to a reliability index of 3.72 (MTD, 1989; Diamantidis 
et al, 1991).
Por inspection scheduling based on fatigue fracture as the only failure mechanism, then this 
corresponds to only one failure type. Thus the set of target reliability values for the RISC 
methodology requires only three values. If fatigue failure defined as the existence of a through 
crack is compared to the NBC categories, then as a through-crack almost certainly does not lead 
to instability and often such a failed joint will still be able to carry some load, fatigue failure may 
be of type 1.
In the RISC project, target reliability indices were proposed by the Registro Italiano Navale (RINA) 
based on the relative difficulties of accessing the joint for inspection and repair (Dharmavasan et 
al, 1994b). This criterion is o f value at the design stage when deciding the safety factors that 
should be applied to the design of the component. Por instance, if a joint cannot be easily repaired, 
then it is important to be assured that its reliability is high and hence the design should be 
appropriate to this requirement. Conversely an easy-to-access joint need not have a large safety 
factor applied to its strength since it would be possible to monitor it closely and to repair it if and 
when necessary. The results of inspection and repair can be used to update the reliability indices 
for the inspected joints and thus ensure the overall reliability of the structure.
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There were three categories with appropriate target reliability indices defined and these are given 
in Table 6.13. RINA proposed that this scheme be applied to inspection planning. Thus, if  a joint 
was considered to be of high importance, then inspection must be carried out before the reliability 
index falls below a threshold value of 3.4. Similarly, 3.0 and 2.4 represent minimum allowable 
values for the reliability of moderately important and less important joints.
Table 6.13 Reliability index target levels proposed in  RISC
Im portance Level C riteria T arget p
High members with no access for inspection and repair 3.4
Moderate members at or below the splash zone 3.0
Low members above the splash zone 2.4
There is an obvious logical problem with this scheme. The fact that a joint is very difficult to 
inspect does not increase the need for inspection. Further, if a joint cannot be accessed for 
inspection, then naturally it cannot be included in a programme of inspections. Even if it assumed 
that “no access” can be interpreted as “very difficult to inspect”, then a definition of “high 
importance” means only that costs of inspection for these joints are very high.
A scheme for deciding which joints it is important to inspect, irrespective of costs, must instead 
take into account the relative importance of the joint to the overall reliability of the structure. 
Redundancy and collapse analyses of a frame structure indicate the level of redundancy and thus 
identify the critical elements in the structure. Thus it is proposed to define the importance of the 
joint in terms of its criticality. As the definition of criticality has already been employed to set 
approximate failure costs for joints, it is proposed by the author that these categories are re-used 
together with the same target reliability levels as given above as given in Table 6.14 below.
Table 6.14 Reliability index target levels fo r the case study
Im portance  Level C riteria T arget p
Critical non-redundant joints 3.4
Non-critical joints with some redundancy 3.0
Minor joints which provide some stiffness only 2.4
Although the relative importance of joints is already incorporated into the cost evaluation of 
inspection plans via the failure costs, these target reliability values ensure that the safety of the 
structure is not compromised by economic considerations. The target p provides a fail-safe
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procedure in the selection of the optimal but appropriate inspection plans.
6.4.1.1 Effect on Maintenance Plans
Possible maintenance plans are restricted by the target reliability values. This means that if the P 
value of the joint falls below the threshold value for that joint just after inspection period IPn, then 
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Figure 6.6 Reliability index fo r  joints (a) 13 and (b) 16
An example of this situation arises for joint 13 for which the reliability index, even after updating, 
falls below the threshold value of 3.0 before year 10. A more extreme example is that o f the test 
joint case 16 of a joint of geometry with a crack detected (and which was not considered for the 
schedule), which drops to below the threshold value at year 2. This means that for joint 13, 
inspections should only take place in years 5 to 9 and for joint 16, an inspection must take place 
immediately.
Chapter 6 2 3 8
6.4.2 Using the Scheduling Module
The knowledge base system Scheduling module requires a text file containing the interpreted 
results from RISCREL in the form of the costs for a subset of possible actions for each joint under 
consideration. It was found that the expected costs of failure dominated the total costs. Only the 
joints which had the greatest expected costs were considered. The threshold was set at £100000.
The joints which had to be inspected at certain times, that is those restricted to only one 
maintenance plan at one inspection period, were ignored in that they would, in practice, be entered 
into the Scope of Work immediately. The remaining resources are then used to define the search 
tree for the combined constraints satisfaction scheduling carried out by the RISC KBS. It was 
found that when considering the threshold set on the maximum allowable expected costs for every 
maintenance plan, there were no restrictions on the inspection times for some for several joints. 
These then were also ignored as they can be added to the schedule after the automatic scheduling 
as required and wherever there are resources available.
The scheduling was based on only one of each joint case requiring inspection, since it is assumed 
the cracks will not grow in most joints as designed, particularly if they have already been inspected 
once. All joints which were found to have fatigue cracks in the past, are included in the schedule. 
In practice, if any unusual findings are made then the schedule would be updated at that point to 
inspect further sample joints of the same type.
6.4.2.1 Resources for the Search Tree
The search tree is created by allocating objects to the tree nodes (distinct from the nodes of the 
structure). For the example search, expected costs were the criterion employed for deciding when 
to inspect. The total resources were taken to be the total time available over the scheduling period. 
This was set at 15 inspections, thus only fifteen joints were to be considered and these are 01 to 
15. In practice, the resource measure would be an average of the number of inspections that can 
be carried out over five weather windows for a structure; for a structure of 1000+ nodes, 
corresponding to 3000+ joints, this would be at least in the order of 1000 inspections or 200 
inspections per weather window.
The tree was allocated five inspection periods from year 6 to year 10, corresponding to the general 
UK requirement that a Scope of Work for a five-year period be presented to the certification 
authorities. For the first combined schedule, each inspection period was allocated resources for 
three inspections only.
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6A.2.2 Alternative Actions
As explained earlier, joints which must be inspected at a certain time and joints for which many 
possible alternatives covering all possible inspection periods may be ignored when creating a 
practical schedule. So, to demonstrate the searching algorithm, from two to four possible actions 
were considered for each joint. The selected actions are listed below where IP stands for inspection 
period and the costs have been rounded up to the nearest £1000.
Table 6.15 List of actions fo r com bined scheduling
Jo in t Action (Inspection Technique, R epair C riteria) Cost (£k) IP
01 MPI, weld when >0.006 230 6
01 ACFM, weld when >0.006 234 7
01 ACFM, weld when >0.006 235 8
02 MPI, weld when >0.005 459 10
02 MPI, weld when >0.005 492 9
02 EC, weld when >0.005 512 7
02 EC, weld when >0.005 520 6
03 MPI, weld when >0.005 388 10
03 MPI, weld when >0.005 401 9
04 ACFM, weld when >0.006 322 6
04 ACFM, weld when >0.006 324 7
04 EC, weld when >0.006 354 8
05 MPI, weld when >0.006 230 6
05 ACFM, weld when >0.006 234 7
05 ACFM, weld when >0.006 235 8
06 MPI, weld when >0.005 478 10
06 MPI, weld when >0.005 501 9
06 EC, weld when >0.005 527 7
07 CV, weld when >0.005 488 6
07 MPI, weld when >0.005 511 10
07 MPI, weld when >0.005 562 9
08 ACFM, weld when >0.006 241 6
08 MPI, weld when >0.006 251 8
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Jo in t Action (Inspection Technique, Repair C riteria) Cost (£k) IP
08 ACFM, weld when >0.006 272 7
09 ACFM, weld when >0.006 435 7
09 MPI, weld when >0.003 479 10
09 MPI, weld when >0.003 498 9
10 EC, weld when >0.005 515 7
10 EC, weld when >0.005 520 6
10 MPI, weld when >0.006 540 6
11 CV, weld when >0.006 324 6
11 CV, weld when >0.006 335 7
11 MPI, weld when >0.005 349 10
12 MPI, weld when >0.001 492 9
12 MPI, weld when >0.001 512 8
12 MPI, weld when >0.001 520 7
13 MPI, weld when >0.005 488 9
13 MPI, weld when >0.005 499 10
13 ACFM, weld when >0.005 520 8
14 ACFM, weld when >0.002 524 7
14 ACFM, weld when >0.002 528 6
14 MPI, weld when >0.002 530 5
15 CV, weld when >0.002 122 6
15 ACFM, weld when >0.006 165 7
15 MPI, weld when >0.005 175 10
6.4.3 Exam ple Program m es of IR M  Actions
The initial schedule is made up of the minimal cost actions for each joint and is shown in Table 
6.16 overleaf. This schedule has a corresponding estimated total cost of £5729000, given by the 
sum of the expected cost for each action.
Given that there is a maximum of three inspections allowed for each inspection period, the 
inspection period 6 has too many inspections allocated to it and inspection periods 8 and 9 are 
under-utilised. Thus a search is carried out for a schedule which levels out the resource usage.
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Table 6.16 Initial schedule of inspections
Y ear List of required  IRM  resources G eneral region of inspection
Node-ED Joint- Inspection Technique R epair C rite ria [Cost (£k)]
ED
Y ear 6 ACFM, MPI, CV
lA l 01 MPI 0.006m 230
2A3 04 ACFM 0.006m 322
2A1 05 ACFM 0.005m 230
07 CV 0.005m 488
08 ACFM 0.006m 241
11 CV 0.006m 325
15 CV 0.002 122
Y ear 7 ACFM, EC
09 ACFM 0.006m 435
10 EC 0.005m 515
14 ACFM 0.006m 524
Y ear 8 none
Y ear 9 MPI
12 MPI 0.005m 492
13 MPI 0.005m 488
Y ear 10 MPI, EC
02 MPI 0.005m 459
03 MPI 0.005m 388
06 EC 0.005m 478
Resources could be re-allocated to the inspection periods which require them. For example in the 
initial schedule, since no optimal actions exist for inspection period 8, the operator may decide that 
no inspection should be carried out that year. Instead the resources from year 8 are re-allocated to 
year 1, and perhaps years 7 and 10. Certainly, resource allocation would need to be carried out in 
the case that the initial schedule has a positive total resource deficit (TRD), since this indicates that 




Three searching techniques have been implemented in the RISC KBS and each one will provide 
a different proposal for a schedule. The search tree corresponding to the initial schedule is easily 
built, and is shown below in Figure 6.7. The leaf nodes of the possible actions for only joint 14 
are given, as an example, and the year 7 action is in the initial schedule.
TRD=()
Year 10Year 9Year 8Year 7Year 6
R D = 4 R D = 0 R D = -3 R D=-1 R D = 0
101 104 105 107 106 111 115 112 113 102 103 106
year? year 6
ACFM, R_Rep=0.002 ACFM, R_Rep=0.002
years 
MPI, R_Rep=0.002
Figure 6.7 Search tree fo r  the initial schedule
Using depth-first searching, the first inspection period, year 6, is considered first as it has a positive 
resource deficit. Searching this branch, the first joint, 01, is considered for reallocation. Each 
alternative action for 01 is considered in turn and the action for year 7 is discarded as year 7 has 
no resources available, so the action for year 8 is selected. Joint 01 is removed from year 6 and 
reallocated to year 8. As year 6 now has RD=3, the next joint, 04, is considered for reallocation. 
It can be seen that joint 04 has an alternative action for year 8 and this is selected. The procedure 
continues in this manner, until year 6 has RD=0.
The search then focuses on the next inspection period with a positive RD, and the search continues 
down this branch. As it happens, the resources are levelled for this tree once year 6 has been 
considered. Table 6.17 shows the final allocation of joint inspections to each inspection period and 
the costs for each action. From this the new total estimated cost is then £5853000.
Using breadth-first search, the target branch changes to the next branch one level up from the point 
at which the search has failed. The first inspection period to be targeted is also year 6, and the first 
joint considered is 01. Assuming that the leaf nodes of the tree, that is the actions, are ordered by
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cost (as in Table 6.16), then the search fails when the first alternative action checked is one for year 
7. The next joint, here 04, is considered. The search also fails here as the first alternative is also 
for a year with non-positive RD; similarly for joints 05 and 07. The first alternative for joint 08 
is for year 8 and so joint 08 is re-allocated to year 8. As joints 11 and 15 also have as first 
alternatives actions for year 7, these are also not re-allocated.
At this point, year 6 has RD = 3 so the search procedure would then focus on the next inspection 
period with a positive RD. For this example, year 6 is the only year with a positive RD and the 
search moves back down and considers the second alternatives for each joint. Joints 01 and 04 are 
re-allocated to year 8, which is then fully utilised, and joint 07 is re-allocated to year 9. The search 
then ends here as all inspection periods have now non-positive RD values. The proposed schedule 
is as in the Table 6.18. and the total estimated cost for this proposed schedule is £5862000.
Table 6.17 Schedule of inspections from  depth  firs t search
Y ear Joints Cost of IRM  Action (k£)
6 08 ,11 ,15 241+325+122
7 09, 10, 14 435+515+524
8 01 ,04 ,05 235+354+235
9 12, 13,07 492+488+562
10 02 ,03 ,06 459+388+478
Total Cost 5853
Table 6.18 Schedule of inspections from  b read th -firs t search
Y ear Joints Cost of IRM  Action (k£)
6 05 ,11 ,15 234+325+122
7 09, 10,14 435+515+524
8 08, 01,04 251+235+354
9 12, 13,07 492+488+562
10 02, 03,06 459+388+478
Total Cost 5862
As can be appreciated from the above examples, depth-first and breadth-first methods will give 
very different results according to the ordering of the nodes in the tree. The assumption has been
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that the nodes are ordered by name first and then cost second. Variations, such as random ordering 
perhaps, or reverse ordering, could be tried for alternatives schedules. Best-first searching, 
however, minimises the effects of the ordering of the nodes.
In best-first searches, the choice of branch depends on the expected result. For this application, 
there is a look-ahead step which considers which inspection period has greatest resource usage and 
which alternative action will result in the least increase in total cost for the schedule. The first 
inspection period to be targeted is the one with the highest RD value, which again is year 6. Of the 
joints allocated to this inspection period, 04 has an alternative action for year 7 which would 
increase the total cost by £2000 only. As year 7 has RD = 0 ,04  cannot be re-allocated and the next 
best alternative is considered. There are two possibilities, 01 and 05, each increasing the overall 
cost by £4000 and both for year and hence cannot be reallocated. Joints 01 and 05 also have 
alternatives with increased costs of £5000, both for year 8, so both are reallocated as year 8 has 
RD<-2. The next re-allocations are of joint 08 to year 8 with an increased cost of £10000 and joint 
07 to year 9 with increased cost of £74000. This proposed schedule is shown in Table 6.19 and has 
total estimated costs of £5823000.
Table 6.19 Schedule of inspections from  best-first search
Y ear Joints Cost of IRM  Action
(k£)
6 04,11, 15 322+325+122
7 09, 10,14 435+515+524
8 01,05, 08 235+235+251
9 12, 13,07 492+488+562
10 0 2 ,0 3 ,0 6 459+388+478
This procedure may be modified for the short, but wide search trees that are constructed for this 
application to allow the best of all the alternatives, irrespective of the inspection period to be 
considered for re-allocation. For this specific example, however, such a procedure would make 
little practical difference.
6.4.B.2 Heuristics-based Searching and Multiple Constraints
The scheduling above has only taken into account costs and time constraints. No other constraint 
other than a maximum number of inspections that can be carried out in one weather window was 
considered in the simple example above. Examples of other constraints to be considered include
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1. Costs, as well as time, may be restricted in any one weather window.
2. There may be restrictions on the use of NDT or repair equipment, so that if an inspection 
task requires the use of ACFM equipment, say, then it should not be the only such task and 
furthermore, a good proportion, if not all of the other ACFM inspection tasks should also 
be carried out during the same weather window.
3. Joints on one node and neighbouring nodes need to be inspected at the same time to avoid 
moving unnecessarily the inspection vessel in any one weather window.
To allow consideration of general soft and quantifiable resources, a metric for the vector of 
resource deficits for each inspection period i RD(i) can be defined. This is a weighted linear sum 
of the resources which will favour preferred constraints and which can then replace the cost value 
as the criterion for the best-first search.
For non-quantitative constraints, such as “ACFM is the preferred inspection technique”, a heuristic 
search strategy was devised to find a best solution in terms of cost or other criteria defined using 
heuristics about constitutes a good schedule. For neighbouring joints to be taiken into account, 
some way of identifying geographical proximity is required. This may be carried out by the use 
of heuristics based on the structural model or by the use of a metric representing the distance of the 
joint from other joints.
Figure 6.8 shows the heuristic-based search method written in ProTalk incorporating a total 
resource cost check into a breadth-first search method. The fwncûon focus_on_next _action, with 
functions focus _on_next_action_period and focus _onjiext_component embedded within it, forces 
the search from upper to lower branches of the tree. Function update_schedule is the constraint 
propagation procedure used to update the schedule and to recalculate resource deficits.
At the component level, before the system searches breadth-first through the tree, all the component 
nodes are sorted by the function SortBySlot, to ensure that the less expensive actions are considered 
first. Thus this search procedure is in effect a variation on the best-first search. An extension to 
the RISC System would be to allow SortBySlot to order components according to some other 
criteria should another analysis program, other than RISCREL, providing another measure of utility 
for an action be incorporated into the system.
The important function to note is test_candidate_action as this invokes a set of rules to check the 
constraints for the possibility of using the tested action. In this way, the best-first search algorithm 
has been generalised to allow a combination of quantitative criteria and heuristics to be used to 
define the “best” node to consider next.
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function heuristic_tesed_search_inethod ()
{for ?acticxi_pericxi inlist all instanceof acticn_periods;
(±> { ?k  = 1;
viiile {?k< init_schec3Lile. no_of_total_al tetxiative_a!Ctic3ns ;
?acticn_period.resource_deficit > 0;} 
do { ?candidate_actiCTi_list = Null;
for ?carpcŒnt inlist all Tactiœrperiod. ccnpanaits ;
<±) {fcxnjs_cn_n£Kt_acticn{?catpcinQit) ; ?k  = ?k  + 1 ; }  
for ?ccnponent inlist all ?acticn_period.cxirpanents; 
do{?nl = ?ccirpanent. cu]n3ait_actiŒLPO ;
?n2 = ?carpcfliQit.previous_acticn_no;
?current_action = LdstNthjeHl ?carpcosnt.actiœs, ?nl) ; 
?p]3evious_actian = LdstNthiall ?ccirpanait.actions, ?n2); 
?cx3ipanent. cost_increase = ?current:^ctian. cost -
pir?e^ nous_acticn.cost;} ; 
SortBySlot (all ?acticn_p6ariod. carpcoaitS/ cost_increase, >" ) ; 
for ?ccnpanents inlist all ?actian_period.ccnpanaits; 
do{if ?ccnpDnent.cw2n:mt_acticn_no <
?carpan€nt. total_acticn_no ; 
then{?actian=ListNth( all ?ccirpcoent.actions,
?carpco3it.ciiiTmt_ac±.iQn_rio) ; 
if test_candicfete_actic 2n(?actian_perlod, Tcarpanent,
?action)= IRJE; 
then ipcfet^ scfayij7e(?acticn_pe3d.od, ?carpœait, ?acticn);}
}}}
Figure 6.8 Heuristics-based search algorithm  
6 .4.33 Selection of a Programme
The best-first algorithm can reduce the cost of a new schedule significantly when the numbers of 
actions and components are large, compared with normal depth-first or breadth-first search 
methods. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the costs may vary according to the 
number joints which can be inspected in one shift by one diver, and hence the total costs, whether 
the output of cost evaluation or based on a combined total resource check, are only an estimate of 
the cost. The use of several searching techniques provides several usable schedules.
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These simple searching techniques provide a powerful way of providing the expert user with 
several possible rational alternative schedules from the RISCREL cost evaluation output. The final 
decision would depend on the operator’s in-depth knowledge of the resources which may be varied 
based on the initial schedules found by the RISC KBS. The changes in the resources can then fed 
back into the RISC KBS to allow the operator to view how these changes affect the expected costs 
for a schedule, as part of a “what-if ’ analysis.
6.5 D iscu ssio n
The case presented here shows how RISCREL results may be used to provide rational schedules 
based on costs and time constraints. The procedure is a generalised scheduling algorithm which 
may be extended to allow any combination of resources and soft resource constraints to be 
considered.
Hard constraints are assumed to have been dealt with before constructing the initial scheduling tree. 
For instance, a hard constraint which has already been considered is that of safety: inspections must 
take place before the reliability index falls below some threshold value. Other hard constraints, 
such as “all damaged joints must be inspected immediately”, are dealt with very simply: the actions 
are added to the tree and no alternatives are allowed.
In general, incorporating any hard constraints requires modifications to the tree by eliminating non- 
permissable actions and adding must-happen actions. At the moment, hard constraints are dealt 
with by the ad hoc application of heuristics. No facility has yet been provided for updating the 
scheduling search tree in a systematic way. Furthermore, the scheme does not include ways to 
handle overlong searches or the situation that there are no solutions. To overcome both of these 
problems automatically may require more advanced features such as constraint network analysis 
combined with constraint relaxation techniques. It may be that only a simple check with the user 
for permission to continue or quit the searching is required. Another simple facility is to allow the 
user to make changes to the resource allocation dynamically, that is, part way through a search.
The case study highlights the data required for the reliability analysis and some of the issues. This 
example of the searching algorithms in use illustrates their effectiveness. The next step to develop 
this scheme further would be to trial the RISC System within an operator organisation and observe 
maintenance engineers using the Constraints Satisfaction (CS) Scheduling module. From such an 
exercise, it will be possible to formulate the requirements for more advanced automatic intelligent 
features to support their decisions.
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I Table 6.20 RISCREL Input data
stru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL X Dist M/
P








Joint_Geometry Member_Thickness double Chord or brace thickness in meter 
units
T.CHORD 1 3 m if Crack-Location = Brace, then 
T_CHORD = Brace.Thickness, else 
T_CIIORD = Chord.Tliickness
dlO% 0 0
CiacleGcoiiictry liiilial_Dcp(h double Initial crack depth or at last
Inspection
AO 2 3 m TNO to recommend Initial value, 
if Joint.Inspected = Yes then AO = 
Joint.Lastlnspection.Crack.Depth else AO 
= Structure.InitialCrackDepth (default 
0.15 mm)
dlO% 0 0
Crack_Geometry IniliaLLength double Initial crack half length or at last
Inspection
CO 3 3 m TNO to recommend initial values, 
if Joint.Inspected = Yes then CO = 
Joint.Lastlnspection.CrackLength else 
AO = Stiucture.InitialCrackJILength 
(default 0.75mm)
dIO% 0 0
Crack_Geometry Member_Thickness_AWR double Member thickness after weld 
repair
T_R1 4 3 m Same value as member thickness. 
= T_CHORD
dlO% 0 0
Crack_Geometry Initial _Depth_AWR double Initial crack depth after weld 
repair
AO_Rl 5 3 m TNO to recommend, 
default 0.15 nun
dlO% 0 0
Crack_Geometry lnitial_Lenglh_AWR double Initial crack length after weld 
repair
CO_RI 6 3 m TNO to recommend, 
default 0.75mm
dlO% 0 0
Crack_Gcometry Member.Thickness.AGR double Member thickness after Grind 
repair
T_R2 7 3 m RINA to recommend.
= (T_CIIORD - Grind.Depth) and 
Grind.Depth default 2 mm
dlO% 0 0
Crack_Geomctry Initial _Depth_AGR double Initial crack depth after Grind 
repair




Crack_Geomclry Initial_Length_AGR double Initial crack length after Grind 
repair




Load_Input WASR double Weighted Average Stress Range 
(MPa)
WASR 10 2 m UCL to carryout study. 
Set-Up values.
dlO% 0 0
I stru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL X Dist M/
P








Load_Input Weibull_A double Weibull-A Parameter to calculate 
Exceedence Curve
WeibulLA II 3 m UCL to carryout study. 
Set-Up values.
dlO% 0 0
Load_lnput Weibull_B double Weibull-B Parameter to calculate 
Exceedence Curve
WeibulLB 12 3 m UCL to carryout study. 
Set-Up values.
dIO% 0 0
Mnk'riai.Iii|Hil Paris.C: double Paris Constant C 1 for the 
material
Paris.Cl 13 3 m From HLMDB DB DB DB
Material_Input Paris_C double Paris Constant C 2 for the 
material
Paris_C2 14 3 m From HLMDB DB DO DO
Material_Input Paris_C double Paris Constant C 3 for the 
material
Paris_C3 IS 3 m From HLMDB DB DB DB
Material_Input Paris_C double Paris Constant C 4 for the 
material
Paris_C4 16 3 m From HLMDB DB DB DB
Material_Input Paris_C double Paris Constant C 5 for the 
material
Paris_C5 17 3 III From HLMDB DB DB DB
Material.Input Paris_C_AWR double Paris Constant C 1 after weld 
repair
Paris 1 18 3 m = Paris_Cl DB DB DB
Malerial_Input Paris_C_AWR double Paris Constant C 2 after weld 
repair
Paris2 19 3 m = Paris_C2 DB DB DB
Material_Input Paris_C_AWR double Paris Constant C 3 after weld 
repair
Paris3 20 3 m = Paris_C3 DB DB DB
Ma(criaLIii|Hit Parls_C_AWR double Paris Constant C 4 after weld 
repair
Paris4 21 3 III = Paris_C4 DB DO DO
Material_Input Paris_C_AWR double Paris Constant C 5 after weld 
repair
Paris5 22 3 m = Paris_C5 DB DB DB
Weld_Geometry Weld_Toe_Radius double Weld toe radius in meter units W_T_R 23 2 m Set-Up value, 
default 0.5 mm
dlO% 0 0





I stru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL X Dist M/
F








Weld_Geometry Weld_Angle double Weld angle in degrees W .ANG 25 2 m RINA Range of values 45 to 70 deg 
sJoint.WeldAngle
dlO% 0 0
WeId_Geomelry Weld_Toe_Radius_AGR double Weld toe radius in meter units for 
Grind repair
W_T_R_G 26 2 m RINA 4 to 5 mm. 
default = 4 mm
or else = Grindlnstrument.Radius
dlO% 0 0
Weld_Geometry Weld_Lenglh_AGR double Weld leg length in m units for 
grind repair
W_LEN_0 27 2 m = W_LEN dIO% 0 0
Weld_Geometry Weld_Angle_AGR double Weld angle in degrees for grind 
repair
W_ANG_G 28 2 m = W_ANG dlO% 0 0
Wcld_Geoinelry Weld_Toe_Radius_AWR double Weld toe radius in meter units for 
weld repair
W_T_R_W 29 2 m = W_T_R dlO% 0 0
Weld_Geomclry Weld_Lcngth_AWR double Weld leg length in m units for 
weld repair
W_LEN_W 30 2 m RINA Longer than W _LEN.
= W_LEN + WeldRepair.AddedLength
dlO% 0 0
Weld_Geomelry Weld_Angle_AWR double Weld angle in degrees for weld 
repair
W_ANG_W 31 2 m = W_ANG dlO% 0 0
Inspection_Method Peif.EpsilonI double Performed Inspection 
Uncertainty for method 1
Epsilon 1 32 2 m WDD to recommend MPI value. 
From inspection DB
DB DB DB
double Epsilonl 33 NOT Used
double EpsiIon3 34 NOT Used
double EpsiIon4 35 NOT Used
double Epsilon) 36 NOT Used
double Epsilond 37 NOT Used
InspeclioD_Method Perf.PODI double Performed Inspection POD for 
method 1
PODI 38 4 o r
9
P WDD to recommend MPI value. 
From inspection DB
DB DB DB
double POD2 39 NOT Used
double POD3 40 NOT Used
double P0D4 41 NOT Used
I stru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL X Dist M/P Remarks and KBS Derivation of mean value 2ndM/P 3rdM/I* 4thM/P
double POD5 42 NOT Used
double P0D6 43 NOT Used
I nspection_Met]iod Plan.Epsilonl double Planned Inspection Uncertainty 
for method 1
Epsilon_Pl 44 2 m WDD to recommend MPI value. 
From inspection DB
DB DB DB
double Epsilon_P2 45 NOT Used
double Epsilon_P3 46 NOT Used
double Epsilon_P4 47 NOT Used
double Epsilon_P5 48 NOT Used
double Epsilon_P5 49 NOT Used
I nspec(ion_Method Plan_PODl double Planned Inspection POD for 
method 1
POD_Pl 50 4 or 
9
P WDD to recommend MPI value. 
From inspection DB
DB DB DB
Plan_POD2 double POD_P2 51 NOT Used
Plan_POD3 double POD_P3 52 NOT Used
Plan_P0D4 double P0D_P4 53 NOT Used
Plan.PODS double P0D_P5 54 NOT Used
Plan_POD6 double POD_P6 55 NOT Used
R6 Data Praclure.Toughness double Fracture toughness of the 
material
SKIC 56 NOT Used
R6_Data Yield Stress double Yield stress SIGY 57 NOT Used
R6_Data Residua!_Stre5s double Residual Stress SIGR 58 NOT Used
R6_Data HS double Significant Wave height HS 59 NOT Used
R6_Da(a TZ double Zero Crossing Period TZ 60 NOT Used
R6_Data SS double Stress Process SS 61 NOT Used
î Tlie following lists the param eters used in  RISCREL.
stru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL PVEC Remarks KBS Derivation of mean value
Analysis_Control Anaiysis_Stalus enum 1= Initialise, 2= Normal, 3= Error, 
4= Internal Use
AS 1 Used internally. 1
Analysis_ControI Error.Returned integer Error Code EC 2 Used internally 0
Joint_Geometry Crilical_C_Deplh_Ralio double Critical Crack depth as a 
percentage of member thickness
CR_C_D 3 default 90
Load_Input Loading_Method enum 1=WASR, 2= Weibull, 3=SRPD L.METH 4 Option 3 not implemented also current 
usage has different options number
if Joint-LoadData.Method = WASR 
then L_METH = 1 else if 
Joint LoadData Method = Weibull 
then = 2 else =3
Load.Input Cycles_Year double Number of Cycles per year CYC_Y 5 Obtained from ULDAN value set at Set-Up
Load_Input Bias_Factor double Weibull Bias Factor BIAS_F 6 Setup Load.WeibullBiasFactor default 1
CFA_Inpul Depth_Growlh_Law enum 1 = Linear Paris, 2= Threshold 
Paris, 3= Forman Paris
D_G_L 7 Currently only options 1 and 8 are 
being used
default 1
CFA_Input Lenglh_Growth_Law enum 1= Linear Paris, 2=Threshold 
Modification, 3=Forman 
Modification, 4=Forcing Function, 
5=Tubular X-joint Forcing 
Function, 6=Vosikovsky, 7=Uscr 
defined, 8 = new option
L_G_L 8 Currently only option 1 is used default 1
but if SIF_M = 1 or 2 then L_G_L = 0
CFA_Inpul No_of_Scgmcnls integer Number of segments t l  to 5) D_SEG 9 From HLMDB
Cl'A_ Input Paris_ni doubleO Paris exponent ml for the material PAR_MI 10 From HLMDB
CFA_Input Faris_m doublet) Paris exponent m2 for the material PAR_M2 11 From HLMDB
CFA_Input Paris_m doublet) Paris exponent m3 for the material PAR_M3 12 From HLMDB
C FA Jnput Paris_m doublet) Paris exponent m4 for the material PAR_M4 13 From HLMDB
CFA_!nput Paris_m doubleO Paris exponent m 5 for the 
material
PAR_M5 14 From HLMDB
CFA_Input Cl_Faclot double C l Factor for Quadratic Forcing 
Function (Dijkstra)
C l IS Required for option 4 of L_G_L default 0
I stru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL PVEC Remarks KBS Derivation of mean value
CFA_Input C2_Factor double C2 Factor for Quadratic Forcing 
Function (Dijkstra)
C2 16 Required for option 4 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_Input X_Joint_Diameter double Diameter of Tubular X-joint 
Forcing Function (TNO)
X_J_DI 17 Required for options 5 or 8 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_Inpul ar doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Arl 18 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_Inpul ar doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Ar2 19 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_Input ar doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Ar3 20 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_Input ar doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Ar4 21 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_Input ar doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Ar5 22 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_ Input cr doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Crl 23 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_ Input cr doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Cr2 24 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA cr doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Cr3 25 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA Input cr doubleO User defined fwcing function 
array
Cr4 26 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_Input cr doubleO User defined forcing function 
array
Cr5 27 Required for option 7 of L_G_L default 0
CFA_Input SIF_Method enum 1= AYS, 2= TPM, 3=Holdbrook- 
Dover, 4=Newman-Raju, 
5=Srawley-Brown-Orange-Wilson
SIF_M 28 If 1 or 2 then L_G_L is not necessary default 4
CFA_Input BM.Reiationship enum l=No decay, 2= Linear bending 
decay, 3=Quadratic Bending 
decay
B_M_Eq 29 default 1
s tru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL PVEC Remarks KBS Derivation of mean value
CFA_Input Iiii(ial_DM_Ra(io double Initial Bending to Membrane 
stress ratio
I_BM_R 30 default 1.0
CFA_Input Pure.Bending double Pure bending case P.BEND 31 If this is 1 then I_BM_R not used default 0
CFA_Input SCF_Hot_Spot double Hotspot Stress Concentration 
Factor
HS.SCF 32 Only used by A VS/TPM if SlF.METllOD = 1 or 2 then = 
Joint LoadData.HotSpotSCF
CFA_Input SCF_Average double Average Stress Concentration 
Factor
AV.SCF 33 Only used by AVS/TPM if SlF_METHOD = 1 or 2 then = 
Joint.LoadData.AverageSCF
CFA_Input Geometry_Parameter double Beta ratio of the Joint for TPM or 
AYS method
GEO_P 34 Only used by AVS/TPM if S1F_METH0D = 1 or 2 then = 
Joint.Beta (Joint. Bela =
Joint BraceThickncss/
Joint .ChordThickness)




MK.FAC 35 Currently only options 3 or 4 are used = Joint.CFAnalysis.MK_Factor
CFA_lnpul Half_Plale_WidU» double Half Plate Width for SIP 
calculation of Finite Width plate
H_P_WI 36 TNO Usually infinity (which is input as 
0)
default 0
CFA_Input 3D_MRF_0MMA double 3D Membrane reduction for depth 
Mk-OMMA
OMMA 37 default 0.9
CF'A..Iii| hi( 3D MMLOMMC double 3D Membrane reduction for length 
MkOMMC
OMMC 38 default 0.8
( FA 3D.MRF’..()M0A double 3D Bending reduction fur depth 
Mk-OMBA
ÜMDA 39 default 0.9
CFA_Input 3D_MRF_OMBC double 3D Bending reduction for Length 
Mk-OMBC
OMBC 40 default 0.8
CFA_lnput Integration.Control enum l=Percentage increment, 
2=Tolerance
INT.C 41 TNO Always, but error in code 
whereby 0 = %, 1 = tolerance
default 0 (see error)
CFA_Input Increment.Percent double ' Increment percentage for 
integration
ALPHA 42 N otusediflN T_C = 2 default 5
CFA_Input Tolerance double Tolerance TOL 43 N o tu sed iflN T _ C = l default 0
I stru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL PVEC Remarks KBS Derivation of mean value
CFA_Inpul Thrcshold_Mod_Depth double Threshold value for Depth 
direction
TH_M_D 44 TNO Not Used default 0
CFA_Input Forman_Deplh_l double Forman Modification Factor Kcr 
for Depth
F0R_D1 45 TNO Not Used default 0
CFA_Inpul Forman_Deplli_2 double Forman Modification Factor R for 
Depth
FOR.D2 46 TNO Not Used default 0
Plan_Input Design_Year integer Design Life of the structure in 
years
L.TIME 47 Given with structure default 25
Plan_Inpul Depth_Last_Inspec(ion double Depth at Last inspection A.INSP 48 Stored with inspection history of joint = AO
Plan_Input Ycar_of_lnspection double Year of Inspection Y.INSP 49 Stored with inspection history of Joint
Plan_Input Year_Plan_Inspection double Year of Planned Inspection Y.PLAN 50 Sensitivity study carried out on this 
parameter
default 5




Plan_Input Cosl_of_Failure double Cost of failure C.FAIL 52 Given for each node = Node.CostOfFailure
Plan.Input Cost_of.Grinding double Cost of Repair 1, Grinding C.R EPl 53 Given for each node = Node.CostGrindRepair
Plan_Input Cost_of_Weiding double Cost of Repair 2, Welding C.REP2 54 Given for each node = Node.CostWeldRepair
IMnn ('(xsl. of Inspcciionl double Cost of Inspection of Inspection 
type 1
C IJN S 55 From inpection DD, and from list of 
maintenance plans generated for Joint




P lan jnpu t Cost_of_Inspection2 double Cost of Inspection of Inspection 
type 2
C 2JN S 56 Not used 0
Plan.Input Cosl_of_I nspeci ion3 double Cost of Inspection of Inspection 
type 3
C3.INS 57 Not used 0
Pian.Input Cosl_of_I nspectiond double Cost of Inspection of Inspection 
typed
C4.INS 58 Not used 0
Plan_Input Cost_of_Inspcction5 double Cost of Inspection of Inspection 
ty p es
C5.INS 59 Not used 0
î Structure Variable Type Description RISCREL PVEC Remarks KBS Derivation of mean valuePlanjiiput CosLofJnspeclionô double Cost of Inspection of Inspection 
type 6
C6.INS 60 Not used 0
Plan_Input Per_Insp_Type integer Performed Inspection 
Type(Method ! to 6)
LTYPD 61 Set to I I
Pian.Input Plan_Insp_Type integer Planned Inspection Type (Method 
I to 6 )
LTYPP 62 Set to 1 I
Plai)_Iiiput Prescn(_Capilal double Present Year of Capitalisation Y.CAPI 63 Given with structure =Structure.Year01Capitalisation
Plan_Input Rate_of_Interest double Real Rate of Interest R.RATE 64 Given with structure =Structure.InfIationRate
R6_Data Wave_Direction_R6 double Wave direction for R6 Failure W_DIR 65 Not used 0
R6_Da(a Zero_Cross_Perlod double Zero crossing Period in seconds TZ 66 Not used 0
Tlie following are RISCREL analysis control parameters, not used by the limit state function.
s tru c tu re Variable Type Description RISCREL KBS Derivation of Value
Analysis_Control IMTask integer RISCREL control parameter Task: 0=Updated 
Reliability, 1= Cost Evaluation
IMTask For Scheduling =1, At Setup and at updating from Observations = 0
Analysis_Control INSP integer RISCREL control parameter Inspection event: 1 
=(crack size= observed size), 2=(crack<observed ), 
3=(crack>observed ), 4 = no detection
INSP if no detection or no inspection then INSP=4 else default INSP =1
Codes used in the above tables are:





M/P m Moments are used for the 
distribution description.
M/P P Parameters are used for the 
distribution description.
2nd M/P dUO% Default value is 00% of mean 
value.
7 A u t o m a t e d  In spe c tio n
This chapter addresses the use of intelligent systems for the automatic interpretation of inspection 
results. Since data on the reliability of an inspection method and the interpretations of inspection 
results are important as input to the reliability analysis, it is valuable to consider ways in which the 
reliability of any inspection technique may be improved and the interpretation o f an inspection 
result made be made more consistent.
The requirements of the project AIRES (Automated Image Recognition using Expert Systems) are 
given. The aim of the AIRES project was to provide the technology for automated total surface 
inspection of components or materials during both production and service by using an expert 
system framework to provide image reconstmction from multiple sensors. For this an integrated 
software and multi-sensor system was developed and this is next described. Details of the 
knowledge representation for the AIRES system are given. Finally, the shortcomings of the 
approach to the AIRES work together with aspects of data fusion and knowledge representation 
are outlined.
7.1 In tr o d u ctio n  to  T he  AIRES System
The primary requirements of an automated inspection system are to identify defects, surface 
condition, roughness and material quality. For this, several different non-destmctive testing (NDT) 
methods are best used to characterise the surface defects, such as cracks or pits, or the general 
quality of component surfaces, such as corrosion.
To automate the inspection process requires an understanding the behaviour of the sensors and 
methods of interpreting the sensor data. It was found in the work here described that it is not 
necessarily a trivial exercise to interpret the results obtained from an NDT tool. Formal 
interpretation procedures may exist, but may be based on idealised conditions and in practice 
human experts will modify the procedures according to the situation. In addition, when trying to 
make definite decisions about the existence of flaws, it is necessary to use more than one NDT 
method, often based on two different physical principles, such as magnetic particle inspection and 
ultrasonics, or close visual inspection and the ACFM technique.
The Automated Image Reconstruction using Expert Systems, AIRES, system was developed to 
combine vision and electromagnetic sensors to locate, classify and characterise surface flaws in 
automobile components. The interpretation of the information gathered from the sensors was 
carried out by specially developed software modules which were integrated into an expert system
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development tool based on the blackboard model. The AIRES software is a blackboard-based 
expert system which carries out interpretation of the signals from a visual (VS) sensor and an 
electromagnetic (EM) sensor. The electromagnetic sensor is an alternating current field 
measurement (ACFM) probe (Collins et al, 1990).
The following sections describe the software architecture used to integrate the different areas of 
expertise necessary to provide automated defect classification and characterisation using 
electromagnetic sensors.
7.1.1 The Electrom agnetic ACFM  Inspection Technique
The electromagnetic sensor used in this work was based on the alternating current field 
measurement (ACFM) technique (Dover & Collins, 1980; Collins et al, 1990). This technique was 
developed at University College London for the detection and sizing of surface cracks and defects 
in metallic structures and components.
Under appropriate conditions, if an alternating current is induced in a surface, the magnetic field 
above the surface will vary according to the geometry of the surface. To investigate the geometry 
of a component or structure, and thus to detect and size cracks and other surface defects, a current 
is induced in the surface, usually by an inducing coil suspended above it, and the magnetic field 
(B) over the surface is then recorded.
7.1.1.1 The Electromagnetic Field Data
There is a broad correlation between the nature of the magnetic field and the features of the surface. 
An example of the magnetic field components, By, B,, in the three axis x, y  and z  respectively 
as predicted by electromagnetic theory for a crack of length 8mm and depth 1mm in a flat surface 
is shown in Figure 7.1, where the unit of the x  and y  axes are 1mm. Typically, human experts are 
able to identify defects from such graphs of sensor data. It is the task of the AIRES software to 
automate the use of B data to determine the surface characteristics.
7.1.1.2 The ACFM Sensor
The sensor used to record the magnetic field data is illustrated in Figure 7.2. An inducing solenoid 
is suspended above an array of magnetic field sensors, which are cylindrical coils arranged in a 10 
by 12 array. A coil can only record the field in the direction of its axis, so they are placed as 
shown: alternating in each of the three x  y  and z directions. To record a complete set of 10 by 10 
magnetic field data, the sensor is placed in three adjacent positions on the surface. The 
electromagnetic sensor outputs matrices giving the x, y, and z components of the magnetic field 
over the surface.
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Figure 7.1 The magnetic fie ld  B over a crack (horizontal plane corresponds to the surface o f  
the component, the crack lies in centre in direction from  fro n t left to back right)
Inducing 1 Inducing 1
Solenoid
Magnetic field sensois Magnetic field sensois
□cx>l!]noDaoDcx> 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Front View Side View
Figure 7.2 Schematic diagram o f  the ACFM probe showing arrangement o f  coils
The solenoidally induced field is not uniform. To apply a first-order correction to this non-linear 
phenomenon, the probe is used to scan a flat featureless surface and this background reading 
subtracted from scans for investigation. This procedure will also offer some correction for 
irregularities and noise in the magnetic sensor coils. Use of more than one solenoid, in an 
appropriate geometric formation, can make the induced field more uniform (Zhou et al, 1993).
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7.12 The Architecture and Requirements of the AIRES KBS System
The AIRES project used electromagnetic and vision inspection techniques to detect, classify, and 
characterise defects in machined metal components. Defects must first be identified and then 
classified and characterised automatically, by initially making use of expert knowledge about the 
inspection sensor employed and then by combining the results o f both.
One way of automating the interpretation of inspection data is to produce software which imitates 
the procedures and reasoning used by a human expert inspector. For this the software will need 
to store and manipulate information related to:
• the component being inspected
• the sensor employed and its mode of operation
• sensor data interpretation procedures
• comparison of different inspection technique data or data fusion
One type of software architecture which is particularly suitable for the interpretation of 
multi-sensor data is that of the blackboard architecture.
7.1.2.1 Architecture of the Knowledge Base System
The electromagnetic and vision sensor data analysis routines were incorporated within a 
architecture based on blackboard system concepts. The architecture of the knowledge base system 
is illustrated in Figure 7.3.

















Figure 7.3 Knowledge base system structure fo r  AIRES
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The blackboard architecture is described by Feigenbaum, in Englemore and Morgan (1988), as the 
most general and flexible knowledge-based architecture. In particular, it allows several levels of 
sub-systems to interact. The main sub-systems here are the electromagnetic sub-system including 
neural networks (Electromagnetic Sensor KBS), the vision sub-system and neural networks (Vision 
Sensor KBS), the Data Fusion subsystem and the Graphical User Interface. An outline of the basic 
requirements and functions of the electromagnetic, vision, data fusion and of the user interface are 
described below.
7.1.2.2 User Interface
There is a man-machine interface (MMI) that is a text based user interface. For the end-user, an 
additional graphical man-machine interface for the final AIRES system was required to show the 
results of the reasoning and interpretation carried out. This interface would allow user interaction 
via menus, dialogue boxes, etc., and with graphical display of results. A suitable form of results 
display is that of a picture of the component in question with detected and characterised defects 
shown graphically on the surface of the component. A basic design, as in Figure 7.4, for a 
Windows environment was implemented.
Spsaman \Mndow
Bxvdue: «âspteiyBd &  v d u e s  cfcptayed
TRAM c o n ird  dBplay
Figure 7.4 Graphical user interface display
7.1.2.3 The Vision Sensor
The vision system in AIRES makes use of standard image processing methods described by Chin 
(1982 and 1988) for the detection of surface defects in fixed, and usually optimised, environments, 
with intelligent control to select the best available method for a particular situation. These routines 
are also augmented by the use of vision neural nets. The vision sensor consists of a monochrome 
CCD camera, with computer controlled focus and lighting. A toolkit of image processing 
operations was developed for dedicated image processing hardware. The image processing 
operations are available to a number of knowledge sources, which together comprise the vision
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KBS. This work was carried out independently by other groups at University College London and 
in Germany at the University of Hanover and Deustche Aerospace.
7.1.2.4 The Electromagnetic Sensor
The electromagnetic inspection technique applied here is based on the Alternating Current Field 
Measurement (ACFM) method, which works by inducing a high frequency alternating current in 
the component inspection surface and studying the resulting magnetic field above the surface. The 
data is collected in the form of a three matrices of B values, one matrix for each direction and each 
point in the matrix for a sample location. The 3-D surface of the magnetic field can be analysed 
for signs of defects, for their type (pit, crack, or other) and their parameters. The algorithms used 
were based on the theoretical modelling of ACFM. A set of electromagnetic neural net routines 
were also used to analyse the magnetic data as a complement to the ACFM theoretical algorithms.
7.1.2.5 Data Fusion
Combining the results of two sensors will in general give a more robust and powerful system. In 
this case, the combination of visual data and the electromagnetic data can work well. Both the 
electromagnetic and vision techniques can detect surface defects only. The ACFM technique 
works through coatings and can, given good conditions and particular defect geometries, give 
accurate readings of the defect sizes, in particular for cracks. In contrast, the visual technique is 
somewhat more robust in terms of required conditions for initial detection of defects, but cannot 
give depth measurements, although gives better results for pits. A fuller interpretation of the nature 
of the object is obtained by combining electromagnetic field and visual information. Making use 
of the vision data early on would provide more accurate initial interpretations o f the 
electromagnetic data, although it is only data from the electromagnetic sensor which will indicate 
the depth of defects such as cracks. Consequently, a data fusion module is required to merge the 
interpreted results from the electromagnetic signals and the vision data.
7.1.3 The Application and Phases of W ork
The AIRES multi-sensor system was to be used for inspection of metallic components, since the 
electromagnetic principle does not function on non-metallic surfaces. The approach is intended 
to be applicable to on-line automatic inspection tasks of components in production in the 
automotive and aerospace industries.
The requirements for the AIRES system was that it should be able to inspect:
1 Standard plate specimens with features such as pits, cracks, high spots, slots etc.
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2 A camshaft to examine surface defects on ground faces.
The first geometry was chosen as a test specimen for the initial work. The second is meant to 
represent the type of component, that might be found in a real application.
The work took place in two phases. In the first phase, a prototype inspection system was developed 
to inspect flat plates, with limited set of defects and free of corrosion. Each sensor in this phase 
was to complete a scan before interpretation of the data and to act independently of each other with 
manual control. Theoretically generated data was used initially, until real sensor data was gathered. 
In the second phase, the aim was to have a system which could inspect a realistic component with 
more realistic defects. In addition, a more integrated and opportunistic use of the sensors was 
investigated, with more sophisticated computer control.
7.2  T h e  B l a c k b o a r d  S y s t e m
Blackboard systems have been in use for about twenty years with varying degrees of success in 
many different applications. There are several reasons for a blackboard approach to software 
development that can be applied to supporting a blackboard system for the AIRES application 
(Corkill, 1991). Firstly, the AIRES project involved several development groups, and the 
modularity and independence of the blackboard KS structure allows for separate development and 
testing of code. Moreover, ACRES includes two main separate areas of expertise, electromagnetic 
and vision, each requiring its own knowledge representation: a blackboard system allows for easy 
incorporation and combination of these two differing approaches. The arguments for using a 
blackboard approach on a project diverse both in location and substance as this are compelling. 
Each subsystem could be developed independently and combined at later stages of the project. The 
only requirement was for the blackboard data stmctures to be defined early on in order to be able 
to communicate across the two subsystems.
There are other benefits from the use of blackboard systems. They provide
• dynamic control, allowing opportunistic reasoning and an incremental approach to problem 
solving
• multilevel data to allow reasoning based on data of various levels of granularity
These facilities allow flexibility of reasoning and control for AIRES. The first feature allows 
information from electromagnetic and vision sensors to be built up incrementally by combining 
sensor results and re-scanning where needed. The second feature allows the use of a range of
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computational processes, from numerical procedures which act on raw sensor data to high-level 
knowledge to be applied to reasoning based on characterised defect data.
7.2.1 T he Development Tool, TRAM
The AIRES system was built using TRAM, which was originally developed for autonomous mobile 
robotics (Tableau noir pour la Robotique Autonome Mobile) as a multi-expert system development 
tool based on a blackboard architecture (Koenig & Crochon, 1989; Koenig et al 1990).
TRAM  has a typical blackboard architecture (Nii, 1986a and b); Engelmore & Morgan, 1988) with 
knowledge sources that are independent modules accessing a common database stracture, known 
as the blackboard, which is composed of several abstraction levels, and a the controller, or 
inference engine, which manages the knowledge sources and the blackboard. As described in detail 
in Section 4.1.2, the blackboard constitutes the system data structure. The knowledge sources 
operate on the data on the blackboard. The execution of the knowledge sources is controlled by 
the system controller. When the blackboard attains a certain state, a KS may become operative, 
and this KS will update the blackboard, which in turn may trigger further KS operation.
The structure of TRAM under Unix is illustrated in Figure 7.5.
MUX
o
Unix ta sk BBM
Unix p ip e SCH
MMI
K S nK Sl KS2
Figure 7.5 The structure o f  TRAM
The core of TRAM is made up of the processes BBM and SCH. BBM is the Blackboard Manager, 
responsible for access to the blackboard databases and for establishing which KSs may be 
activated. SCH is the Scheduler, which selects the executable KS to carry out next. TRAM was 
written in C, and hence the knowledge sources and concepts refer to C structures and functions. 
Procedures in other languages can also be integrated by using a C function interface. In addition, 
M M I, TRAM'S text-based user interface man-machine interface, is used to input operator
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commands and provides the operator with details of the function of TRAM, and MUX multiplexes 
and de-multiplexes the communication between KS and BBM.
7.2.2 Blackboard Concepts
The blackboard can be considered as an object-oriented database composed of a hierarchy of 
concepts. Automatic interpretation of inspection data requires that the software make use of 
information on:
the component being inspected
the sensors employed and their mode of operation
initial sensor data
interpretations of sensor data
data fusion results
Thus the concepts defined for this application have to represent each one of the above. In the 
TRAM tool, each concept has structure shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 TRAM concept structure
concept name the name of the TRAM concept
main structure a C structure type, accessible only by a KS
inherent attributes C structure types accessible by both KSs and the BBM
attached attributes C structure types accessible only by the BBM
relation attributes pointers to other concepts in the blackboard
The structure of TRAM concepts reflects frames, described in Section 4.1.2, in that the relation 
attributes indicate the relationship between classes in the blackboard, and inherent attributes are 
equivalent to slots in a frame or concept. Attached attributes and main structure have no direct 
equivalence in traditional frame-based systems, but are defined to provide extra efficiency in that 
C data structures do not have to be coded for the attached attributes, since they will only be used 
for reasoning by the BBM and high level structures do not have to be coded for the data which is 
to be passed to C functions.
The knowledge representation in this work reflects the findings of previous work in general sensor 
fusion that three levels of data or information are stored (Pan, 1989). The first or lowest level here 
corresponds to the pre-processed sensor data, the mid level stores data about the existence of
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features, and finally the top level is that of the characterised defects. The classification and 
characterisation routines used classical signal processing algorithms and neural network models.
7.2.3 Knowledge Sources
The core o f a KS in TRAM is a C function which carries out numerical or other routines. A 
mechanism is then required to link the C function to the blackboard, to feed data from  the 
blackboard to the function and to make use of the output from the function to update the contents 
of the blackboard. This is fulfilled by the knowledge source card which provides TRAM with a 
description of when to use the C function, how to provide the function with data and the effect that 
the output from the function will have on the common data storage or blackboard.
KS cards have the structure given in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 TRAM knowledge source card structure
program the name of the KS C function
activation condition when the blackboard database satisfies the 
specified condition, the KS is activated
input parameters the KS C function input parameters
proposition provides instructions for the BBM to update the 
blackboard with the KS results
output the KS C function output parameters
error test provides a condition to activate error handling
error action specifies the particular error action
The activation condition has a relatively easy-to-read grammar. Error actions provide a way for 
the BBM to detect problems and rectify them.
7.2.4 The Agenda
In large applications, reliance on full opportunistic reasoning may be inappropriate. M aking the 
BBM check all KSs in case they can be triggered can be very inefficient and can slow the process 
considerably. To overcome this problem, TRAM allows the use of an agenda that indicates which 
KSs may be triggered at each stage of the process. This agenda encapsulates the knowledge about 
the best strategy for making use of the KSs and is based on flowcharts describing the complete 
process of operating the sensor and interpreting the data.
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7.2.5 Interpretation of the Electromagnetic Sensor Data
Within AIRES, the electromagnetic sensor data needs to be processed and the results interpreted. 
In order to do this, a full understanding of the form that the data takes and of how the sensor may 
be utilised to obtain data is required. This section discusses the algorithms designed to process and 
interpret the signals from the electromagnetic sensor.
The ACFM technique can detect surface defects in metallic components. The classes of defects 
that can be detected by ACFM can be loosely defined as cracks or notches, pits or areas of changed 
electromagnetic properties. The electromagnetic sensor outputs matrices giving the x, y, and z 
components of the magnetic field B over the surface. This data can be interpreted to give the 
geometry of the defect and the size. The modelling theory, however, is only fully developed for 
hemispherical pits and cracks or notches which are semi-elliptical in shape. So for general defect 
shapes, classification and characterisation can only be approximate.
The precise numerical form of the magnetic field above a crack can be accurately predicted, and 
by comparing the experimentally recorded data to the predicted values, the crack dimensions may 
be established (Michael et al, 1991). A similar method may be used to detect and size any other 
defect, such as a pit, for which the numerical magnetic field can be predicted. The practical use 
of the numerical solutions requires these to be implemented as look-up tables. The use of these 
tables requires a defect to be identified and its alignment given. This procedure is now explained.
7.2.5.1 Tvpical Theoretical electromagnetic Data
From Figure 7.1 on page 261, where a clear pattern in the magnetic field can be seen, it appears that 
a human expert would be able to classify or at least detect a defect. These patterns can be 
described in terms of peaks and troughs. Hence the work carried out initially concentrated on 
classification based on attempting to encapsulate the reasoning that an expert would carry out for 
classification.
The B surfaces displayed in Figure 7.1 each have a characteristic shape. The important 
characteristics and use of each are given below.
B^ Two peaks and a trough lying in between. The length of a crack is related to the distance 
between its B , peaks; an exact analytical relationship between the two may be calculated 
using electromagnetic theory. The depth of a crack or other defect geometries may be also 
be calculated from similar quantities extracted from the B , peak and trough co-ordinates.
By Two peaks and two troughs. The relative positions of these are used to distinguish between 
pits and cracks.
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O ne peak  and one trough. The peak and trough co-ordinates and values may be used 
for a similar purpose to the B% ones, and are used as supplementary data.
1 .25 .1  Typical Classification of Defects
The ACFM method, as incorporated in AIRES, works as follows for the inspection of a defect on 
an otherwise smooth surface:
1. For each of the B^, By and B , data sets, the co-ordinates and the values of the peaks and 
troughs are found.
2. The feature is then classified as either a pit or a crack or of unknown type, by using the four 
By turning points (see Figure 7.6):
• If the angle a  between the lines joining opposite pairs of turning points is small
enough, the defect is a crack.
• If a  is large enough, the defect is a pit.
• The value of a  outside given ranges will signify a unknown defect type.
3. If a crack or pit exists, the length and depth are then calculated by using the co-ordinates and 
values of the B , and B , peaks and troughs and a set o f look-up tables which relate these 


















Figure 7.6 By peaks and troughs fo r  cracks and pits 
7.2.6 The Signal In te rp re ta tion  Procedure
As in Figure 7.7, the electromagnetic sensor KBS carries out signal interpretation in four steps:
7.2.6.1 Pre-processing
Collected sensor data is pre-processed to give to the electromagnetic sensor KBS data free of noise 
and irregularities due to sensor sensitivity.
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For each located irregularity, select flaw type, i.e. whether 
pit or crack, and align accordingly_____________________
Feature Extraction
Analyse^ach feature using lookup tables to determine depth, 
length and other significant details
 Grading and Output
Outpufare feature, type,Tocation, depth, length, and graphics 
illustrating surface character. The component is also graded, i.e. 
it is assessed for rejection or acceptance.
Figure 7.7 Electromagnetic sensor KBS signal interpretation procedure
7.2.Ô.2 Flaw Detection
A flat featureless surface will produce a uniform magnetic field. Any irregularity in the magnetic 
field indicates the existence of surface features. During the pre-processing an initial analysis of 
the three B-matrices to isolate portions corresponding to features or flaws is performed.
It was found that flaw detection was best performed by a neural network.; a function based on the 
electromagnetic theory was found to be very much less effective and efficient. Thus the Phase II 
system contained only one KS to carry out this step which was based on a neural network 
developed in parallel to the analytical theory based KSs by the group at Deutsche Aerospace.
7.2.6.S Flaw Classification
Each type of surface flaw produces different magnetic fields; the nature and shape of the magnetic 
fields arising from pits, cracks, and high spots have been described and analysed. At this stage a 
given flaw or feature which has been spotted by the pre-processing is classified. A feature is 
defined as one of the following: pit, high spot, slot, pore, inclusion, or crack. In the developed 
demonstrator electromagnetic KBS, only features of the type pit, crack and unknown are 
considered.
A flaw such as a crack has a direction and this may not be parallel to the edge of the scan, but the
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feature detection procedure assumes that it is. Thus data has to be aligned in the crack direction, 
which effectively means rotation of the x  and y  co-ordinates. Re-alignment is carried out, not by 
physically moving the probe, but by a mathematical transformation of the data.
7.2.Ô.4 Feature Extraction
The next stage is to extract the characteristics of each feature, e.g. the depth and length for a crack. 
Lookup tables are provided which relate the height z of the electromagnetic probe above the 
surface and certain values extracted from the magnetic field matrices to the length and depth of 
the crack; similar tables are provided for other features.
12.6 .5  Grading/Output
Finally the surface details are output and the surface is evaluated using the grading criteria.
1 2 .1  Issues in  Real A CFM  Sensor D ata  In terpreta tion
The actual data produced by a sensor reproduces the theoretically predicted data with varying 
fidelity. Consider the B , data shown in Figure 7.8(a). In the scan of feature 1, the characteristic 
shape of the surface may be seen: two peaks with a trough in between, although the trough is 
almost completely obscured in the figure. In the second scan, this shape is hardly visible and it 
appears to be a featureless irregular surface. It would be hoped that AIRES would provide a 
reasonably accurate analysis of the first data, but not so for the second set of data. Note that the 
first data set was obtained from scanning a feature with five times the linear dimensions of those 
of the second data set. The sensor will have a limited resolution depending on the size of the 
sensor coils, their sensitivity, and other parameters.
As already discussed, the key to the ACFM analysis is the identification of the peaks and troughs 
of the data. Once these are known, the simplistic rules relating the relative locations of the peaks 
can be applied for classification. Although this is relatively easily done by a human expert, 
identifying peaks and troughs automatically is essentially a problem of surface analysis. As can 
be seen from Figure 7.8(a), the likelihood of doing this, and the usefulness of any solution, depend 
significantly on the data set B.
Two issues concerning real ACFM sensor data are here considered. The first issue is related to 
removal of noise introduced into the sensor signal. The second and, from a computational point 
of view, more complex problem is the identification of the sensor signal pattern, that is of peaks 
and troughs, for initial classification and further characterisation.
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(a)Before masking:
Feature 1 Feature 2
(b)After masking:
Feature 1 Feature 2
Feature I is a notch 10mm long and 5mm deep. Feature 2 is a notch 2mm long and I mm deep. 
Both data sets have been corrected fo r  solenoidal irregularities and noise. The unit o f  the x  and 
y axes is 1mm.
7.2.7.1
Figure 7.8 data fo r  tv^o features  
Removal of noise
The operation of the electromagnetic sensor is very delicate as the electromagnetic sensor is highly 
sensitive to small deviations in positioning. Real data can be distorted by noise usually caused by 
the geometry of the component and by any slight defect in use.
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It was found that for the purposes of the initial system, simple masking was sufficient to remove 
some of the effects of noise. The masked data allowed the underlying peaks and troughs to be more 
easily identified.
Figure 7.8(b) shows the data of Figure 7.8(a) after masking. A simple masking formula has been 
used with no weighting:
Masked (B^J= ^  g
mo
(7.1)
where By denotes the value of the relevant B component at a point Py, one in a mesh of points as 
shown in Figure 7.9. The formula is easily modified for comer points and edges.
^m-2p-l Pm-2fl ^m2^1
P p




Pmf2^ >-2 Pnf2n-1 Pnf2fl Rih-2.[H-1 p
Figure 7.9 Mesh o f  points
The first data displayed in Figure 7.8(b) shows only a slight smoothing; but the second is massively 
smoothed. If an unmasked peak/trough lies at the location of the corresponding masked 
peak/trough will be at one of the eight adjacent points or P^ n itself, which enables the unmasked 
location to be found once the masked location is known. Masking may reduce the value of maxima 
but the value of a maximum before masking may be obtained by reference to the original unmasked 
data and similarly for the minima.
For more complex problems of noise, further work may require the application of more complex 
algorithms from signal processing techniques.
1.2.1.2 Peak/Trough Location Methods
Three methods have been considered for locating the peaks and troughs of the masked B data.
■ Sim ple Searching fo r Peaks and Troughs
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In this method, a search is carried out through all the data points for the greatest and least values. 
This method is naive and cannot be relied upon for any but the most regular surfaces. For example, 
if in a set of data, where two peaks are expected, one peak Pj has height the other (P^) height 
with h{> /12, one of the adjacent surface points to P, has height h with h{>h> /12, and /ij and h 
are the greatest B, values in the surface, then such an algorithm will record and h as the two 
greatest B% values and hence miss the peak Pg.
■ Location of Local Maxima and Minima
Here, a search is carried out to locate groups of data points which make up peaks and troughs. This 
second method is more robust than the simple search and works in most situations. Criteria used 
to check for peaks and troughs are that a maximum value is greater than the surface values at all 
eight adjacent points and, for robustness, it is greater than each adjacent point of a maximum has 
value greater than the values at all adjacent points to it lying further away from the maximum and 
likewise for a minimum. In detail, consider a point P^ „ surrounded by a mesh of points, as in 
Figure 7.9. The criteria used in the algorithm for P„y, to be a maximum are:
1- Pm.n ^ Pm+i.n+j for i=-1,0,11 j= -1,0,1
2. The value at each diagonal point adjacent to P ^  must be greater than or equal to the values 
at the three neighbouring points which are furthest away from P^„; thus Pm+i.n+i  ^ Pm+i.n+2»
Pm + l,n+ ] ^Pm +2.n+l» Pfn+ l ji+1 ^ P |n + 24i+2 S i m i l a r l y  f o r  Pm +l,n-l»  P m -l,n -l»  Pm-l.n+1
3. The value at each non-diagonal point adjacent to P^^ must be greater than or equal to the 
values at the three outward adjacent points; thus Pm+i.n^Pm+2.D+i, Pm+i.n^Pm+2.n, Pm+i.n^Pm+2.n-i 
and similarly for the other points Pm.n+i, Pm,n-i-
To search for a minimum, “less than or equal to” is substituted for “greater than or equal to”.
The algorithm is applied as a two-test process. The first test finds and records all points satisfying 
condition 1. Then these points are tested for 2 and 3. The procedure is easily altered if P^^ is an 
edge or com er point, or if it is adjacent to an edge point, to exclude non-existent points. This 
method will locate all local maxima and minima, and this of course may still provide inconclusive 
results owing to data irregularity, as too many peaks and troughs may be given.
For example, applying this algorithm to the first set of data in Figure 7.8(b), four local maxima and 
three local minima are found to exist. One minimum and one maximum lie at the comers, and may 
therefore be omitted from further consideration, but that still leaves three local maxima and two 
local minima. To decide which two maxima and one minimum to consider, various mles may be 
used. For example, the B , peaks and troughs should lie along the same line as the B, peaks and
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troughs, and if the peaks and troughs can be located, their positions can be used to decide upon 
the true peaks and troughs.
This method was chosen to be applied in AIRES.
■ F itting  Surfaces to the M agnetic Field D ata
This method involves fitting the B surfaces with surfaces of known equations, whose peaks and 
troughs are known and thus model known signals from defects, by least squares minimisation or 
other numerical techniques.
The difficulty with this method is to find appropriate analytical functions to map the B*, By and B, 
surfaces. Work was carried out to find possible candidates. Unfortunately, although reasonable 
exact-fitting functions were found for some theoretically generated surfaces, the same functions 
do not map the surfaces derived from actual sensor scans. Further work could be carried out in this 
area by considering advanced methods for signal interpretation, such as wavelets which can be used 
in pattern matching (Mallet, 1989; Wu & Du, 1996).
7.3 Kn o w led g e  Sources  and  Co ncepts fo r  th e  E lectrom agnetic  Senso r
The purpose of the knowledge elicitation process for the electromagnetic sub-system was to 
encapsulate the expertise required for the interpretation and classification of electromagnetic data, 
using the ACFM techniques, as a set of concepts, knowledge sources to act on the concepts and an 
agenda for making efficient use of the knowledge sources.
The concepts representing the defects are based on the classes of defects that can be detected by 
ACFM, which are cracks or notches, pits, and general areas of changed electromagnetic properties. 
The electromagnetic signal interpretation can be approximately divided into the following steps:
1. Scan the component and collect the data.
2. Carry out any pre-processing which may be required.
3. Decide if a feature is present in the given signal data.
4. If a feature is present then classify it as one of: crack, pit or unknown defect, or possibly
other.
5. For a defect which has been successfully classified, characterisation then takes place. 
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6. If the feature has not been satisfactorily classified then re-scanning may take place based on 
the results of data fusion.
The electromagnetic sensor outputs matrices of the x, y, and z components of the magnetic field B 
and these are interpreted to give the geometry of the defect and the size. For general defect shapes, 
the classification and characterisation given can only be approximate at this stage, since the 
modelling theory is only fully developed for cracks or notches which are semi-elliptical in shape 
and for hemispherical pits.
It was envisaged that knowledge sources based on the mathematical modelling of the field would 
be sufficient. It was found nonetheless that much work was required to provide sufficiently smooth 
data before the algorithms designed could be applied. Even more surprisingly it was found that 
simple neural networks created independently of the electromagnetic theory based knowledge 
sources by others were found to be very successful at flaw detection.
7.3.1 D etailed Design of Concepts and Knowledge Sources
As described above, four groups of knowledge sources were required for this sub-system:
• Electromagnetic Sensor Control
• Electromagnetic Signal Interpretation functions
• Data Fusion procedures
• User interface input functions
The following outlines the concepts and gives example KS cards. Most KSs have an associated 
C function which has the same name as the KS itself. All KS names begin with the prefix EM, for 
example EMInspect and so on, to indicate that they are part of the EM KBS as opposed to the 
vision and main KBS. Neural network KSs for the electromagnetic sensor KBS have function 
names beginning with EM_NN.
In the AIRES system, the KS Card entries for the error test and the error action are exactly the same 
for all KSs. The test is carried out on the parameter errorcode, an output variable from the C 
function which is additional to the ones given explicitly in the following descriptions. If an non­
zero errorcode is returned by the C function, then an EMError object is posted on the blackboard 
with the attribute state set to the ‘error_has_occurred’ and code set to the errorcode value. In the 
prototype AIRES system, the system would halt and output the error information to the user. In 
future extensions, it is foreseen that the errorcode can be used to identify the procedure required 
to recover from the error.
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73.2 Electromagnetic Sensor KBS Concepts
Only the concepts required for the electromagnetic sensor KBS are considered here. These are 
concepts which represent the object being inspected, the electromagnetic sensor, the 
electromagnetic sensor data and interpretations of the electromagnetic sensor data and finally 
aspects of data fusion control.
Figure 7.10 below illustrates the set of concepts implemented for the Phase II electromagnetic 
sensor KBS. The arrows indicate relational attributes, so for example, the concept EMSdData is 
linked to the concept EMSensor. The three lower boxes contain the main structure, inherent and/or 























































Figure 7.10 Electromagnetic sensor KBS concepts
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When a component, which here was limited to a flat plate or camshaft, is presented to the system 
for inspection, an instance of one of the EMFlatPlate or EM Camshaft concepts is created on the 
blackboard. This instance stores all the necessary data pertaining to the component. For the 
inspected object, it was found that the concept for a flat plate required only minor modifications 
in order to model the camshaft component. By using polar co-ordinates to map the surface of 
approximately cylindrical components onto a flat surface, the same attributes could be used for the 
EMCamshaft concept as for the EMFlatPlate concept.
The AIRES system starts by setting up the electromagnetic sensor (and vision) sensor(s) to inspect 
the plate, and details of the sensor, such as its location, its lift-off from the surface, etc., are stored 
in an instance of EMSensor. Every time a set of B data is received by the electromagnetic sensor 
KBS from the sensor, it is stored in the blackboard as EMSdData objects. Two EMSdData 
instances are created at one time: one is at a low resolution for use by neural nets for identification 
of possible features and for classification and characterisation, the second is used during 
characterisation by analytical methods.
In the initial prototype developed during Phase I, each set of B data was analysed to find the peaks 
and troughs needed for classification and characterisation, and the details of these peaks and 
troughs are stored in an instance of EMPeakTrough. This object was then inspected to decide on 
a classification. In the final prototype developed during Phase H, this was replaced by only one 
neural net KS that classified flaws in one step.
The existence of flaws in the electromagnetic sensor data is indicated by instances of EMFeature. 
This object has as an attribute the location of the feature within the B data. Once the feature has 
been classified and categorised, the results are also stored in this concept, either using crack or pit 
related attributes.
A common set of KBS concepts for the output of sensor interpretation results was specified to 
facilitate the data fusion process: these were DFFaultData and DFControl. This resulted in a 
change for the electromagnetic sensor KBS concepts: the two concepts EMCrack and EMPit were 
combined into one EM Feature concept, which was also used to give an initial indication of the 
existence of a possible feature.
General concepts were used to communicate with external sources to the Electromagnetic KBS:
• The EMError concept which is used to indicate errors occurring when executing a knowledge 
source. It records any error code output by the relevant treatment function.
• DFFaultData is a data fusion concept common to both the Vision and the Electromagnetic 
Sensor KBS to allow interKBS communication.
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• A concept which would trigger output to the users on the screen was also defined called 
UserlO.
Two example concepts are given in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Exam ple concepts
concept name EM Sensor
main structure SENSORPARAMETERS
inherent attributes state: SENSORSTATE, location: POSITION, 
time: EMTIME, another_location: YN
attached attributes
relation attributes inspects_specimen: EMHatPlate
concept name EM 3dD ata
main structure aSdData
inherent attributes pktr_found, identified, feature_exists, nn_classified: YN, 
nn_type: FEATURETYPE, resolution: high, low
attached attributes
relation attributes with_sensor: EMsensor
7.3.3 Overview of Knowledge Sources
The above short description of the use of the electromagnetic sensor KBS concepts needs to be 
supplemented by explaining the electromagnetic sensor KBS knowledge sources and their 
operation.
Figure 7.11 shows a flowchart of the KS without reference to the blackboard. Figure 7.12 shows 
the interaction of the KS and the blackboard. From these figures it can be seen that the 
electromagnetic sensor KBS starts the operation with EMInit which creates instances of the 
EMFlatPlate and EMSensor in the blackboard and assigning values to their attributes.
When an instance of EMSensor exists in a certain ready state, that is, all appropriate parameters 
have been initialised, it triggers the operation of EMScanning. This KS controls the interaction 
between the sensor and the KBS: it sets the sensor position and lift-off from the plate surface and 
then reads in the magnetic field data firom the sensor and this is stored in an instance of EMSdData.
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A complete instance of EMSdData triggers the EM_NNIndicate KS. If a feature is indicated in the 
data, then an instance of EMFeature is created. Only if an instance of EMFeature exists will the 


























Figure 7.11 Flowchart of electromagnetic sensor KS operations
Any feature is simultaneously classified and characterised by EM_NNClassifyCharacterise, which 
is shown in two parts in the flowchart, and classified only by EM_ANClassify. The results are 
stored in the instance of EMFeature and EMCompareClassifications compares the classifications. 
The feature is then characterised using look-up tables based on ACFM theoretical modelling by 
EM_ANCharacterise. The characterisation is then compared with that of the earlier result from 
EM_NNClassifyCharacterise by EMCompareCharacterisations. The final results are now written 
to the common data fusion format, i.e. to an instance of DFFaultData by EMWriteToDataFusion. 
It also indicates that the process of investigating the feature has been completed.
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If no feature is found, the KS EMFinishedScan is triggered, to determine if any more sensor 
scanning of the surface should be performed. The electromagnetic sensor KBS may then loop back 


































Figure 7.12 Interaction o f electromagnetic sensor KSs and the blackboard
The following details the implemented KSs, but also describes the KSs required for a general 
system which may be considered in future development.
Some example KS Cards are given in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 Exam ple KS cards
knowledge source E M Init
activation condition
input
output state, geometry, now, parameters, location
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action CREATE X IN EMFlatPlate WITH x.state = state,
AND X.FGEOMETRY = geometry;
CREATE y IN EMSensor WITH y .state = ready AND 
y.inspects_specimen = x AND y .location = location AND y .time 
= now AND y.another_location = notyet 
AND y .SENSORPARAMETERS = parameters
knowledge source E M A N C h a rac te rise
activation condition EXIST X IN EMFeature WITH x.an_characterised = no 
EXIST t IN EM3dData AND u IN EMPeakTrough AND 
V IN EMSensor WITH x.has_datal= t AND t.resolution= high 
AND u.has_data= t AND t.with_sensor = v
input u.aPktrData, v.SENSORPARAMETERS, x.type
ou tput pit_param eters, crack_param eters
action M O D IFY  X W IT H  x.an_pp =  pit_param eters AND 
x.an_cp=  crack_param eters A N D  x.an_characterised = yes
7.33.1 EM Sensor Control KSs
Since EMInit is the first KS to be activated, it has no activation condition nor input parameters for 
the treatment function. It initialises the blackboard by creating instances of the component, and 
of the electromagnetic sensor with attributes taken from a file.
The EMScanning KS collects pre-processed data from the sensor by reading, from a particular 
point in the component description file, the B data. Two matrices of electromagnetic sensor data 
are collected for two different resolutions.
The EMFinishedScan KS inspects the list of points to be scanned in the electromagnetic sensor 
inspection plan to see if there are any more points left to scan. If there is another location to be 
scanned, the EMResetSensor KS creates a new instance of the electromagnetic sensor ready to 
input new data. If no more locations need to be scanned, the electromagnetic sensor KBS ends 
operation with EMEndScan. For this KS, no associated C code was required.
EMError can interpret any error codes for the electromagnetic sensor KSs. At this stage it merely 
reads the error code from the blackboard and any text associated with is output to the MMI.
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73.3.2 Electromagnetic Sensor Signal Interpretation KSs
There are two main operations in the KBS: inspection of specimen geometry and inspection of 
specimen features. The geometry of the specimen must be known to perform adequate inspection 
of the specimen. The geometry is supplied as part of a component description file which also 
contains the stored sensor data.
The EMFindPeakTroughs KS uses the chosen search algorithm to pick from the B matrices the two 
greatest values B^^ax^), the B^ minimum (B^^m)' the two greatest By values
(By^axl3ymax2), the two least By values By^^Z), the B, maximum (B^^x), and the B,
minimum (B^^jJ. A KS for identifying possible features, EMInspect, was created as part of the 
Phase I AIRES system. It analysed the magnetic field matrices B ,, By, and B, for the possible 
existence of features, by testing that they satisfied the following
t  ®  zmax ^  ®  zmin
2. The value of B, at the nearest point in the sensor array to the halfway point between B^^ax 
and B^j„ should be approximately 0, that is less than 10% of B^^^
® x m in  <  1
4. B^ max^  = Bxma%2, to withiu an appropriate tolerance
Unfortunately, tests carried out showed that the analysis employed could not easily distinguish 
features. Instead, a neural net was developed which could carry this task out very effectively. Thus 
this KS was not part of the fmal implementation and was replaced by a KS with a neural network.
If an irregularity exists it must be classified; it will be one of an agreed list of flaw types, that is pit, 
crack, or unknown. The EM_ANClassify KS determines whether a feature is a pit or a crack if 
EM_NNIdentify indicates that a feature exists. The algorithm to determine the feature type is 
based on the positions of the four By peaks and troughs. As illustrated in Figure 7.6 on page 270, 
these are placed around the feature: the acute angle a between the two lines joining these points 
is measured. For a pit, a  is close to a right angle; for a crack, it is close to zero. Currently if the 
angle is less than 30°, the feature is classified as a crack; for angles between 65° and 115°, a pit is 
recorded.
Once the feature type has been determined its details, such as its depth and length, are extracted 
by EM_ANCharacterise. The grading of the feature is done after fusion of the results of the 
analytical methods and neural nets.
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7333 Data Fusion KSs
In the final implementation of the AIRES system, data fusion may take place at two points:
1. results from the EM neural nets are combined, if possible, with the results from the KSs 
based on analytical theory
2. the final output from the electromagnetic sensor and vision KBSs are compared
In the first step, only the one KS, EMWriteToDataFusion, is required to ensure that the results can 
be compared between KBSs. No grading of classifications is carried out as yet.
Classifications carried out by the neural net KS, which uses EMSdData for this, could be compared 
to the analytical method KS, which would use the higher level data in EMPeakTrough. In Phase 
n, before it was realised that the use of the analytical method would lead to problems, it was 
proposed that a simple comparison would be carried out by EMCompareClassifications. If there 
is any disagreement at this stage then the result would be an unknown classification. This of course 
was discarded as an option at this stage for real data, but was possible with artificially generated 
B data. In future work, it may still be possible to use higher level reasoning.
After characterisations have taken place, EMCompareCharacterisations combines the results as 
simple averages. The EMWriteToDataFusion KS transfers the information held on features 
identified by the EM KBS to the instance of DFFault, in order that the data fusion process can be 
completed. The data fusion process was very basic: it involved presenting the user with the output 
from each independent KBS. The intention was that at a future date the final result from each KBS 
would be combined using some Bayesian decision process based on a priori probabilities, but the 
idea is fundamentally weak in that no use is made of intermediate results. This is further discussed 
in Section 7.3.5.
7.3.S.4 User interface KSs
The user interface's main function is to inform the user of the operations of the sensor and KBS 
throughout. The main KBS is expected to operate such system features as user and geometry input 
as well as the grading and output of results. As the specimen is examined by the electromagnetic 
sensor the KBS will build up a picture of the specimen geometry. The user should be shown what 
the KBS "sees".
1 3 3 .5  Future KSs
Other KSs which were not implemented, but which may be required to allow greater control of the 
sensor and manipulation of the sensor data.
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A scan may be performed on a specified surface area of the specimen, either the whole surface, or 
some part of it. The data sought by the scan consists of the z, y or z components of the magnetic 
field at the surface of the specimen. In the current implementation, a scanning route, has been 
predefined. In future implementations it can be foreseen that the KBS will be able to re-direct the 
sensors to either carry scanning as required or even to re-scan problem area by 
EMRequestSensorScan.
To allow complete flexibility in the method of collecting data, a KS EMDataCollect, which carries 
this out explicitly is required. Data may be collected from the electromagnetic sensor using a serial 
or parallel communication interface or from previously stored data. The data will be filtered 
through a pre-processing routine before being fed to the electromagnetic sensor data interpretation 
functions.
The KBS must be able to complete the feedback loop to control the sensors by altering the various 
sensor parameters by use of EMSensorAdjust. The parameters in the electromagnetic sensor 
operation that may be adjusted are the gain, the frequency, the solenoidal current and the sensor 
lift off. In the current implementation, pre-processing of data is carried out before the data reaches 
the KBS. It can be foreseen that in the future, the KBS may require more direct control over 
pre-processing parameters and thus would require an EMPreprocessData KS.
Before analysis of the B matrices supplied by the electromagnetic sensor control functions, the data 
must be pre-processed to account for noise, variations in the coils used to measure the magnetic 
field, and the non-uniformity of the inducing electrical field. Pre-processing is initialised by a 
calibration process KS EMCalibrate which is performed on a smooth featureless sample of the 
material to be inspected. This initial calibration need only take place once for each material type.
In the future the geometry of the specimen may be supplied to the electromagnetic sensor KBS by 
the main KBS, which in turn will receive it from user input or vision KBS or through pre-scanning. 
The electromagnetic sensor KBS may be required to check the geometry. This is a simple scanning 
and analysis operation compared to the inspections of specimen features and provides assurance 
that the electromagnetic sensor KBS and vision sensors are operating successfully. An 
EMCheckSpecimenGeometry KS would check the alignment of the sensor and main KBS, to 
ensure sensor operation is reliable. This would analyse EM data to determine specimen geometry 
and compares this with input geometry. Once the geometry of a component has been satisfactorily 
established, the KBS may initiate a general search for features using EMSearchForPeature. This 
involves building up a quick picture of the overall component and involves combining several B 
matrices.
Other KSs may be implemented for direct output from the electromagnetic sensor KBS, that is. 
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before data fusion with the vision KBS results.
• EMDepictSpecimenGeometry - The purpose of this KS is to inform the user of the KBS 
knowledge of the specimen's geometry by calling a graphics routine to draw a model of the 
specimen.
• EMIndicateSensorOrKBSOperation - The KBS must tell the user what it is doing; this will 
include giving statistics of the process being undertaken and appropriate visual or other data.
• EMDepictFeatures - When a feature is being investigated the KBS must inform the user of 
the feature's characteristics. Once the existence of a feature has been firmly established, it 
will be shown in the specimen geometry.
7.3.4 The Use of N eural Networks
The original intention was to carry out all electromagnetic sensor data interpretation explicitly, that 
is, by use of knowledge sources encapsulating explicit reasoning. This was based on the 
experience of human experts who were able to recognize the existence of a feature in the 
electromagnetic data when viewing output from the ACFM sensor. As already mentioned, the 
knowledge sources based on the encapsulated and high level knowledge of surface shapes were not 
successful when considering real data.
The possibility of using neural nets for rapid interpretation for data was originally considered for 
the vision data only. The vision system produces measurements on the position, area, perimeter, 
and the second order position invariant moments of inertia of the possible defects detected. A 
neural net can be used to provide an initial classification of the defect into pit, crack, multiple 
defect, or unknown. Where the defect cannot be classified with confidence, additional knowledge 
sources may select image processing operations to provide more defect parameters.
Parallel work by co-workers in Deutsche Aerospace was then carried out on the use of neural 
networks for this problem. It was found that neural nets were very effective and more efficient than 
making use of the electromagnetic sensor theory for defect identification. Neural nets were then 
incorporated into the electromagnetic sensor KBS by the TRAM developers to provide a very 
effective method of checking the magnetic field data for a possible feature as EM_NNIdentify. 
This became the only KS in the EM KBS which identified features. Additionally, neural nets were 
developed which could classify and characterise a feature from low resolution data simultaneously, 
and these were included in EM_NNClassifyCharacterise. This KS carries out classification and 
characterisation in parallel to the analytical knowledge sources.
This result corresponds well with experiences in the AI field where human experts cannot always 
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explain how they recognize a situation. It is clear that this is a pattern recognition problem which 
cannot be solved easily by symbolic high level reasoning. Future work would concentrate on 
applying neural networks to this problem.
73 ^  Issues of Data Fusion
The complete AIRES system is intended to use the data from the vision and electromagnetic 
sensors to provide a full defect inspection of a particular component. This involves data fusion, 
whereby data from different sources are somehow combined. In general there are two basic types 
of data fusion: early fusion where the merging of the data is done near the sensor, and late fusion, 
where the merging is performed later during computational analysis and processing of the data. 
The former situation is quite common where identical sensors are used; the latter is more usual if 
the data comes from different sensors.
In AIRES, since most of the work was concentrated in automating electromagnetic signal 
interpretation, the main form is that of late data fusion. The final results of the electromagnetic 
sensor KBS and of the vision KBS are combined. When, for example, the electromagnetic sensor 
KBS has located, classified, and characterised a defect, this result must be checked with the vision 
KBS. The flowchart of Figure 7.13 shows how this is accomplished.
EM KBS
— continue EM KBS operation















NO request vision KBS 
'to scan defect area
NO
request botti KBS to 
rescan and check results, 
using different sensor 
parameters if appropriate
Figure 7.13 Illustrating AIRES data fusion
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In addition, some early data fusion takes place between the neural net KSs and the KSs based on 
analytical methods for the electromagnetic sensor KBS. Thus the implemented data fusion process 
is rather simplistic. In the following, issues relating to data fusion are discussed, in order to 
consider how the work carried out may be extended to provide more intelligent data fusion.
7.3.5.1 Asynchronous Use of Sensors
In the current system, the two sensors do not necessarily scan the component in the same order, and 
defects may not be detected simultaneously. Thus the data structures or objects stored in the 
blackboard need to incorporate information on the time of detection and location of possible 
defects.
Suppose a particular surface area has been inspected by each sensor. If the two subsystems differ 
in their interpretation, further information must be obtained to resolve the KBS inconsistency. This 
may be achieved by changing the operational parameters of each sensor to obtain different data 
from the same area. In the event of an intractable inconsistency, the operator may be informed who 
then takes the final decision.
A further possibility that must be considered is that one system may fail to interpret the data 
received. In this case, it may request that the other sensor scans the originating area to provide 
more data to assist its interpretation. As an example of this, consider that the vision subsystem 
detects what appears to be a pit. The vision subsystem knows that it will not be able to measure 
the depth of the pit and thus may request other sensors to inspect the pit in order to find the depth. 
The request can be made even if the vision sensor has no knowledge of another sensor existing and 
may can take the form of a "mayday", that is, a call to any sensor listening to inspect the area where 
it has not been able to identify the feature. Data fusion becomes an iterative process with the aim 
being to obtain convergent KBS results.
13.5 .2  Combined and Irregular Flaws
Another question which has not yet been raised is that of combined or irregular flaws. One 
example is that of a defect which does not lie at the centre of the scanning area. Noisy 
electromagnetic sensor data may not allow for detection of such a feature. If another sensor detects 
such a feature, then as part of data fusion, re-scanning may occur to cover the area containing the 
feature. It should be noted that there will be a considerable difference between the inspection of 
a nearly featureless plate with, say, a single crack and a single pit well separated from each other, 
and of a surface which is massively corroded and scratched with numerous flaws of all types. In 
the former case, the magnetic field will be well structured and easily receptive to analysis; in the 
latter, isolation of features at the pre-processing stage alone will be a considerable task. Even the
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difference between the investigation of a single semi elliptical crack and a single crack with an 
irregular profile, which may consist of a combination of semi-ellipses, will be significant. The 
main case to consider is where features combine, for example a crack overlaid by a pit. Even if 
such a flaw is surrounded by flat and flawless surface, the analysis of the magnetic field of the 
combined flaw presents a further problem.
Another simpler example can be given: supposing that the vision sub-system has identified some 
surface defect, which may be a pit. If the electromagnetic sensor KBS cannot detect nor 
characterise this defect, then this would indicate that the surface defect may be merely paint on the 
component rather than a defect of the metal.
For a general system, the data fusion design should be extended to allow for re-scanning, split 
features, and inter-KBS communication for combined features at scanning time.
7.3.5.3 Opportunistic Partial Interpretations
The data fusion process may also allow opportunistic inspections. This is done by ensuring that 
intermediate results about possible detected features and classifications are stored in the 
blackboard. These may also be combined with the knowledge about the component to allow 
targeting of areas to inspect.
In the last case given above, instead of the vision subsystem making explicit requests to another 
sensor to take over, the vision subsystem could post all its intermediate results onto the blackboard 
and if it cannot continue interpreting data for a region of the component, it will then move onto to 
consider another region. Any other sensor, an ACFM sensor, say, would recognise that the 
blackboard contains the information that a pit of unknown depth has been found and would proceed 
to inspect the area to size the pit without passing through the detection and classification processes. 
Further, if several defects have been detected in many areas of the component, then the knowledge 
sources required to characterise those which are in the more critical areas, leading to complete 
rejection say, as opposed to re-working of the component, would be triggered first. Also, if 
necessary, the sensors could be requested to re-scan those areas, before inspecting other areas.
By combining two or more sensors and providing data fusion at all levels, it is possible to enhance 
the capabilities of the inspection techniques, both in terms of the speed at which defects are 
detected and characterised and the types of defects that can be identified accurately. In addition, 
the use of a blackboard architecture may also allow future work in this area to consider providing 
additional knowledge bases on the component being inspected and the likelihood and relative 
importance of defects at different points of the component. This form of knowledge which could 
enable automatic inspection systems to be more powerful and useful.
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7.3.5.4 Data Fusion Concepts
It can be argued that the implementation of early data fusion may lead to a conflict of interests. It 
was stated earlier that one of the benefits of the blackboard concept is that it allows separate teams 
of experts to work independently in order to provide sets of knowledge sources representing their 
areas of expertise. Early data fusion may require these teams to combine their knowledge to 
provide knowledge sources for the data fusion process, thus the whole procedure no longer allows 
for complete independence. This argument can be overcome by noting that a set of common 
blackboard concepts that trigger data fusion KSs will be useful. Additional concepts may be 
included to allow data fusion at the early stages of identification of defects.
7.5.5.5 Expert Knowledge as part of Data Fusion
It is in places such as this that the appropriate inclusion of expert knowledge is vital, and where in 
fact this system transforms from a merely analytical system to a KBS. At this step, most of the data 
fusion process is carried out so that the results from the visual sensor can be compared with that 
those from the electromagnetic sensor to give information indicating if there are possibly combined 
or irregular features.
73.6 Implementation and Testing
The knowledge base systems in AIRES were implemented using blackboard-based software, 
TRAM, that is an AI tool originally developed using LISP originally for robotics applications. It 
was then translated to ANSI C on Sun workstations. For AIRES, work was carried out to port 
TRAM to IBM RS/6000 workstations with the ADC operating system by and the electromagnetic 
sensor KBS Knowledge Source functions were written in ANSI C. The implementation procedure 
was as outlined in Figure 7.14.
The diagram indicates the allocation of tasks for the electromagnetic KBS to each partner involved 
in the AIRES project: LETT developed TRAM and encoded the agenda and concepts; DASA 
developed the neural networks which were incorporated by the University College London team 
into appropriate KSs; UCL provided specifications for the concepts and agenda, coded the C 
functions for the KSs and ported the TRAM C code to the IBM RS/6000 workstations.
The electromagnetic data transfer from the ACFM sensor to the AIRES software was carried out 
initially through files only. The two datafiles were component description file containing the 
specimen geometry, and a sensor data file holding the magnetic field data as in Figure 7.15. The 
process could be easily modified to allow real-time data transfer via an RS232 link.
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Figure 7.15 File-based data transfer
73.7 Tests for Phase I Detection and Categorisation
Tests carried out on the KS treatment functions were carried out using artificially generated data
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and with data recorded from sensor scans. The features analysed in these tests were pits and cracks 
on flat plates only.
7.3.7.1 Theoretically Generated Data
The analytical knowledge sources of the electromagnetic sensor KBS depend for their operation 
principally upon the accurate location of the turning points of the B data. The artificially generated 
data is noise-free and has clearly defined peaks and troughs. Consequently the electromagnetic 
sensor KBS functions with reasonable accuracy.
The crack lengths found from the data were within 10% of the actual crack lengths and the pit radii 
are also reasonably accurate. The crack depths were not nearly so accurate. This can be attributed 
to the fact that although the error in the position of the actual peak or trough co-ordinates would 
be only one half-unit either way of the computed co-ordinates, the values of the turning points are 
likely to be significantly different from the values taken read off the B data owing to the sharp 
gradient of the B surface near these points. This problem may be overcome if the peak/trough 
location algorithm is changed to surface-fitting procedure as this would probably provide a better 
estimate of the value of the function at the estimate peak/trough point.
7.3.7.2 Real Sensor Data Results
The real sensor data is much more distorted than the artificially generated data and the current 
electromagnetic sensor KBS methods were not able to analyse it successfully. In particular, the 
peak and trough searching algorithm was applied only to masked data, since it did not work at all 
for unmasked data. This algorithm did not always find the correct number of peaks and troughs.
Some problems which affected the implementation of KSs for the electromagnetic sensor KBS 
were related to the physical limits of the ACFM probe. The sensor coils used had a diameter of 
1mm which limits their resolution. For example, 10mm pit defects should have a clear effect on 
the recorded magnetic field, 5mm pits a less clear but noticeable effect, and 2mm pits may be 
hardly noticeable, especially after the smoothing from masking. Additionally, the theoretical work 
assumed a uniform, that is, constant inducing field, but the actual inducing field is non-uniform.
As electromagnetic induction is a non-linear effect, the variation in the field cannot be removed by 
simple linear correction. Even cases where there are clearly defined peaks and troughs, the field 
non-uniformity makes it difficult to determine the desired maxima and minima. The locations of 
the peaks and troughs may also be displaced. Hence either a uniform inducing field must be 
provided, or some other way of making use of explicit knowledge, say in the form of a set of rules, 
must be devised to identify the turning points of interest.
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The first solution may be practically impossible to ensure in a usable sensor, although some work 
was carried out with the AIRES project by colleagues to develop an improved probe. Yet the latter 
solution may not produce results as good as those produced by the analysis o f uniformly induced 
data.
7 .4  C o n c l u d in g  R e m a r k s
The finished AIRES system works for the given component and with several simplifying 
assumptions being made. Further work is required to extend the system to one which can be used 
in real applications.
For a general component, a general 3D co-ordinate system should be implemented, together with 
identification of component geometry. The former will then allow more complex geometries to 
be considered; the latter will enable the system to be applied to perhaps several components at any 
one time, or more importantly be used to ensure that the component has been placed properly in 
the required position. The concepts used here should be re-designed to follow a format based on 
the STEP description language for product data storage, or other similar data storage standards to 
allow future extensions of this work to other industries in manufacturing.
For a more effective use of multi-sensors the following improvements should be considered:
• more extensive data fusion at many levels
• real-time control of sensors, whereby the results from one may affect the use, such as where 
to place the sensor or the settings of operational parameters, of the other sensor
These points will enable more rapid and efficient classification and sizing of possible features. For 
improved use of the electromagnetic sensor, in particular, the following issues require further work:
• addition of a rule-base to assist turning point location or of advanced pattern recognition 
techniques to aid feature detection
• assembly of several B matrices to allow identification of features larger than the probe head 
size or of partially scanned defects
One o f the major weaknesses of the tool-kit of electromagnetic sensor knowledge sources now 
developed, is that the KSs are sensitive to the chaotic nature of real data. W ith improved sensor 
design and the addition of rule bases to enable expert interpretation of the data it is expected that 
this problem may be overcome.
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The AIRES concept involves linking multi-sensor (ACFM and vision) data with fast modelling to 
give real-time signal inversion and fusion of data within a black-board system to interpret the 
reconstructed images. The AIRES prototype system provides a basis for a general automated 
inspection system.
The AIRES concept is important to ensure that automatic interpretation of sensor data based on 
the component geometry, expected defect types and other background information. AIRES-like 
systems could be combined with analysis and decision support systems, such as the RISC System, 
which require consistent interpretations of inspection data.
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8 C o n c l u s io n s
The purpose of this work was to demonstrate the feasibility of providing operators of offshore 
structures a computer décision-support tool for inspection scheduling. The objectives were to 
develop a suitable methodology for scheduling based on the output from structural reliability 
analysis combined with fatigue fracture mechanics and to implement a demonstrator knowledge 
base system for Reliability based Inspection Scheduling (RISC).
The work carried out in developing the knowledge base system has shown that the use of advanced 
software techniques when combined with classical analytical programs, such as the FORTRAN 
program, RISCREL, can provide substantial benefits in ease-of-use and decision making when 
there is a large volume of information and many different types of data. Extensions to the RISC 
work for general inspection scheduling are discussed here and concepts for the integration of an 
AIRES-like system with the RISC System are described.
8.1 B a c k g ro und  to  th e  W ork
In the offshore oil industry, the current statutory requirements in the UK are that the certifying 
authorities issue a Certificate of Fimess for each platform according to The Offshore Installations 
(Construction and Survey) Regulations (1974) (MTD, 1989). The operators of the structures are 
required to ensure the integrity of these structures by carrying out periodic inspections and 
repairing when necessary. Decisions on inspection, repair and maintenance (IRM) actions on 
offshore structures were based on engineering judgement and these decisions were supported by 
the use of deterministic analyses.
The work towards the RISC methodology started in 1990. At this time, there had been many 
advances in the areas of
• structural reliability analysis and the Level II methods FORM and SORM
• fast analytical models for fatigue assessment of tubular joints
• corrosion effects on fatigue crack growth
• reliability of inspection techniques
The use of structural reliability methods combined with the other advances on corrosion fatigue 
modelling and inspection reliability can lead to more rational strategies for scheduling of IRM 
actions. Applying structural reliability analysis to inspection schedules, however, requires
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understanding the inspection procedure and making use of the appropriate information on 
inspection techniques. There are difficulties in collecting input data. The interpreted results need 
to be combined to form a global solution for the structure that takes into account practical 
constraints. These issues point to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to provide 
operators with a decision support tool to aid scheduling. Many advances in the field of artificial 
intelligence have been made in
• knowledge representation to support reasoning processes
• general and systematic searching techniques
• methods of dealing with hard and soft constraints
Several AI -based systems have been developed for planning and scheduling for general human 
reasoning, manufacturing, and robotics and control. A few researchers have considered the 
maintenance planning problem and in general, such work has concentrated on production lines. 
To date, no system targeting offshore structures integrates objective analysis methods with a 
flexible, but systematic scheduling algorithm.
8.2 S um m a r y  of  ACHIEVEMENTS
The main aim of this thesis was to pull together techniques from several disciplines to solve a 
complex, real-world problem, that of scheduling of maintenance actions for a complex structure. 
This work extended knowledge in applying pure AI techniques to help provide a framework for 
integrating structural reliability analysis, fatigue fracture mechanics, and planning and scheduling 
which takes into account guidelines and resource constraints.
■ Reliability based Inspection Scheduling for fîxed offshore structures (RISC)
The RISC methodology aimed to integrate stmctural reliability with fatigue fracture mechanics to 
enable rational scheduling of IRM actions. The RISC Demonstrator has the following features:
• the object base contains all the data required to carry out the ranking, the analysis and the
scheduling of IRM actions for a fixed jacket platform
• rapid prioritising of joints is carried out based on the values of attributes associated with each 
joint
• the execution of COMREL, the early version of RISCREL, is controlled by the KBS
• the expected costs for each IRM action are used to produce an initial schedule
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• searching techniques and heuristics are used to modify the initial schedule in order to take
into account resource constraints, which may be in turn reallocated by the user to enable 
“w hat-if ’ analysis
The achievements of the author in this work and as described in the Chapter 5 and demonstrated 
in Chapter 6 are:
1. A through review of the IRM procedures and requirements was carried out and this provided 
basic information for the specifications for the reliability based fatigue fracture mechanics 
and the decision theoretic basis for the analysis.
2. A prototype knowledge base system was produced which can schedule based on reliability 
index and expected costs only and this was extended to build the RISC System demonstrator.
3. Documents of the detailed design for the interfaces for RISCREL, the reliability based 
fatigue fracture mechanics software, and user interface specification and design were 
produced (Dharmavasan et al, 1994b).
4. Knowledge base system modules for system control, ranking joints to prioritise joints for 
analysis, planning possible maintenance plans for a jo in t, and constraints-based scheduling 
of the IRM actions have been developed.
5. A case study has been produced to demonstrate the use of the RISCREL software and the 
constraints-based scheduling algorithms.
■ Automated Image Recognition using Expert Systems (AIRES)
The electromagnetic sensor KBS of the demonstrator AIRES system includes a set of knowledge 
sources which can be used as a toolkit for basic electromagnetic sensor data interpretation. The 
implemented prototype has the following features:
it can be used to inspect flat and cylindrical components
the component geometry is provided in the component description file
the sensor data is pre-scanned and stored in the electromagnetic sensor data file
basic data fusion is also allowed
The achievements by the author are:
1. Appropriate concepts and the basic procedure for defining knowledge sources based on the 
inspection procedure will act as useful starting point to future work.
2. The electromagnetic sensor KBS subsystem represents a step towards understanding how
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electromagnetic sensor signal interpretation may be carried out automatically and 
intelligently for multi-sensor inspection tasks.
8.3 Fu tu r e  W o rk
In order to apply the RISC System in practice, the current demonstrator system requires some 
immediate work to allow operators to use it directly:
1. Operators would require the ability to be able to interface the RISC System directly with 
other existing information systems, such as inspection databases, to provide the RISC System 
with all the necessary information. Interfaces to operators' own information systems are 
needed.
2. The ProKappa code should be translated to a language which can be ported to different 
hardware. This work would be essential before possible commercialisation.
3. Currently only text files are used as interfaces to the analysis modules and for set-up and 
these are predefined in format. Different file types and formats should be allowed in the 
RISC System. Modules for interfacing to external analysis modules should be developed to 
allow set-up data from any source. In particular, interfaces to finite element systems are 
required. A generalised language for set-up should be considered which allows file formats 
to be defined by the operator or by automatic definition to interface to external analysis 
modules.
4. A detailed design for a MOTIF Windows-based graphical user interface was produced during 
the RISC project. This should be developed fully and implemented for the RISC System.
5. The integration of AIRES into RISC requires at least an interface to allow the final 
interpreted results from an AIRES-like inspection system to be added to the RISC object 
base.
8.3.1 Analysis of the S tructu re
The structural reliability analysis in RISC has been restricted to Level II with a limit state based 
on fatigue crack growth only in tubular joints. This presupposes many assumptions which may not 
be valid for all components. In addition, the stmctural reliability analysis may be extended in many 
ways.
Chapter 8 299
1. One fundamental problem is that it is assumed that only one crack is of interest in the tubular 
joint under consideration. There is the problem of groups o f cracks and how to compare 
detections and measurements against the actual cracks. Consider the real cracks shown in 
Figure 8.1(a). An inspection may reveal cracks as shown in 8.1(b) or as in (c). Neither of 
these results represent a poor inspection result since they are indications the actual cracks.
b) _____________________________
Figure 8.1 Crack classification
There are several possible ways o f defining what constitutes a crack and its size. The 
approach taken by inspection reliability experts is to classify overlapped cracks and cracks 
a very short distance apart to be one. The justification for this is that cracks which are close  
together do behave as one, due to the high stress concentration between the two cracks 
leading to very rapid crack growth. It has also been assumed that only one crack per weld 
would be considered. Further studies could be carried out to see how different classifications 
o f cracks and multiple cracks will lead to different reliability measures and hence the 
scheduling of inspections.
2. Some of the base assumptions for the development o f  the decision procedure implemented 
as part o f RISCREL need to be investigated carefully. For instance, the reliability 
assessment is based on the assumption that repair is carried out immediately if a crack is 
found. As already discussed, a possible outcome of the use o f the RISC methodology is that 
repair may be delayed if it can be shown that this w ill not affect the fitness fo r  purpose of 
the joint or structure. Not so serious from the point o f  view of reliability, but o f practical 
significance, is that the cost of repair will vary considerably according to whether or not 
repair is carried out at the same time as inspection, or if  several confirmatory re-grindings 
are required. Yet the costs are treated as constants. Sensitivity analyses should be carried 
out to gauge the extent to which the process is affected by variations and uncertainties in the 
costs. Such an investigation would require access to potentially sensitive financial 
information.
3. Consideration o f failure modes other than fatigue w ill require the development o f several 
RISCREL-type programs to carry out structural reliability analysis based on different failure 
functions, modelling each required failure process. The possibility o f allowing other damage 
mechanisms to be considered is discussed below in Section 8.3.4. In the short term.
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heuristics would be required to deal with damage mechanisms for which suitable models that 
can be integrated into FORM or SORM reliability analysis do not yet exist.
4. The RISC System would require a decision module to select the appropriate reliability 
analysis knowledge sources for each component. This system could act as a decision-aid tool 
for engineers which would incorporate the many analysis programs used by engineers 
together with the associated knowledge to be able to make use o f these programs effectively. 
It would act as an intelligent information retrieval system, that is, as a repository for 
undocumented data, techniques and procedures.
5. Reliability measures for a structure may be combined to obtain immediate information on 
the criticality of the component to the structure. Systems reliability methods, such as the 
branch-and-bound and P-unzipping methods outlined in Chapter 3, should be considered for 
incorporation into the RISC System. Alternatively, systems reliability software packages 
such as RASOS may be combined with the RISC System (Gierlinski et al, 1993).
8.3.2 Scheduling Algorithms
The scheduling procedure is based on simple brute force searches through a scheduling tree
representing a single structure. This may be extended in many ways.
1. It may not be useful to carry out an exhaustive generation of schedules based on all 
conceivable searching algorithms. The reason is that the schedules are based on the cost 
evaluation result for each inspection task. Yet, the cost of inspection is o f course affected 
by the number and types of inspection tasks carried out in any one year, so the schedule itself 
affects the costs assigned. As was noted in Chapter 6, the failure cost has a huge impact on 
the schedule, thus for each node, the failure costs must at some point be determined with an 
accuracy that is currently not routinely established. Thus any perceived improvement in the 
quality of the schedule may not justify the extra work involved and may even give erroneous 
results. At the moment this is very much a grey area. An investigation should be carried out 
to find out how sensitive the total cost of overall schedule is to aspects such as the number 
of neighbouring joints included in one weather window, the use of many different inspection 
techniques in over one weather window, and so on. As before, this requires access to 
potentially sensitive information. In the meantime, systematic searches are effective tools 
to produce alternative usable and rational schedules.
2. Case-based reasoning is one artificial intelligence technique which has not been implemented 
for the RISC System, but which has been suggested for scheduling applications (Miyashita, 
1995). If a proposed schedule is considered successful by the user, then an interactive and
Chapter 8 301
inductive procedure may be used to obtain from the user some indication of how and why 
it is considered to be a “good” schedule. The information obtained can be used to update 
heuristics defining a “good” schedule or to make searches more efficient. Additionally, 
stored schedules may be used as initial schedules, rather than the cost optimal schedules from 
an initial interpretation of the cost evaluation output, to be modified according to other 
requirements or to take the reliability and cost evaluation data into account.
3. Offshore operators are often concerned with planning the maintenance across a field o f oil 
platforms. The scheduling algorithms may be extended to considered many constraints 
across scheduling trees for several structures. This may involve setting up a new search tree 
for the field made up o f scheduling trees for each structure and a new root node representing 
overall resource constraints for the operator organisation. The concern here is that, as this 
new tree would be very much larger, systematic simple searching techniques may no longer 
be sufficient as there may be a combinatorial explosion in the number of alternatives to 
search through. More complex constraint satisfaction algorithms would be required.
4. The current system follows a prescribed procedure. Any exceptions have to be identified as 
such and then must be treated separately. The use o f the blackboard concept would allow  
the use of cooperating knowledge sources to carry out the most suitable analysis for each 
component and to reason using many criteria at different points o f the decision-making 
process.
5. Data fusion combined with pattern matching could be used to reason about joints that are in 
some way similar but seem to be behaving differently within the structure, or to reduce the 
amount o f individual analyses to be carried out. Comparing the service history of a joint 
with new analysis results for similar joints helps decide whether to inspect or not. The 
service history and latest analysis results combined with further information on the geometry 
of the joint and compared with other similar inspection decisions may help to select an 
inspection technique. Latest inspection results for the rest o f the structure and past 
information on the joint, with information on the geometry of the joint will help decide what 
detailed analysis, if any, is required for the joint and will aid decision-making on any repair 
or future IRM action. Finally, learning from past cases o f joints from other structures which 
have failed to try to identify factors indicating failure would cut down on detailed analysis 
and provide a greater understanding of causes o f failure for the future (Stone et al, 1989).
8.3.3 An Integrated Monitoring, Inspection and Planning System
The RISC methodology is based on analysis which requires accurate models of inspection and
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loading. The loading information is more often assumed data used at the design stage. As already 
discussed, the inspection results are highly affected by the conditions under which the inspection 
is carried out. The AIRES concept may provide a way of ensuring consistent and accurate 
interpretation of inspection data. Additionally, offshore structures are subject to many different 
forms of damage mechanisms not just fatigue.
1. One improvement would be to have the most up-to-date environmental loading information 
to carry out the analysis with real data as opposed to design and simulated data. On-line 
monitoring is an obvious solution to collect data on sea-states, wave-heights, induced strains, 
levels o f cathodic protection and crack sizes. This huge volume of data collected will need 
to be analysed, screened and interpreted into a form suitable for reliability analysis. Using 
on-line monitoring was first proposed as part of an intelligent stmctural integrity assessment 
system which is a natural extension of the RISC concept (Dharmavasan et al, 1988b).
2. The requirement to have consistent inspection results input to the reliability analysis leads 
to the idea o f incorporating an AIRES-type system which carries out automatic and 
consistent interpretation o f inspection data. To achieve this, the system would need to 
include require automatic image reconstruction from data from several NDT techniques, such 
as ACFM and close visual inspection, together with expert interpretation, to make 
unequivocal decisions.
3. Damage mechanisms may be categorised as either those leading to continual deterioration, 
such as crack growth due to fatigue, or wal 1-thickness corrosion, or those producing sudden 
damage, such as collisions, blow-outs, impact, punch-through, or even fracture due to 
extreme loads. Analytical and numerical models exist or are in development which can 
predict the deterioration o f a component due to most damage mechanisms in offshore 
structures. Systems reliability techniques can be used to model the effect o f the loss of 
component on the reliability o f the stmcture. The RISC System could be extended to include 
several damage mechanisms.
4. Another area of great research interest is that of using neural networks for both interpreting 
data from sensors particularly for subsea applications, and for storing sensor data for 
stereotypical defect cases. As the base sensor data cases would require high amounts of 
memory and rapid methods of retrieval, the use o f novel methods o f storage, such as 
holographic techniques, would need to be investigated (Tao et al, 1995).
5. Any future work in the use o f neural networks for ACFM data interpretation will consider 
different ways o f providing intermediate results and a more formal basis for data fusion with 
other sensor results. Intelligent and early use o f data fusion may enhance significantly the
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total capabilities o f an inspection system by combining intermediate results from different 
sensors, knowledge about the inspection techniques and the component being inspected. 
Concentrating on the blackboard system approach with multi-level data fusion, may lead to 
sophisticated and intelligent automatic inspection systems.
These extensions would go towards creating an integrated system for the complete life-cycle o f an 
offshore stmcture. It will aid design that takes into account reliability and maintenance issues over 
the life o f the stmcture, by allowing extensive comparison with other stmctures. Once the stmcture 
is in operation, it will allow monitored data on the state o f the stmcture to be compared to design 
data and the results to be fed directly into the maintenance planning and scheduling.
83.4 Other Applications
The RISC methodology may be applied to any stmcture made up o f many similar components 
subject to fatigue failures. In the case o f extensions to RISC proposed above, which allow several 
models for varying damage mechanisms and different components, there are few restrictions on the 
type o f stmcture.
The AIRES concept is applicable to industries ranging from aero-engine/aerospace to nuclear, 
chemical processing and the offshore industry. Wherever inspection is an important aspect o f the 
maintenance procedure, but the inspection data is difficult to interpret in a consistent and accurate 
way, then an automated inspection interpretation system is required.
Several stmctures have been suggested for the application o f RISC and AIRES, such as air-frames 
and steel bridges. The following are o f particular interest to the author:
1. Another type of offshore stmcture which suffers from fatigue is the jack-up platform. Jack- 
up rigs were intended for exploration drilling only, but they are often used during the 
production phase. This leads to operational problems, in particular the new requirement to 
carry out inspections in situ. As these stmctures are subjected to the dynamic loading, they 
are affected by fatigue cracks. Other failure modes, however, such as blowout and collisions, 
but primarily punchthrough, are o f greater importance, thus several failure mode analysis 
modules are required for jack-ups.
2. Pipelines are another example o f aging stmctures which require periodic inspections to 
assure their integrity. Some work to develop assessment packages for pipelines has already 
been carried out by other researchers, such as Barbian et al (1992), based on in-line 
inspections using pigs. Failure modes for pipelines which have been investigated include 
spanning of the pipeline over areas where the seabed is not flat, leading to bending and.
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ultimately, buckling; metal loss due to corrosion; and fatigue cracks growing due to cyclic 
loading from pressure changes (Gresnigt & Van Foeken. 1990; Gresnigt et al, 1994). These 
analytical and inspection tools may be incorporated in a RISC-like system to provide IRM 
schedules.
3. Several other researchers, such as Kobbacy (1992) and Efstathiou (1996), have worked 
towards applying KBS for maintenance and scheduling o f production and manufacturing 
system s. There are many examples o f structures in manufacturing which require general 
scheduling of operations and o f maintenance actions. Intelligent systems would enable 
improved and more effective mnning o f the systems. The essential features o f such systems 
for manufacturing are that they should allow objective reliability analysis, pattern 
recognition and model selection as in the RISC/AIRES combined system.
8 .4  F in a l  R e m a r k s
The work described in this thesis represents a rational approach to solving a real-world decision 
problem using artificial intelligence techniques with traditional engineering analytical methods. 
The aim was to integrate the rigorous and objective measures o f reliability with practical 
requirements and subjective criteria for inspection planning for fixed offshore platforms. The main 
achievements were in
• the establishment o f a rational methodology based on reliability based fatigue fracture 
mechanics analysis for fixed offshore stmctures
• the specification of a computer architecture which integrates the analysis programs with the 
information on a stmcture and knowledge about scheduling requirements
• the detailed design of computer data stmctures and interfaces for the storage o f the data and 
information required for planning and scheduling o f IRM actions
• the development o f a scheduling algorithm based on simple bmte force searching procedures 
and extended to include heuristics providing the value o f the schedules and dealing with 
multiple constraints
• the overall specification and design of the knowledge sources and concepts for an automatic 
inspection system making use o f an electromagnetic sensor
This work goes towards providing a general procedure for planning and scheduling maintenance 
o f complex stmctures and systems.
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